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In the last part of Ethics Spinoza introduces the doctrine of the intellectual love of God, 
along with the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the doctrine of intuitive 
knowledge. According to the doctrine of the intellectual love of God, God loves himself 
with an infinite intellectual love. This doctrine has raised one of the most discussed 
puzzles in Spinoza scholarship: How can God have intellectual love if, as Spinoza says, 
God is Nature itself?  
  After examining existing approaches to the puzzle and revealing their failures, I 
will propose an alternative approach to the puzzle. I will compare Spinoza’s 
philosophy with Neo-Confucian (especially Wan Yang-Ming’s) philosophy and argue 
that we can develop a new approach to the puzzle by appealing to the comparison. I 
will argue that Spinoza’s three doctrines stress three distinct aspects of the same 
thought which form an organic unity: (i) the metaphysical aspect, which is concerned 
with the eternity of the mind, (ii) the epistemological aspect, which is concerned with 
intuitive knowledge and (iii) the ethical aspect, which is concerned with the 
intellectual love of God. I conclude that the intellectual love of God can 
be properly understood from different perspectives. From God’s perspective it is 
understood as the creative power of God. From an individual’s perspective it is 
understood as the essence of this very individual. Moreover, once we combine these 
two perspectives we can reach what I consider to be the correct interpretation of 
Spinoza’s view: Given that intuitive knowledge and action are one and the same the 
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intellectual love of God should be comprehended not only as man’s final fulfillment 
of freedom through intuitive knowledge, but also as man’s self-cultivation in 
practice. I maintain that a free man who the intellectual love of God leads us to 
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In this Chapter, I will provide an overview of this PhD thesis. In Section 1.1, I introduce 
a puzzle concerning Spinoza’s doctrine of the intellectual love of God and explain why 
we should be concerned with it. In Section 1.2, I examine the main existing approaches 
to the puzzle and reveal their failures. I propose an alternative approach to the puzzle 
through a comparative study of Spinoza and Neo-Confucianism. In Section 1.3, I 
investigate the relationship between Spinoza and traditional Chinese thought, and 
explore the relevant literature. In Section 1.4, I focus on the relationship between 
Spinoza and Wang Yang-ming (王阳明1 , 1472-15292 ) in particular, and reveal that 
many important concepts and thoughts that they each hold have parallels in the other’s 
thought. This parallelism supports a fresh way of thinking about the puzzle, and helps 
us to finally resolve it. In Section 1.5, I introduce the structure of this thesis, and the 
relationships between the chapters. 
                                                             
1 Upon formally introducing important concepts, historical figures, and books in Chinese philosophy, 
their corresponding Simplified Chinese characters will be introduced, so as to help the reader who has 
knowledge of Chinese to understand them quickly. Except for specific demonstration, all the 
translations of these concepts, historical figures, and books follow from Chan (1963) --- A Source Book 
in Chinese Philosophy. 
 
2 The ancient Chinese dynasties, historical figures, and important historical events will be dated for 




1.1 A Puzzle 
In the last part of his magnum opus, Ethics, Spinoza made the following statement in 
E5p20 Scholium3: 
 
I have completed all that concerns this present life… it is now time to pass on to 
those matters that concern the duration of the mind without respect to the body. 
(Spinoza, 2002, p. 373)4 
 
Spinoza then introduced his last three doctrines one by one from E5p21 in the rest of 
his Ethics: (i) The eternity of the mind. He held that ‘[t]he human mind cannot be 
absolutely destroyed along with the body, but something of it remains, which is eternal’ 
in E5p23 (p. 374); (ii) Intuitive knowledge as the third kind of knowledge, where ‘the 
highest virtue of the mind…is to understand things by this third kind of knowledge’ in 
E5p25 Proof (p. 375); (iii) The intellectual love of God (Amor Dei Intellectualis, 
henceforth, the Amor5). He tells us that ‘God loves himself with an infinite intellectual 
                                                             
3 Here E refers to the book of Ethics, 5 refers to Chapter 5, p20 refers to the 20st proposition, and 
Scholium refers to its scholium. Similarly, there are also some other direct references, such as Proof, 
Corollary, Lemma, Definition, Axiom, Appendix, Preface, and so on. This reference rule will be 
followed throughout this thesis. 
 
4 Here the reference is Spinoza’s Complete Works (Spinoza, 2002), translated by Samuel Shirley and 
edited by Michael L. Morgan. In order to be concise, only the page will be referenced when Spinoza’s 
words are cited hereafter. Unless another reference is given, the whole thesis will follow this pattern of 
reference. 
 
5 Maxwell (1990) introduced this abbreviation. In order to be concise, I will follow it in this thesis. 
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love’ in E5p35 (p. 378). 
  However, the last three doctrines seem to contradict the basic thoughts of Spinoza’s 
philosophy. The doctrine of the eternity of the mind seems to conflict with Spinoza’s 
theory of isomorphism. According to his theory of isomorphism between the mind and 
the body, it seems impossible to discuss any problem concerning the mind without 
respect to the body. Moreover, it is prima facie puzzling to see that Spinoza, as a 
rationalist, puts intuitive knowledge in a privileged position in his epistemology. 
Furthermore, how can God have intellectual love if, as Spinoza says, God is Nature 
itself? It is clear that Spinoza’s thoughts in his last three doctrines are very puzzling.  
  As a result, how exactly the last three doctrines are to be understood has become one 
of the most hotly debated issues among Spinoza scholars. Broad (1930) claims that 
these three doctrines are ‘not consistent with the rest’ of Spinoza’s philosophy (Broad, 
1930, p. 16). Bennett, who has studied Spinoza for more than 25 years, asserts directly 
that ‘after three centuries of failure to profit from it, the time has come to admit that 
this part of the Ethics has nothing to teach us and is pretty certainly worthless’ (Bennett, 
1984, p. 372). By contrast, Pollock claims that the last three doctrines are consistent 
with Spinoza’s basic metaphysical framework (Pollock, 1880, pp. 279-8). Hampshire 
(1951) also argues that the last three doctrines are coherent with Spinoza’s whole 
philosophy. Yovel (1990) asserts that without the last three doctrines, and in particular 
without the third kind of knowledge, Spinoza ‘would be as lame throughout as Plato 
would be without the Ideas’ (Yovel, 1990, pp. 158-9).  
  Even if I cannot agree with the above opinions of Broad (1930) and Bennett (1984), 
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their critique highlights the complexity and significant value of the puzzle in the study 
of Spinoza. There are multiple reasons that explain why this puzzle is provocative. First 
of all, the aforementioned contradiction between the last three doctrines and the rest of 
Spinoza’s philosophy seems obvious. However, it is hard to swallow the opinion that 
part of the conclusion is incoherent with the rest of a great work in the history of 
philosophy, such as the Ethics. Secondly, as the above quotation shows, I believe that 
Spinoza was aware of the impact of the last three doctrines, so it seems unreasonable 
to assert that they “pretty certainly” disaccord with the rest of his philosophy. Last but 
not least, the last doctrine, the Amor, is ignored within the current research of the three 
doctrines.  
  To say that the Amor is ignored is also to say that the ethical aspect of the last three 
doctrines is ignored in the current study of Spinoza. This ignorance is not merely 
occasional. According to the orthodox interpretation of Spinoza in our contemporary 
circle of philosophy, the principal controversy seems always to be his identification of 
God with Nature. Then, the second controversy seems to focus on his understanding of 
freedom: his commitment to determinism and his endeavor to nevertheless defend the 
freedom of mankind. The third controversy seems to refer to his epistemology: as one 
of the main rationalists, his proposal of the third kind of knowledge, intuitive 
knowledge, above the second kind, reason, has raised concerns. For these, Spinoza has 
been labeled a unique ontological master, an advocate of psychotherapy, an 
epistemological mystic, and, of course, one of the main rationalists, alongside Descartes 
and Leibniz.  
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  As such, it seems that not only has the Amor been ignored, but also his whole ethical 
theory has been forgotten. Curley (1973a) observes this basic fact and he claims that 
when ethical theory is discussed in our era, the relevant books or papers seem always 
to refer ‘to Mill or Kant, to Plato or Aristotle, to Hobbes or Butler, to Hume or St. 
Thomas, but not to Spinoza’ (Curley, 1973a, p. 354). It is fairly common to find his 
geometrical method, his metaphysics, his epistemology, his psychology, and his 
political philosophy, but not his ethical philosophy, occupying the main space of the 
monographs, collected papers and general books about Spinoza. As an endeavor to 
correct the above imbalance, my thesis will focus on Spinoza’s last doctrine, the Amor.  
  I am not alone on this point, and a few philosophers have challenged the tradition 
above. Roth claims that Spinoza ‘is primarily a moralist’ (Roth, 1929, p. 43). Broad 
argues that Spinoza’s ‘ultimate and explicit aim’ is ethical (Broad, 1930, p. 15). Curley 
believes that we will achieve much if we ‘take a fresh look at’ his ethical theory (Curley, 
1973a, p. 354). Garrett concludes that ‘Spinoza’s ethical theory has greater resources, 
and is of greater plausibility and philosophical interest, than is sometimes supposed’ 
(Garrett, 1990, p. 237). I agree with these opinions. Moreover, I believe that the title of 
Spinoza’s main work, Ethics, itself implies this point. Furthermore, when Spinoza’s last 
three doctrines in the Ethics are taken seriously, it seems to me that there is no reason 
not to agree with the above opinions, and it will be revealed in this thesis that Spinoza’s 
last doctrine, and its ethical focus, should be placed at the core of his whole philosophy.  
  To summarize, in the last part of the Ethics Spinoza introduces the doctrine of the 
Amor, along with the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the doctrine of intuitive 
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knowledge. These three doctrines are very puzzling, and have raised one of the most 
discussed puzzles in Spinoza scholarship. Relatively speaking, the doctrine of the 
Amor has been ignored among Spinoza scholars. Even worse than this, Spinoza’s 
whole ethical theory has been almost forgotten. I think that Spinoza’s last three 
doctrines should be taken seriously, and that his theory of ethics provides enough 
value to warrant another investigation. My thesis will focus on the doctrine of the 




1.2 My Approach to the Puzzle 
The issue now, then, concerns how the puzzle is to be properly understood, and 
especially how the doctrine of the Amor is to be properly understood, if we cannot 
accept a hasty conclusion explicitly denying both the doctrine of the Amor and the other 
two doctrines. Several approaches have been proposed. The first approach is the so-
called ‘religious approach’. This approach stems from Spinoza’s Jewish background 
and a heavy religious element in the context of the latter part of Part 5 in the Ethics. 
Broad hints at this move, as he suggests that the final doctrines are the ‘philosophic 
expression of certain religious and mystical experiences which Spinoza and many 
others have enjoyed and which seem supremely important to those who have had them’ 
(Broad, 1930, p. 15). In short, Broad is proposing mysticism. However, it seems ironic 
to pursue mysticism in order to interpret the thought of Spinoza when he is considered 
one of the greatest rationalists. Spinoza’s use of the geometrical method seems to imply 
his denial of mysticism. Furthermore, most of us will not be satisfied with the approach 
of mysticism alone, as it cannot provide us with a detailed answer. To say something is 
mysterious is equal to saying that it cannot be explained.  
  The second approach is the so-called ‘reformulated approach’. Some scholars note 
the obvious inconsistency in the standard formula when Spinoza uses it to denote 
different kinds of love in his Ethics. They, then, propose some alternative formulae to 
replace Spinoza’s standard formula. According to this approach, the main thought in 
the Amor is considered to be consistent with the rest of the Ethics, but at the same time 
its formula needs to be adjusted. In other words, they believe that Spinoza made some 
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mistakes in the last part of the Ethics, an opinion I will oppose in this thesis. 
  The third approach is the so-called ‘epistemological approach’. There are still some 
scholars who detect the rigid connection between the doctrine of the intuitive 
knowledge and the doctrine of the Amor. They claim that the Amor will be in 
accordance with the rest of the Ethics only when the relationship between the Amor and 
the knowledge of intuition is explained in the correct way. However, they have not 
successfully integrated the doctrine of the eternity of the mind into their explanation. 
At the same time, the puzzles in both the doctrine of intuitive knowledge and the 
doctrine of the eternity of the mind were not dealt with properly. 
  To summarize, as stated in the previous section, all of these approaches have been 
refuted strongly by Bennett (1984) and other opponents in different ways. In Chapter 2, 
I will examine these approaches fully and reveal that no single approach has been 
widely accepted. After examining the existing approaches to the puzzle and revealing 
their failures, I will propose an alternative approach. This alternative approach stems 
from mainstream traditional Chinese thought: Confucianism in general and Neo-
Confucianism specifically. I will label my approach the ‘Neo-Confucian approach’ 





1.3 Spinoza and Traditional Chinese Thought 
The relationship between Spinoza and traditional Chinese thought is not a new issue. 
Here the use of the term ‘Chinese thought’ rather than ‘Chinese philosophy’ is not 
accidental. The term ‘philosophy’ itself was introduced for the first time into China 
from Japan just one century ago (Allinson, 1991, p. 24), and its embodiment of a 
particular kind of research method, and its concern for certain Western philosophical 
content, is radically different from traditional Chinese thought. Therefore, whether or 
not there is a true ‘philosophy’ in traditional China is also a debated issue. This becomes 
a difficulty when we talk about the issue of the relationship between Spinoza and 
Chinese philosophy. Let us put this issue aside for now: the philosophical character of 
Confucianism, and especially Neo-Confucianism, will be amply demonstrated to the 
reader throughout this thesis. For our current purposes, it is enough for us to say that 
the issue at hand is the relationship between Spinoza and traditional Chinese thought in 
a general sense, and also the relationship between Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-
Confucian philosophy in a specific sense6. 
  As the dispute concerning Spinoza’s radical thought arose alongside the publication 
                                                             
6 For this reason, I will use the term ‘thought’ and the term ‘philosophy’ interchangeably in the rest of 
this thesis. Their meanings should be understood according to the context in which they occur. In order 
to be concise, sometimes I will use the word ‘Spinoza’ to refer to Spinoza’s philosophy. It is 
noteworthy that the words ‘Confucianism’, ‘Neo-Confucianism’, ‘Taoism’, ‘Buddhism’, and so on, 
should be mainly understood as ‘the philosophy of Confucianism’, ‘the philosophy of Neo-
Confucianism’, ‘the philosophy of Taoism’, ‘the philosophy of Buddhism’, and so on in this thesis, 





of his writings, the issue of associating Spinoza with traditional Chinese thought 
occurred. This association is primarily due to their sharing a pantheistic character. 
While the pantheistic character seems always to be a foundational feature of traditional 
Chinese thought, the term ‘pantheism’ itself was first coined to describe Spinoza’s 
thought that ‘Nature is God’ in the seventeenth century. Leibniz, Bayle and 
Malebranche also made some similar comments7. However, the research of Lai (1985) 
and Weststeijn (2007) also reveals that these associations between Spinoza and 
traditional Chinese thought was ‘based on nothing more than a superficial knowledge 
of oriental philosophy’ in its early stage (Weststeijn, 2007, p. 539). We can consider this 
early stage, which lasted until the end of nineteen-century, as the first stage of the 
research concerning the issue of the relationship between Spinoza and traditional 
Chinese thought. In this first stage, it was only thinkers in the West making the 
association based on their limited knowledge of traditional Chinese thought: there 
seems to have been no voice associating Spinoza with traditional Chinese thought from 
the East due to historical reasons.  
  Once the term ‘philosophy’ was accepted and began to prevail in the early decades 
of the twentieth century in China, the relationship between Spinoza and traditional 
Chinese thought became the concern of some Chinese thinkers. Therefore, the 
subsequent period can be considered as the second stage of the issue’s research. In the 
second stage, there were two factors that differed from the first stage: the first one was 
that some Chinese thinkers joined the research community; the second one was that 
                                                             
7 See Lai (1985), Perkins (2004), Israel (2007), Weststeijn (2007), and Meynard (2011). 
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some basic traditional Chinese literature had been systematically translated into 
Western languages. Consequently, Western scholars could also research traditional 
Chinese thought based on the original texts rather than superficial comments. Based on 
these two factors, research of the issue could now be carried out in detail. 
  It is noteworthy that, when the issue of associating Spinoza with traditional Chinese 
thought occurred, the problem of whether or not traditional Chinese thought had any 
direct influence on the development of Spinoza’s thought also arose. In other words, 
the question is whether or not Spinoza’s philosophy has any direct sources in traditional 
Chinese thought. There are up until now two papers discussing this possibility. 
Maverick (1939)8 claims a possible Chinese source of Spinoza’s thought9. However, 
Lai (1985) refutes the possibility. Contrary to Jewish, Christian and Cartesian 
philosophy, which directly influenced the development of Spinoza’s thought, there are 
no contextual clues referring to traditional Chinese thought among Spinoza’s writings 
                                                             
8 It is not an English piece, and Yuen-Ting Lai (1985) interprets its argument as follows:  
 
Father Nicholas Trigault’s account of China in his De Christiana Expeditione apud Sinas 
(Augsburg, 1615) was reproduced in a book by a fellow resident of Amsterdam, Bernard Varen or 
Varenius (b.1615) in a crucial year when Spinoza first contemplated leaving the Synagogue, in 
1649, and that this could have been a source of Spinoza’s religious thought. The book in question 
is Descriptio Regni Iapoiniae cum quibusdam affinis materiae, ex variis auctoribus collecta, et in 
ordinem redacta (Amsterdam, 1649). See Maverick 1939, 419, Maverick’s argument is weak. 
Apart from the lack of evidence that Spinoza had ever read Varen’s book, his excommunication 
occurred seven years later (1656). (Lai, 1985, p. 152 in Note 6) 
 
9 Due to the language limit, the literature referred to in this thesis is limited to English texts (or texts 
that have been translated into English) except for a small number of supplemental Chinese texts. Most 
of the Chinese texts that are referred to here will use these versions that have been translated into 




and letters. Even if the possibility exists, it remains extremely remote absent the 
unearthing of some significant new facts. Therefore, for our current purposes, I will 
maintain a neutral opinion on the possibility since this problem does not affect my 
overall argument10. I will not discuss this problem further in this thesis.  
  At the same time, due to historical reasons, it makes no sense to ask the opposite 
question of whether Spinoza’s philosophy carried any direct influence on the 
development of traditional Chinese thought. Our main concern regarding the 
relationship between Spinoza and traditional Chinese thought, then, will not be their 
direct affecting of each other, but rather a comparative study concerning their 
similarities and differences. Further, given that my thesis focuses on a puzzle on the 
Spinoza side, and will propose a Neo-Confucian approach to solve this puzzle, my 
comparative study will emphasise their similarities, and their differences will be briefly 
touched upon only if necessary. 
  However, even if we restrict our focus to the similarities of content, the situation is 
still not ideal due to the fact that the literature concerning this kind of research has until 
now been lacking, at least in the English-speaking world. Briefly speaking, there are 
three approaches to the relationship within the literature. The first approach observes 
the similarity between Spinoza’s philosophy and Taoism in traditional Chinese thought 
due to the aforementioned pantheistic character. It is obvious that Nature has been 
explicitly considered as the Ultimate Reality since 500 B.C. in Chinese Taoism, and 
this is, of course, a kind of pantheism. Hu, a representative of modern Chinese scholars, 
                                                             




presented a paper to emphasise the similarity between Spinoza and Taoism in a seminar 
in Beijing in 1915 (Hu, 1978). The core content in Hu’s paper is introductive and 
focuses on their pantheistic character. Unfortunately, the paper is very short, at only 
three pages. Levine (2002) systemically investigates the pantheistic character of 
Spinozism as well as Taoism, but his topic is the pantheism itself rather than the 
relationship between Spinozism and Taoism. Further literature is lacking. 
  The second approach is to consider Spinoza from the perspective of Buddhism. 
Melamed argues that Spinoza is a Buddhist (Melamed, 1933). Wienpahl (1971) wrote 
a paper entitled ‘Chán Buddhism, western thought, and the concept of substance’. 
Following this, Wetlesen (1978a) published a paper entitled ‘Body awareness as a 
gateway to eternity: a note on the mysticism of Spinoza and its affinity to Buddhist 
meditation’. Naess (1978) also published the paper ‘Through Spinoza to Mahāyāna 
Buddhism or Through Mahāyāna Buddhism to Spinoza?’. Hartshorne agrees with this 
approach and claims further that the Hua-yen school (华严宗) of Mahāyāna Buddhism 
is apparently similar to Spinoza’s pantheism in the sense that they both propose that 
everything is One (Hartshorne, 1978, p. 404). However, Liu criticizes this opinion, and 
queries the issue as follows:  
 
Would Hua-yen ever start with a definition of “Substance” and use a deductive 
method to develop a whole metaphysical system? On what ground can Hartshorne 
attribute eternalism to Hua-yen, a Buddhist school which took dependent 
origination and Śūnyatā seriously?... Can Spinoza ever say that Substance is also 
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nonbeing? (Liu, 1978, p. 415).  
 
Unfortunately, Hartshorne (1978) and Liu (1978) offer a general discussion about the 
relationship between Eastern philosophy and Western Philosophy, and Spinoza is not 
their core topic. Wienpahl (1979) emphasizes the similar notion of Egolessness between 
Spinoza and Buddhism. However, it is clear that Liu’s criticism can also apply to this 
view. The fundamental opposition in their ontologies prevents further development of 
this approach. 
  The third approach focuses on the relationship between Spinoza and Confucianism. 
Bruce (1923), in his PhD paper ‘Chu Hsi [朱熹, 1130-1200] and His Masters: An 
Introduction to Chu Hsi and the Sung School of Chinese Philosophy’, argues that ‘the 
Great Ultimate [太极] in Chu Hsi’s philosophy, with the two material forces of Yin [阴] 
and Yang [阳], is similar to God, being both Natura naturans and Natura naturata, in 
Spinoza’s philosophy’ (Chan, 1976, p. 570). Graf (1949), in his paper ‘Chu Hsi and 
Spinoza’, argues that Chu Hsi’s Heaven (Tian, 天) could be identical with Spinoza’s 
God and that Jen (仁) in Chu Hsi’s philosophy is also identical with Spinoza’s doctrine 
of the Amor (ibid.)11. This is the first contextual clue in the literature, in which Spinoza’s 
doctrine of the Amor is considered to be identical with the concept of Jen in 
Confucianism. Liu also confirms that ‘there is some justification to compare Neo-
                                                             
11 As Bruce (1923) is not accessible now and Graf (1949) is not available in either an English or 




Confucian philosophy with panentheism12’ (Liu, 1978, p. 416). 
  To summarize, research into the relationship between Spinoza and traditional 
Chinese thought in the last one hundred years has referred to three core parts of 
traditional Chinese thought: Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism. However, what has 
been said shows that the research up until now has been introductive and superficial, 
and further research is needed. Moreover, comparatively speaking, the relationship 
between Spinoza and Neo-Confucianism has not been paid enough attention, given that 
Neo-Confucianism has been at the center of mainstream traditional Chinese thought 
since the Song Dynasty (960 - 1279). Therefore, this thesis is intended to study the 
relationship between Spinoza and Neo-Confucianism in detail.   
                                                             
12 For my purposes, I will not make a distinction between pantheism and panentheism in this thesis.  
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1.4 Spinoza and Neo-Confucianism 
There are two main representatives of Neo-Confucianism. The first main representative 
is Chu Hsi (Chu, hereafter). To investigate the relationship between Spinoza and Neo-
Confucianism, we must first investigate the relationship between Spinoza and Chu. Chu 
is commonly recognized as the third greatest Confucian following Confucius (孔子, 
551 - 479 B.C.) and Mencius (孟子, 372 - 289 B.C.), and his philosophy has since the 
thirteenth century dominated the intellectual life not only of China but also of Southeast 
Asia, Korea, and Japan13. Chu achieved multiple successes. Firstly, he was the great 
synthesiser of the Neo-Confucian movement. There are five important figures who 
pushed the Neo-Confucian movement in the Northern Song Dynasty (960 – 1126), and 
were honored as the Five Masters of the Northern Song Dynasty (Chan, 1963, p. 518). 
These were Shao Yung (邵雍, 1011 - 1077), Chou Tun-I (周敦颐, 1017 - 1073), Chang 
Tsai (张载, 1020 – 1077), Ch’eng Hao (程灏, 1032 - 1085), and Ch’eng I (程颐, 1033 
- 1107)14 . Chu systematically edited the literature of the Five Masters. It is quite 
possible that we would not know the thoughts of the Five Masters today if Chu’s editing 
works had not been carried out. Moreover, he established the orthodox line of 
transmission of Confucianism from Confucius through Mencius, Chou Tun-I, Chang 
Tsai and Ch’eng Hao and Ch’eng I (Chan, 1963, p. 589; Yao, 2000, p. 105). The 
                                                             
13 Except the philosophy of Wang Yang-ming overtook it for around 150 years during the late stage of 
the Ming Dynasty (1368 – 1644), and I will touch upon this point in due course. 
 
14 Ch’eng Hao is the brother of Ch’eng I, and the two Ch’eng brothers are the nephews of Chang Tsai, 




thoughts of Mencius, Chou Tun-I, Chang Tsai and Ch’eng Hao and Ch’eng I were 
emphasized through this line, but it has been criticized by modern scholars such as Fung 
(1953), Chan (1963), and Yao (2000), for ignoring Hsun Tzu (荀子, 298-238 B.C.) in 
the classical era and Shao Yung in the Neo-Confucian era. However, the main figures 
in the line are recognized universally in scholars’ circles. Confucianism as a continuing, 
complete system of civilization was set up through the orthodox line of transmission. 
Secondly, Chu edited and commented upon the Four Books: the Analects (论语), the 
Book of Mencius (孟子), the Great Learning (大学), and the Doctrine of the Mean (中
庸 ), thus identifying them as the core scriptures of Neo-Confucianism. Chu’s 
commentaries upon the Four Books became the orthodox answers in the civil service 
examinations, through which the officials of every dynasty thereafter were chosen. The 
entire intellectual class in every dynasty thereafter had to learn, and even fluently recite, 
Chu’s commentaries upon the Four Books15. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the 
concept of Li (理) became mature in Chu’s hands, and was raised up as the core concept 
of Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism as rationalism was finally established. 
  Among the third approach in Section 1.3, we observed that the relationship between 
Spinoza’s philosophy and Chu’s thoughts had been touched upon in the literature, and 
some important conclusions had been outlined, such as that the Great Ultimate is 
similar to God, Tian is identical with God, and Jen is identical with the Amor (Bruce, 
1923; Graf, 1949). These conclusions are very helpful for us when investigating the 
                                                             
15 This seems to be similar to the way in which every Christian philosophy in the Middle Ages had to 




relationship between Spinoza and Neo-Confucianism. However, we also observed that 
an examination of the relationship between Chu’s most important concept, Li, and 
Spinoza’s relevant thought does not unfold in their research. I will explore this point 
further through a comparison of the metaphysical frameworks of Spinoza and Neo-
Confucianism in Chapter 3. 
  The second main representative of Neo-Confucianism is Wang Yang-ming (Wang, 
hereafter). Wang had the given name Shou-Jen (literally meaning ‘to remain Jen’). He 
is considered the last peak of Confucianism in Chinese history. It seems to be generally 
agreed that he was the last sage in Chinese history because, even setting his academic 
achievements aside, he was both a successful military general and an outstanding 
statesman. Wang’s importance in the development of Confucianism is perhaps 
surpassed only by Confucius, Mencius, and Chu (Kim, 1996, p. 189; Van Norden, 2014). 
Wang’s tablet was placed in the Confucian Temple in 1584, and this is the highest honor 
an intellect can receive in Chinese history since Confucius. Contrastingly, whereas 
Spinoza wrote his masterpiece Ethics himself, Wang’s masterpiece, Ch’uan-hsi Lu (传
习录，Instructions for Practical Living)16, was collected and compiled by his disciples. 
                                                             
16 When Wang’s thought is explored, the main resource is his Instructions for Practical Living 
(Ch’uan-hsi Lu). We currently have two English translation versions of Ch’uan-hsi Lu. The first one 
was by Frederick Goodrich Henke in 1916, and he named his translation The Philosophy of Wang 
Yang-ming. Henke was an American missionary, and was teaching at the University of Nanking in 
China in the 1910s. The second one was by Wing-tsit Chan (Chan, 1963; Wang, 1963). Chan (1963) 
(also Wang, 1963) corrects some errors in Wang (1916) and absorbs some new research results. I will 
mainly use Chan’s translation in the main body, and support Henke’s translation as a comparative 
version in the footnotes if necessary, except in several cases in which I believe that Henke’s translation 




On this point it is similar to Confucius’ Analects. Therefore, it seems more reasonable 
to call Wang, like Confucius, a teacher rather than a philosopher17. 
  In the history of Confucianism, Wang is chiefly a radical reformer. In contrast to 
Chu’s School of Li, in which Li is considered to be a chief ontological substance 
prevalent throughout the universe (its slogan is that ‘Tian is Li’), the School of the Mind 
(mind-and-heart18, 心) developed this core notion further, reaching its mature stage 
through Wang’s proposals19, and claimed that there is nothing under Tian external to 
the mind, (its corresponding slogan is that ‘The Mind is Li’). The external, objective Li 
is changed into the immanent subjective mind, and then the objectivity and the 
subjectivity of Li are united seamlessly in the hands of Wang. 
  In Wang’s philosophy, there are two main doctrines. The first one is the doctrine of 
Liang-chih (良知), in its literal meaning this is ‘intuitive knowledge’ but in different 
contexts the term can be translated into three different meanings: innate knowledge, 
intuitive knowledge, and intuitive knowledge of good (Wang, 1916; Cady, 1928). All 
three of these meanings are united in the doctrine of Liang-chih. According to Wang’s 
                                                             
17 However, it should be noted that Wang wrote his paper ‘Inquiry on the Great Learning’ by himself, 
and the paper ‘embodies his basic teachings and represents his final conclusions’ (Wang, 1963, p. 271, 
cited in Wienpahl, 1974, p. 200). 
 
18 When we use the term ‘the mind’ in Chinese ancient thought we are in fact always referring to the 
conception of the mind-and-heart, which is relevant to not only the mind but also the heart. This is 
different to the Cartesian conception of the mind in Western thought. Literature further pursuing this 
point includes as De Bary (1986). 
 




doctrine of Liang-chih, man’s mind is the key to the whole world20, and ‘it is the abyss’, 
in which Liang-chih as ‘[the] original substance of the mind contains everything’ (Chan, 
1963, p. 199)21. To say that The Mind is Li is in fact to say that Liang-chih is Li, and as 
such Wang’s Liang-chih has its meaning of metaphysical aspect. For Wang, Liang-chih 
is to know ‘without any cogitation’ (Cady, 1928, p. 263), and it is similar to the term 
‘intuitive knowledge’ in Spinoza’s epistemology. As such, Wang’s Liang-chih has its 
meaning of epistemological aspect as well. Wang’s doctrine of Liang-chih is a further 
development of Mencius’s doctrine of the Goodness of Human Nature, according to 
which human nature is considered as potential goodness. As such, Wang’s Liang-chih 
also has an ethical meaning. In short, the doctrine of Liang-chih is the core of Wang’s 
philosophy and it has a metaphysical aspect, an epistemological aspect, and an ethical 
aspect.  
  Wang’s second main doctrine is that of Chih-hsing Ho-I (知行合一), the unity of 
knowledge and action. Van Norden asserts that the doctrine of Chih-hsing Ho-I is 
Wang’s most distinctive and well-known doctrine (Van Norden, 2014). According to 
Wang, knowledge not put into practice is not real knowledge, and action 
                                                             
20 Given the term ‘man’ is used both in A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (Chan, 1963), and 
Spinoza’s Complete Works (Spinoza, 2002) as the same as the term ‘human being’. I will follow this 
established usage, and it has no particular gender implication in this thesis. 
 
21  Chan (1963) --- A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy--- is one of the most important source books 
for Chinese philosophy, and its status is established in the study of Chinese philosophy. In this thesis, 
all the quotations about Chinese ancient philosophers are cited from this book except when another 




unaccompanied by even the slightest bit of knowledge is blind, and as such is not 
successful action. Knowing is acting and acting is knowing: knowledge and action are 
unified. It is Wang’s conclusion that the essence of knowledge and action is the same. 
Wang’s philosophy inspires me to have a fresh look at the puzzle of the Amor. 
  Wienpahl (1969) establishes a direct link between the philosophies of Spinoza and 
Wang. Wienpahl, a professor of philosophy and, at the same time, a translator of 
Spinoza, claims that the similarity is certainly ‘striking and crucial’, and ‘the teachings 
of Wang and Spinoza are almost identical’ (Wienpahl, 1969, p. 19) 22. He argues that 
Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge and Wang’s doctrine of Chih-hsing Ho-I are 
similar. Wienpahl also compares Wang’s thought of Jen with Spinoza’s doctrine of the 
Amor in the paper’s last part (Wienpahl, 1969, p. 27). 
  Wienpahl’s insight is special in two ways. Firstly, according to my investigation of 
the English literature, Wienpahl is the first person to have established a direct link 
between the philosophies of Spinoza and Wang. Secondly, Wienpahl is the first person 
to claim that Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge is also a kind of knowledge of acting. 
Unfortunately, this paper has only nine pages and the main arguments do not unfold 
sufficiently. However, Wienpahl’s insight enhanced my interest in studying the 
relationship between the philosophies of Spinoza and Wang.   
  To summarize, I will reveal that Spinoza’s philosophy is remarkably similar to Neo-
Confucianism, and Wang’s philosophy in particular, and I will consider the similarity 
                                                             





here as a parallelism between them. The aim in this thesis is to provide a comprehensive 
comparative piece of research on Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-Confucianism, with 
particular emphasis on Wang’s philosophy. The parallelism will help us to resolve the 
puzzle in Spinoza’s last three doctrines in the Ethics, especially the puzzle of the 
doctrine of the Amor. I conclude that the Amor can be properly understood from 
different perspectives. From God’s perspective it is understood as the creative power 
of God. From an individual’s perspective it is understood as the essence of that very 
individual. Moreover, once we combine these two perspectives we can reach what I 
consider to be the correct interpretation of Spinoza’s view: given that intuitive 
knowledge and action are one and the same, the Amor should be comprehended not 
only as man’s final fulfilment of freedom through intuitive knowledge, but also as 
man’s self-cultivation in practice. I maintain that a free man, as Spinoza endeavors to 





1.5 The Structure of the Thesis 
In this thesis I focus on Spinoza’s last three doctrines in his Ethics, especially the 
doctrine of the Amor. My aim is to resolve the puzzle of the doctrine of the Amor. With 
this aim in mind, I will employ a problem-oriented structure organized in the following 
way. In Chapter 2, I will explore the puzzle and investigate existing approaches. Then, 
I will analyse the related problems from Chapter 3 to Chapter 7. Finally, I will provide 
a systematic solution for the puzzle in Chapter 8.  
  Since this is a project of comparative research, in this thesis I try to find some insights 
in Neo-Confucianism, especially in Wang’s philosophy, which help us to find a suitable 
solution to the puzzle. I observed that Wang’s doctrine of Liang-chih is impressive. As 
we saw in Section 1.4, the doctrine of Liang-chih has a metaphysical aspect, an 
epistemological aspect, and an ethical aspect. This point leads me to realize that 
Spinoza’s last three doctrines have the same character. Through the investigation in 
Chapter 2, I will reveal that it is not possible for us to resolve the puzzle if we focus on 
the doctrine of the Amor alone: the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the doctrine 
of intuitive knowledge should be taken into account in our explanation. Therefore, I 
will argue that they stress three distinct aspects of the same thought which form an 
organic unity: (i) the metaphysical aspect, which is concerned with the eternity of the 
mind, (ii) the epistemological aspect, which is concerned with intuitive knowledge and 
(iii) the ethical aspect, which is concerned with the Amor. This organic unity forces us 
to realize that the puzzle of the Amor could not be resolved if both the puzzle of the 
eternity of the mind and the puzzle of intuitive knowledge remain unresolved. This 
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organic unity also gives us hope of success in a comparative study concerning all three 
aspects (metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics). 
  Through the comparison, the parallelism between Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-
Confucianism will be revealed with all three aspects. Firstly, I will focus on the 
metaphysical aspect in Chapters 3 and 4. In Chapter 3, I will argue that the metaphysical 
frameworks and the main concepts of Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-Confucianism are 
parallel. In Chapter 4, I will explore the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of 
the mind in detail and argue that the parallelism of the metaphysical aspect is supported 
as a way of approaching this puzzle. Secondly, I will focus on the epistemological 
aspect in Chapters 5 and 6. In Chapter 5, I will argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive 
knowledge and Wang’s doctrine of Liang-chih are parallel. In Chapter 6, I will explore 
a puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge in detail and argue that the 
parallelism of the epistemological aspect is supported as a way of approaching this 
puzzle. Thirdly, I will focus on the ethical aspect in Chapters 7 and 8. In Chapter 7, I 
will argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor and the Neo-Confucian doctrine of Jen 
are parallel. In Chapter 8, I will combine all of the above thoughts, and resolve the 
puzzle of the Amor. 
  Given the nature of comparative research, I will need to discuss both Neo-
Confucianism and Spinoza’s philosophy. However, I will not give them equal weight 
in every section. My focus is on the puzzle in Spinoza’s philosophy and my 
investigation and critique are intended mainly for Spinoza scholars. This will be evident 
in Chapters 2, 4, 6 and 8. By contrast, with respect to Neo-Confucianism, I will follow 
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the orthodox conclusions of scholars of Neo-Confucianism, except for my denial of 
Wang as an idealist in Chapter 5. This will be evident in Chapters 3, 5, and 7. In other 
words, my writing will be critical with respect to Spinoza scholarship but merely 
introductory with respect to Neo-Confucianism scholarship.  
  Moreover, I assume that my readers are mainly Anglo-Americans, and therefore 
more familiar with Spinoza than with Neo-Confucianism. With respect to Spinoza, I 
will not introduce his thoughts in detail and shall only focus on the issues that I believe 
are relevant to my arguments. Contrastingly, with respect to Neo-Confucianism, I will 
need to introduce the basic concepts and main thoughts in detail. In other words, with 
respect Spinoza my discussion is specific. With respect to Neo-Confucianism, my 
discussion is systematic. 
  Several issues need to be emphasized here. Firstly, one of my main arguments is that 
Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-Confucianism are parallel. The conception of 
parallelism itself needs some further explanation. On the one hand, my claim is much 
stronger than merely that they are similar. Due to the same pantheistic framework, at 
one point or another, it is not difficult to argue that Spinoza’s philosophy is similar to 
some Chinese thoughts. But, as I claimed in Section 1.3, these opinions are superficial. 
On the other hand, I do not agree with some scholars who claim, to varying degrees, 
that they are the same as each other. These opinions are too strong. I do not think that 
there is any major concept or thought that is exactly the same in Spinoza’s philosophy 
and Neo-Confucianism, given that they were developed in two totally different 
civilizations, and that there is no evidence to show that Spinoza ever borrowed Chinese 
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ideas. My position is in the middle of these. Further, by ‘parallelism’ I do not merely 
mean that there are some similarities between them, but that their metaphysical 
frameworks considered as wholes, and their main concepts (including epistemological 
aspects and ethical aspects), are stunningly similar. 
  Secondly, I need to clarify at this beginning stage that, when I talk of parallelism, I 
am not simply borrowing thoughts from Neo-Confucianism in order to explain the 
puzzles in Spinoza’s doctrines. What I am arguing is that the parallelism between them 
helps us to find some internal resources in Spinoza’s philosophy itself, and that the 
puzzle will be resolved by properly using these internal resources. Of course, I also do 
not borrow any thoughts in Spinoza’s philosophy to resolve the possible problems in 
Neo-Confucianism. Put simply, we cannot cross the two sides of the parallelism, and 
borrow elements of a doctrine on one side to resolve problems on the other. 
  Thirdly, this is a comparative piece of research focusing on Spinoza’s philosophy 
and Neo-Confucianism in detail (and Wang’s philosophy in particular). With respect to 
Neo-Confucianism, I will focus on the philosophies of Chu and Wang. It is easy for us 
to consider Wang’s philosophy as being in opposition to Chu’s philosophy at its every 
aspect given that Wang seems to be a rival of Chu. However, this is not the case. Wang 
agrees with Chu on the metaphysical aspect of his theory23, opposes him with regard to 
the epistemological methods, and in fact inherits Chu’s views on the ethical aspect. We 
will see that Chu’s thought is at the core of the metaphysical framework of Neo-
                                                             
23 Tien also confirms that ‘Wang’s theory of the relation between Li and matter-energy [Ch’i] hold 
much in common with the metaphysics of other prominent Neo-Confucians, such as Zhu Xi [Chu Hsi]’ 
(Tien, 2010, p. 30). 
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Confucianism. In Chapters 3 and 4, I will, then, refer to Chu’s metaphysical thought 
and not touch on Wang. Wang’s perceived status as the rival of Chu is chiefly due to 
his radical epistemological thought. In Chapter 5, I will introduce their opposing 
thoughts. In Chapter 6, I will resolve a puzzle concerning Spinoza’s intuitive 
knowledge chiefly through the inspiration of Wang’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge. 
With respect to the ethical aspect, Wang develops the Confucian doctrine of Jen 
following Chu’s contribution. In Chapters 7 and 8, I will refer to the thoughts of both 
Chu and Wang. 
  Fourthly, Spinoza’s Ethics is the final criterion when assessing Spinoza’s philosophy 
as a whole, since Spinoza’s thought undergoes a process of development from an 
immature to a mature stage. The Ethics was revised in the last stage of his life and is 
his most important masterpiece. I will use Samuel Shirley’s translation of the Ethics in 
2002 (Spinoza’s Complete Works, 2002) in the main body of the text. The translation 
of the Ethics itself is also a largely disputed issue, and I will support Elwes’ translation 
of 1951 as a comparative version in the footnotes when necessary, given that Elwes’ 
translation is both classic and popular.  
  Finally, I will not argue as to whether or not Spinoza’s three doctrines are coherent 
within the whole framework of his Ethics with respect to his geometrical argument style. 
In other words, I will not consider whether or not every proposition and its relevant 
explanations, to which the last three doctrines are related, are right in the geometrical 
argument style. Rather, I will insist on their internal coherence. I have good reasons to 
support this choice. Firstly, as was previously mentioned, Spinoza himself was aware 
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of the uniqueness of his last doctrines when considered in the context of his whole 
framework. There are many contextual clues showing that the whole of the Ethics is 
organic, such as what the title of the book indicates, the third kind of knowledge 
introduced in Part two, the definition of eternality in Part one, etc. Secondly, in Section 
1.1, it was shown that many scholars agree that his last three doctrines are coherent. 
Finally, it is not necessary for us to argue over the soundness of Spinoza’s every 
argument nowadays given that Spinoza is in any case agreed to be a giant in the history 
of philosophy. It is my core task to understand Spinoza’s philosophy better through a 
comparison with Neo-Confucianism. I believe these reasons are sufficient for my 
current purpose. 
  To summarize, Chapter 1 is an introduction. Chapter 2 explores the puzzle of the 
doctrine of the Amor and investigates the existing approaches. In Chapter 3 I argue that 
Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-Confucianism are parallel in their metaphysical aspect. 
Chapter 4 explores the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind, and 
resolves this puzzle through the parallelism of the metaphysical aspect. In Chapter 5 I 
argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge and Wang’s doctrine of Liang-chih 
are parallel. Chapter 6 explores a puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge, 
and resolves this puzzle through the parallelism of the epistemological aspect. In 
Chapter 7 I argue that Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor and the Neo-Confucian doctrine 
of Jen are parallel. Chapter 8 resolves the puzzle of the Amor. Chapter 9 summarizes 





The Puzzle and its Existing Approaches 
Spinoza’s final doctrine in the Ethics, the Amor, is enigmatic and puzzling. Nadler notes 
that it is ‘disjointed, impenetrable, and frustrating’ for Spinoza scholars (Nadler, 2017, 
p. 1). Moreover, Maxwell concludes that the Amor has been almost totally neglected in 
Spinoza studies (Maxwell, 1990, p. 133). In this chapter, I will explore the puzzle 
entailed by Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor, and investigate existing approaches to the 
puzzle. In Section 2.1, I will explore the puzzle itself. In Section 2.2, I will analyze the 
main approaches proposed by Spinoza scholars and investigate their advantages and 
disadvantages. 
2.1 The Puzzle of the Doctrine of the Amor 
According to my reading of Spinoza, the puzzle of the Amor has three levels, and we 
cannot understand the Amor properly until all three levels have been sufficiently 
explored. 
2.1.1 The Problem of Cause 
The shallowest level of the puzzle concerns the obvious contradictions within Spinoza’s 
discussion of his concept of love. It is a near-unanimous conclusion among Spinoza 
scholars that Spinoza lists three kinds of love in the Ethics: passionate love, our love 
towards God and the Amor. In order to explore these contradictions, let us discuss the 
three kinds of love one by one. 
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(i) Passionate Love 
In the Ethics, Spinoza does not give a formal definition for the term until Definition 6 
in the end section of Part 3 as follows: 
 
Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. (E3 Definition 6, 
p. 312, my italics)24 
 
In this definition, the term ‘pleasure’ is placed at the core. We can find the formal 
definition of the concept of pleasure in E3 Definition 3 as follows: 
 
Pleasure is man’s transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection (E3 
Definition 3, p. 311, my italics) 
 
Since pleasure is the transition to a state of greater perfection, love is also the transition 
                                                             
24 The term is also defined in a quotational style in E3p13 Scholium as follows: 
 
Love is merely “pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause,” and hatred is merely “pain 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause.” (E3p13 Scholium, p. 286) 
 
Obviously, Spinoza’s quotation in E3p13 Scholium from E3 Definition 6 is accurate. The structure of 
Part 3 in the Ethics is unusual, and in the end of Part 3, as a separate section, Spinoza summarizes 
every kind of emotion (including the concept of emotion itself) that he has discussed in the main 
section of Part 3. This is why every kind of emotion has two sets of definitions; one in a quotational 




to a state of greater perfection. In fact, Spinoza has touched on the concept of pleasure 
in E3p11 Scholium as follows: 
 
We see then that the mind can undergo considerable changes, and can pass now to 
a state of greater perfection, now to one of less perfection, and it is these passive 
transitions [passiones] that explicate for us the emotions of Pleasure [laetitia] and 
Pain [tristitia]. So in what follows I shall understand by pleasure “the passive 
transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection” (E3p11 Scholium, pp. 284-5, 
my italics) 
 
As with the definition of the concept of love, here the definition of the concept of 
pleasure is directly quoted. It is noteworthy that, in contrast to the definition of the 
concept of love, Spinoza’s quotation in E3p11 Scholium is not accurate. The term 
‘transition’ in E3 Definition 3 is changed into the term ‘passive transition’ in E3p11 
Scholium. To comprehend the discrepancy between them we should note the qualifier, 
‘in what follows I shall understand’, in E3p11 Scholium. This qualifier implies that the 
definition of the concept of pleasure in E3p11 Scholium can only be used in a limited 
scope. Spinoza draws the terminating line of the scope in E3p58 as follows: 
 
Besides the pleasure and desire that are passive emotions, there are other emotions 





In other words, from E3p13 Scholium until E3p58, Spinoza focuses on the passive kind 
of love rather than considering all of the kinds of love. This kind of love is the so-called 
‘passionate love’ and its definition could be rephrased as follows: 
 
Passionate love is the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection, 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause. 
 
To follow E3p58, it is clear that, apart from passionate love, there is also active love 
that is the active transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection. Correspondingly, 
the formal definition of the concept of love in E3 Definition 6 could be rephrased as 
follows: 
 
Love is the transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection, accompanied by 
the idea of an external cause. 
 
This could be considered Spinoza’s standard definition of the concept of love in his 
Ethics, and it encompasses both passionate love, and active love. This definition has 
two features. Firstly, Spinoza recognizes the feature of pleasure, the transition of the 
mind from a state of lesser perfection to a state of greater perfection. Secondly, Spinoza 
emphasizes the cause, and here it is an external cause. Therefore, the formula is the 
combination of these two features. To put the formula simply, it follows the pattern of 
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‘transition + cause’. We will see that Spinoza repeatedly presents this formula in due 
course.  
In short, for Spinoza, love is considered to be a kind of pleasure. Spinoza emphasizes 
the essence of pleasure as a transition of the mind from a state of lesser perfection to a 
state of greater perfection. At the same time, Spinoza’s formula of love also requires 
that the lover has the idea of an external cause in the mind. Therefore, Spinoza’s 
standard formula of love has the pattern of ‘transition + cause’. In the Ethics, the first 
kind of love that is discussed is passionate love, which is passive. It is also possible for 
the formula to contain active love however, and I will discuss this point in the next 
section. 
(ii) Our Love towards God 
Our love towards God is an example of active love in the Ethics. Spinoza’s discussion 
of the concept of our love towards God will help us to further comprehend his theory 
of love. Spinoza introduces the concept of our love towards God as follows: 
 
He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and 
the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions (E5p15, p. 371). 
 
Here Spinoza emphasizes that, in our love towards God, the lover has a clear and 
distinct understanding of himself and his emotions or, in other words, has an adequate 
idea of our love towards God. From the epistemological perspective: once the love 
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occurs, the lover has the second kind of knowledge, i.e. reason. Therefore, it is 
legitimate to say that our love towards God is a special case of rational love. As such, 
a general and special relationship between rational love and our love towards God is 
established.  
  In Spinoza’s discussion of the concept of our love towards God, he does not define 
it again, but rather quotes the definition of love as follows: 
 
He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions feels pleasure 
(Pr. 53, III) accompanied by the idea of God (preceding Pr.). So (Def. of Emotions 
6) he loves God, and, by the same reasoning, the more so the more he understands 
himself and his emotions (5P15 Proof, p. 371, my italics). 
 
Here Spinoza is referring to the definition of the concept of love itself (E3 Definition 
6). This is the second time that Spinoza formally uses the definition of love in the 
Ethics25. Therefore, the formula of our love towards God could be rephrased simply as 
follows: 
 
Our love towards God is the active transition of the mind to a state of greater 
perfection, accompanied by the idea of God. 
 
                                                             




Here the formula still follows the pattern of ‘transition + cause’. Spinoza’s standard 
formula of the concept of love, E3 Definition 6, seems to reconcile the concept of 
passionate love with our love towards God that is a special kind of rational love. So far, 
so good. 
  However, a problem emerges under a careful reading. Notice that the term ‘the idea 
of an external cause’ in the formula of the concept of love has been replaced by the term 
‘the idea of God’ in the formula of the concept of our love towards God. Is it legitimate 
here for Spinoza to repeat the definition of love even if the formula has been changed 
slightly? Spinoza seems to imply that it is legitimate since he repeatedly refers to E3 
Definition 6. However, is the idea of God capable of being an external cause? The 
answer seems to be ‘no’, since Spinoza’s God is not a transcendent God but an 
immanent God. As an immanent God, the idea of God cannot be considered an external 
cause. Indeed, Spinoza never claims that God is an external cause in his discussion of 
our love towards God. Obviously, Spinoza’s metaphysics seems not to allow him to say 
so.  
  In short, rational love has its corresponding knowledge: reason, knowledge of the 
second kind, whereas passionate love has its corresponding knowledge: imagination, 
knowledge of the first kind. Our love towards God is an example of rational love. 
Spinoza repeats his definition of the concept of love in his discussion of the concept of 
our love towards God. Spinoza’s standard formula seems to reconcile passionate love 
and rational love (and its specific example, our love towards God). However, a problem 
seems to arise once it is observed that Spinoza’s God is not transcendent but immanent, 
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and his God cannot be considered an external cause. This problem is subtle, and it has 
not been discussed as an independent topic in the related literature until now. However, 
once the topic of the Amor is introduced, this problem will be highlighted. I will explore 
this point further in the next section. 
(iii) The Amor  
Spinoza gives an explicit definition of the concept of the Amor as soon as he engages 
the topic as follows: 
 
From the third kind of knowledge there necessarily arises the intellectual love of 
God [Amor Dei Intellectualis]. For from this kind of knowledge there arises 
(preceding Pr.) pleasure accompanied by the idea of God as cause, that is (Def. of 
the Emotions 6), the love of God not in so far as we imagine him as present (Pr.29, 
V), but in so far as we understand God to be eternal. And this is what I call the 
intellectual love of God. (E5p32 Corollary, p. 377, my italics) 
 
Here, Spinoza emphasizes the necessary connection between the Amor and intuitive 
knowledge. From an epistemological perspective: once intuitive knowledge occurs, the 
Amor arises necessarily. Again, Spinoza is referring to the definition of the concept of 
love itself (E3 Definition 6), and this is the third time that Spinoza uses the formula of 
the concept of love directly in the Ethics. The formula of the Amor could be rephrased 




The Amor is the active transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection 
accompanied by the idea of God as cause. 
 
This formula, which Spinoza gives in E5p32 Corollary, still seems to follow the pattern 
of ‘transition + cause’. However, it is worth noting that a subtle change has occurred in 
Spinoza’s explanation: the term ‘the idea of an external cause’ in the definition of the 
concept of love has been replaced by the term ‘the idea of God as cause’ in Spinoza’s 
explanation of the Amor. This subtle change reveals that Spinoza himself is conscious 
of the problem that we raised in the previous section, i.e. that his immanent God cannot 
be considered an external cause. Therefore, Spinoza changes it to ‘the idea of God as 
cause’. Now the problem is this: why does Spinoza repeat the quotation of the definition 
of love even though he is conscious of the contradiction? In order to be concise, let us 
label this the problem of cause.  
  To summarize, the formulae for the three kinds of love are as follows: 
 
I. Passionate love is the passive transition of the mind to a state of greater 
perfection, accompanied by the idea of an external cause. 
II. Our love towards God is the active transition of the mind to a state of greater 
perfection, accompanied by the idea of God. 
III. The Amor is the active transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection 




The below table will help us understand the problem of cause better: 
 
Table 1 A comparison of the formulae of Spinoza’s three kinds of love. 
 
Spinoza insists that these formulae are the same as the standard formula of the concept 
of love in E3 Emotion 6. However, when compared to Spinoza’s standard formula in 
E3 Emotion 6, we see that the second part of the pattern of ‘transition + cause’ has been 
changed in a subtle way. The reason for this is that Spinoza’s God is an immanent God, 
and as such cannot be considered an external cause. When our love towards God is 
discussed, the change seems imperceptible. However, once the Amor is discussed, the 
change is highlighted immediately. This is the problem of cause.  
2.1.2 The Problem of Transition 
The problem of cause is the shallowest level of the puzzle. Let us temporarily leave it 
and continue on to explore the next level of the puzzle. Spinoza focuses on the 
discussion of his last doctrine, the Amor, from E5p32 Corollary to E5p40 in the last 
Love Transition Cause 
Standard definition of love Transition The idea of an external cause 
Passionate love Passive transition The idea of an external cause 
Our love towards God Active transition The idea of God 
The Amor Active transition The idea of God as cause 
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part of the Ethics. However, his discussion incurs a new and bigger problem. The Amor 
is, in fact, an umbrella word. With respect to the viewpoint of God, it refers to both the 
love of God (the divine Amor, hereafter)26, and its sub-type, the love of God towards 
men (the divine Amor towards men, hereafter). With respect to the viewpoint of men, 
it refers to the mind’s intellectual love towards God (the human Amor, hereafter). We 
now need to explore these notions.  
(i) The Divine Amor 
Spinoza claims that ‘God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love’ in E5p35: this 
is Spinoza’s concept of the divine Amor (E5p35, p. 378). It is noteworthy that Spinoza 
gave us a new definition in its proof as follows: 
 
God is absolutely infinite (Def. 6, I); that is (Def. 6, II), God’s nature enjoys infinite 
perfection, accompanied (Pr. 3, II) by the idea of itself, that is (Pr.11, and Def. 1, I), 
by the idea of its own cause; and that is what, in Cor. Pr.32. V, we declared to be 
intellectual love. (E5p35 Proof, p. 378, my italics) 
 
Here the divine Amor refers to the intellectual love in E5p32 Corollary, in which the 
Amor is defined. In other words, Spinoza believes that the divine Amor is identical with 
the Amor.  
                                                             
26 Maxwell (1990) introduces a set of neat terminologies: the human Amor and the divine Amor 
(Maxwell, 1990, p. 148). 
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  However, to compare the previous pattern of 'transition + cause’ of the formula of 
the concept of love, we find that Spinoza changes the first part of the pattern of the 
formula to ‘God’s nature enjoys infinite perfection’. Therefore, the formula could be 
rephrased simply as follows: 
 
The divine Amor is God’s nature enjoying infinite perfection, accompanied by the 
idea of God as his own cause. 
 
Put simply, the formula of the divine Amor becomes the pattern of ‘perfection + cause’. 
The reason for Spinoza’s changing his formula for the divine Amor is not difficult to 
uncover. According to Spinoza, pleasure is a transforming process from lesser to greater 
perfection. However, God enjoys infinite perfection (we will explore this point in 
Section 3.1.2). In other words, God always enjoys the highest perfection rather than 
undergoing a transforming process from lesser to greater perfection. This is why 
Spinoza cannot continue to use the term ‘pleasure’ in the definition of the divine Amor. 
The problem is now as follows: why does Spinoza still insist that the divine Amor is 
identical with the Amor when he is conscious of the fact that his formula of the Amor 
cannot be reconciled with the concept of the divine Amor? In order to be concise, let us 
label this the problem of transition. 
(ii) The Human Amor 
Following his definition of the divine Amor, Spinoza immediately introduces another 
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kind of love, the human Amor, in E5p36 Proof as follows: 
 
This, the mind’s love, must be related to the active nature of the mind (Cor. Pr. 32, 
V and Pr. 3, III), and is therefore an activity whereby the mind regards itself, 
accompanied by the idea of God as cause (Pr.32, V and Cor.); this is (Cor. Pr. 25, I 
and Cor. Pr. 11, II), an activity whereby God, insofar as he can be explicated 
through the human mind, regards himself, accompanied by the idea of himself 
(E5p36 Proof, p. 378, my italics). 
 
Here we see that Spinoza still manages to follow the pattern of the standard formula. 
This is the fifth time that Spinoza refers to the definition of the concept of love in the 
Ethics. He defines the human Amor in two ways.  
  The first way in which he defines it is as an activity whereby the mind regards itself, 
accompanied by the idea of God as cause. This manner of defining it mainly refers back 
to E5p32, in which Spinoza discusses the relationship between the third kind of 
knowledge and the Amor, and E3p3, in which Spinoza believes that ‘[the] active 
states…of the mind arise only from adequate ideas’ (E3p3, p. 282). Therefore, this is 
mainly an epistemological way of defining it. In this way, a man is the lover and God 
is the beloved. God as the cause seems to be an external cause of the human Amor since 
God is the beloved in the human Amor. However, ‘the mind’ here refers to adequate 
ideas, and this is intuitive knowledge that ‘proceeds from the adequate idea of certain 
of God’s attributes to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ (E5p25 Proof, 
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p. 375). It is not the passive, inadequate, and temporary ideas, but active, adequate and 
eternal under the form of eternity. Given that the mind is under the form of eternity, 
God is not an external cause but an immanent cause. Therefore, the formula of the 
human Amor could be rephrased simply as follows: 
 
The human Amor is an activity whereby the mind regards itself, accompanied by 
the idea of God as cause. 
 
Put simply, here the formula becomes the pattern of ‘activity + cause’. This formula is 
in terms of the epistemological viewpoint of the human mind, and reveals that the 
human Amor is one part of the divine Amor.  
  The second way of defining it is as an activity whereby God explicates himself 
through the human mind. This way refers to E1p25 Corollary, in which particular things 
‘are nothing but affections of the attributes of God’, and E2p11 Corollary as follows: 
 
Hence it follows that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God; and 
therefore when we say that the human mind perceives this or that, we are saying 
nothing but … God … has this or that idea. (E2p11 Corollary, p. 250) 
 
Here Spinoza is referring to his God-Attribute-Mode metaphysics. We will explore this 
point further in Section 3.1.2. As such, the second way is mainly ontological. Since the 
mind is part of the infinite intellect of God under the form of eternity, the human Amor 
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could also be rephrased simply as follows: 
 
The human Amor is an activity whereby God, insofar as he can be explicated 
through the human mind, regards himself, accompanied by the idea of God as cause. 
 
This formula is in terms of the ontological viewpoint of God and reveals that one part 
of the divine Amor is the human Amor. This formula is structurally the same as the 
formula in the first way above, the pattern of ‘activity + cause’. Upon embracing the 
third kind of knowledge, the mind does not experience a transforming process from 
lesser to greater perfection, but is instead anchored in the state of perfection.    
  In short, both ways emphasize the human Amor as an activity. In other words, even 
if Spinoza wants to follow the standard pattern, he is forced to change his formula here 
and replace the term ‘transition’ with the term ‘activity’. 
(iii) The Divine Amor towards Men 
The discussion above reveals that the human Amor is a part of the divine Amor. A 
further question is whether or not this part of the divine Amor could have another name 
in terms of the viewpoint of God. Spinoza engages immediately with this question in 
the corollary of 5P36 as follows: 
 
Hence it follows that God, insofar as he loves himself, loves mankind, and 
consequently, that the love of God towards men [the divine Amor towards men] 
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and the mind’s intellectual love towards God [the human Amor] are one and the 
same. (5P36 Corollary, p. 378) 
 
Here we see that there is another name, and this name is the divine Amor towards men. 
Spinoza emphasizes that the divine Amor towards men and the human Amor are one 
and the same. The reason for this is that particular things, including men, are nothing 
but the modes of the attributes of God. As such, that God loves himself means that God 
loves particular things, including men, at the same time. The difference is that in the 
divine Amor towards men the lover is God and the beloved is men whereas, in the 
human Amor, the lover is the man and the beloved is God. In other words, the difference 
is only due to differing viewpoints. Therefore, the formula of the divine Amor towards 
men could be rephrased using the same formula for the human Amor, only now in terms 
of the viewpoint of God: 
 
The divine Amor towards men is an activity whereby God, insofar as he can be 
explicated through the human mind, regards himself, accompanied by the idea of 
God as cause. 
 
Here we see that the formula still follows the pattern of ‘activity + cause’. 
  In short, the divine Amor, the human Amor and the divine Amor towards men all 





I. The divine Amor is God’s nature enjoying infinite perfection, accompanied 
by the idea of God as his own cause. 
II. The human Amor is an activity whereby the mind regards itself, 
accompanied by the idea of God as cause, or is an activity whereby God, 
insofar as he can be explicated through the human mind, regards himself, 
accompanied by the idea of God as cause. 
III. The divine Amor towards men is an activity whereby God, insofar as he can 
be explicated through the human mind, regards himself, accompanied by 
the idea of God as cause. 
 
The below table will help us understand these formulae better:  
Table 2 A comparison of the formulae of the Amor. 
 
Now we see that the first part of the pattern of ‘transition + cause’ has been 
incrementally changed in a surprising way. The pattern in the concept of the divine 
Amor is ‘perfection + cause’; in the human Amor and the divine Amor towards men the 
Love Transition Cause 
Standard definition of love Transition The idea of an external cause 
The divine Amor Perfection The idea of God as his own cause 
The human Amor  Activity The idea of God as cause 
The divine Amor towards men Activity The idea of God as cause 
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pattern is ‘activity + cause’. This is the problem of transition.    
  In short, Spinoza struggles to use one formula to define all of the different kinds of 
love. He refers to the definition of the concept of love, E3 Emotions 6, in the definitions 
of the concepts of our love towards God and the Amor. However, he seems to fail to 
reconcile all of the different kinds of love into one single formula. With respect to our 
love towards God, the failure exists in the second part of the pattern of ‘transition + 
cause’: this is the problem of cause. When the Amor and its several variations as the 
divine Amor, the human Amor, and the divine Amor towards men are brought into the 
discussion, Spinoza is forced to change his formula correspondingly. They raise both 
the problem of cause and the problem of transition. 
2.1.3 The Problem of Nature 
In this section, let us explore the deepest level of the puzzle of the Amor. Given that 
Spinoza’s God is non-personal, and Nature is his other name, the deepest level is how 
the Amor makes sense in nature. Spinoza’s attitude is clear, and there is no space for a 
compromising anthropomorphism in his philosophy. Spinoza explicitly announces as 
much as follows: 
 
Strictly speaking, God does not love or hate anyone. For God (preceding Pr.) is not 
affected with any emotions of pleasure or pain, and consequently (Def of Emotions 




It is worth noting that Spinoza emphasizes the qualifier “strictly speaking” here. 
According to Spinoza, ‘God is without passive emotions’ because God’s ideas are 
always true and adequate (E5p17, p. 371). Therefore, God does not love anyone through 
passive emotions. Does Spinoza insinuate that God loves men through active emotions 
then? Spinoza answered this question in the same place as follows: 
 
Again, God cannot pass to a state of greater or less perfection (Cor.2, Pr. 20, I), and 
so (Def. of Emotions 2 and 3) he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or 
pain. (E5p17 Proof, p. 371, my italics) 
 
Spinoza emphasizes the qualifier “again” here because he is concerned that the reader 
will misunderstand his view and believe that God loves men through active emotions. 
God always enjoys the highest perfection, and the state of his perfection remains 
unchangeable forever. Since pleasure is a transition from lesser to greater perfection, it 
is not possible for God to have the emotion of active pleasure. Therefore, it is also not 
possible for God to love men through active emotions. Clearly, this point helps us to 
clarify the problem of transition in another way.  
  Furthermore, Spinoza reinforces his view through E5p19, in which we are told ‘He 
who loves God cannot endeavor that God should love him in return’ (E5p19, p. 372). 
Here, Spinoza emphasizes the claim that God does not love anyone through either 
passive or active emotions. Since God does not love anyone, man should not have any 
expectation that God will love him in return. 
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  However, as shown in Section 2.1.2, it is true that Spinoza has the concept of the 
divine Amor in mind, and believes that God loves himself with an infinite intellectual 
love in E5p35. According to Spinoza, this kind of love is precisely what he has defined 
in E5p32 Corollary, that is, the Amor (E5p35 Proof, p. 378). Is it legitimate for Spinoza 
to employ the concept of the divine Amor given that his God is not a personal God? 
What is the nature of the Amor? This is the deepest level of the puzzle in Spinoza’s 
doctrine of the Amor. In order to be concise, let us label this the problem of nature. 
  To summarize, Spinoza’s last doctrine in the Ethics, the Amor, is puzzling. According 
to our analysis, there are three different levels of the puzzle of the doctrine of the Amor, 
and three problems arise from them respectively. These are the problem of cause on the 
shallowest level, the problem of transition on a deeper level, and the problem of nature 
on the deepest level. These problems are intertwined, and composed the puzzle of the 
doctrine of the Amor, which creates huge confusion and difficulty for Spinoza scholars. 
In order to overcome the puzzle, many approaches have been proposed. I will 
investigate these existing approaches in the next section.  
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2.2 The Existing Approaches 
Spinoza scholars have offered a variety of approaches to the puzzle. The simplest 
approach is to directly deny the doctrine of the Amor since some scholars believe that 
it entails too many errors and confusions. For example, Bennett employs a particularly 
harsh tone when he claims that it is nothing but ‘rubbish which causes others to write 
rubbish’ (Bennett, 1984, p. 374).  
  Some other scholars note a heavy religious element in the context of the latter part 
of Part 5 in the Ethics, and they believe that Spinoza falls into the traditional mode of 
religion, through which he either wants to compromise with the mainstream society in 
which he lived or to express his own religious experience. In what follows, I will refer 
to this as the ‘religious approach’ to the puzzle. Some scholars note the obvious 
inconsistency when Spinoza uses his standard formula to denote different kinds of love. 
They, then, propose some alternative formulae to replace Spinoza’s standard formula. 
In what follows, I will call this the ‘reformulated approach’. There are also other 
scholars who note the connection between the doctrine of intuitive knowledge and the 
doctrine of the Amor, and believe that the Amor will be coherent with the rest of the 
Ethics when the relationship between the Amor and intuitive knowledge is somehow 
explained correctly. In what follows, I will call this the ‘epistemological approach’. We 
will now investigate these approaches one by one. 
2.2.1 The Religious Approach 
It is a basic fact that many religious terms, such as eternity, salvation, blessedness, the 
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love of God, the grace of God, and the Holy Scriptures, are heavily employed in the 
last part of the Ethics. Melamed observed that it was traditional for at least some great 
medieval philosophers, such as Maimonides and Averroes, to change their tone in the 
concluding part of their masterpieces, in order to provide relief to the masses having 
suffered through their radical thoughts (Melamed, forthcoming, p. 6). Spinoza claims 
that the masses ‘will give a more favorable hearing to the truth’ if we speak ‘as far as 
possible to their level of understanding’ (TIE, p. 6). In other words, Spinoza believes 
that sometimes it is necessary to be flexible in one’s writing style in order to attract the 
masses to sound but radical thoughts. In the TTP, in order to establish a more rational 
and orderly society, Spinoza proposes that the masses should be persuaded to be 
obedient to some basic dogmas, such as ‘the love of God’, even if these dogmas 
themselves are not the exact truth (TTP, p. 519). For example, when his landlady 
inquires whether or not she can be saved through her religion, Spinoza confirms that 
‘[y]our Religion is a good one, you need not look for another, nor doubt that you may 
be saved in it’ (Colerus, 1880, p. 403). Cook (1999) explores Spinoza’s real position in 
the answer to his landlady, and confirms that Spinoza does not commit himself to the 
truth of his landlady’s Christian faith. If Spinoza follows this pattern and has the 
purpose of appeasing the masses in mind, the heavy religious tone seems to make sense 
in the last part of his Ethics even if it turns out that this part is not coherent with the rest 
of the Ethics. This is the religious approach to the puzzle of the Amor. 
  Some scholars argue for the religious approach from a different direction, and 
propose that the heavy religious tone derives from Spinoza’s own religious experiences, 
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and that the Amor is a philosophical expression of these kinds of experiences. Pollock 
claims that there is a heavy influence of oriental mysticism on the doctrine of the Amor 
(Pollock, 1880, p. 298). Melamed goes further and argues that Spinoza has ‘a 
Buddhistic outlook upon life’, an opinion I reject in this thesis (Melamed, 1933, p. 2). 
Broad believes these kinds of experiences ‘which Spinoza and many others have 
enjoyed and which seem supremely important to those who have had them’ (Broad, 
1930, p. 15) explain the religious tone.  
  Still other scholars, such as Harvey (2014), trace the root of the Amor back to 
Maimonides, or even to Aristotle. ‘In Aristotle the idea is problematic, and remains so 
in Maimonides and Spinoza’, Harvey argues, ‘[if] it seems more problematic in Spinoza, 
it is only because he exerted the greatest effort to make philosophic sense of it’ (Harvey, 
2014, p. 106). 
  In short, the religious approach accepts that the doctrine of the Amor has meaning 
and value in itself but denies that the doctrine is coherent with the rest of the Ethics. 
The religious approach highlights the religious element in the doctrine of the Amor, and 
it also emphasizes the huge influence of established religion on both Spinoza’s life and 
his philosophy. However, it fails to catch the subtle and crucial meaning of the doctrine 
of the Amor. In this thesis, I will argue that the doctrine of the Amor is coherent with 
the rest of the Ethics, and I will show that the religious approach fails to note the 




2.2.2 The Reformulated Approach 
By contrast to the religious approach, some scholars choose the ‘reformulated’ 
approach towards the puzzle of the Amor. According to this approach, the main thought 
in the Amor is indeed consistent with the rest of the Ethics, but at the same time its 
formula needs to be emended.  
  Melamed (forthcoming) systematically investigates Spinoza’s formula of the concept 
of love, and finds that the formula cannot accommodate the concept of the Amor. As a 
replacement, Melamed notes that Spinoza has another concept, self-contentment 
(acquiescentia in se ipse)27, ‘which is quite close to’ the Amor (Melamed, forthcoming, 
p. 15). Melamed proposes that the Amor, as a technical term, should be replaced by 
acquiescentia in se ipse. Melamed cites the following passage from E3p30 Scholium 
as evidence: 
 
Since love (Sch. Pr. 13, III) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external 
cause, and hate is pain also accompanied by the idea of an external cause, this 
pleasure and this pain are species of love and hatred. But as love and hatred have 
reference to external objects, we shall assign different names to these emotions. 
The pleasure that is accompanied by an external cause28 we shall call Honor 
                                                             
27 It is called ‘self-esteem’ in Curley’s translation (Spinoza, 1985), and ‘self-complacency’ in Elwes’ 
translation (Spinoza, 1951). 
 
28 It is an internal cause in Curley’s translation, and Curley has a special note going into detail about 




[gloria], and the pain that is its opposite we shall call Shame [pudor]; but be it 
understood that this is when the pleasure or pain arises from a man’s belief that he 
is praised or blamed. Otherwise, the pleasure that is accompanied by the idea of an 
internal cause I shall call Self-contentment [acquiescentia in se ipse], and the pain 
that is its opposite I shall call Repentance [paenitentia]. (E3p30 Scholium, p. 294)29 
 
What attracts Melamed in the quotation above is the last sentence, in which Spinoza 
calls the pleasure accompanied by the idea of an internal cause self-contentment 
(acquiescentia in se ipse). It is clear, Melamed believes, that the pleasure accompanied 
by the idea of an internal cause ‘is precisely’ what the Amor is (Melamed, forthcoming, 
p. 17, italics in original). Melamed, then, concludes that ‘while writing the third part of 
the Ethics, Spinoza was keen on calling this affect “Acquiescentia in se ipse”; only 
when he turned to develop the last section of part five did he attach the additional title 
of “intellectual love” to it’ (ibid.). Melamed conjectures that either Spinoza’s 
Collegiant 30  friends compelled him to employ the title of the Amor rather than 
                                                             
29 Cf. ‘As love (III. xiii.) is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause, and hatred is pain 
accompanied by the idea of an external cause; the pleasure and pain in question will be a species of 
love and hatred. But, as the terms love and hatred are used in reference to external objects, we will 
employ other names for the emotions now under discussion: pleasure accompanied by the idea of an 
external cause1 we will style Honour, and the emotion contrary thereto we will style Shame: I mean in 
such cases as where pleasure or pain arises from a man’s belief, that he is being praised or blamed: 
otherwise pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause1 is called self-complacency, and its 
contrary pain is called repentance.’(Spinoza, 1951, pp. 150-1) 
 
30 The Collegiants refers to a group of people, including Spinoza, who embraced radical theology and 
formed an informal religious college in Rijnsburg since 1619 (Van Bunge, 2008, p. 62). 
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acquiescentia in se ipse or Spinoza himself saw that both love and the Amor ‘are kinds 
of Joy [pleasure] accompanied by the idea of an object [an external object or an internal 
object] as its cause’ (ibid.). Melamed is right to note that an external cause, which is 
applied in the formula of the concept of love, has been changed into an internal cause 
when acquiescentia in se ipse is discussed, and the problem of cause, then, seems to 
have been resolved once the concept of the Amor is replaced by the concept of 
acquiescentia in se ipse. 
  The crucial point of Melamed’s argument is that in the quotation above he reads 
Honor (or Shame) as an emotion accompanied by an inadequate idea (which belongs to 
the knowledge of imagination) and, in contrast, acquiescentia in se ipse as an emotion 
not accompanied by an inadequate idea. Melamed’s suggestion here is that 
acquiescentia in se ipse is an emotion accompanied by an adequate idea, which belongs 
to intuitive knowledge only. However, what I understand throughout Spinoza’s 
discussion of the conception of acquiescentia in se ipse is in opposition to Melamed’s 
claim. Firstly, Spinoza tells us that acquiescentia in se ipse ‘can arise from reason’, and 
that the idea accompanying acquiescentia in se ipse does not belong exclusively to 
intuitive knowledge, but to rational knowledge also (E4p52, p. 347). Moreover, Spinoza 
also defines acquiescentia in se ipse as the ‘pleasure accompanied by the idea of some 
deed which we think we have done from free decision of the mind’ in his explanation of 
its definition (E3 Definition 25&26 Explication, p. 315, my italics). According to 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, the idea that we can act from a free decision of the mind is not 
right, and only imagined. Furthermore, Spinoza believes that the mind can feel pleasure 
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once it ‘imagines itself and its power of activity’ (E3p53, p. 305). The reason is that 
‘the more a man imagines he is praised by others, the more this pleasure is fostered’ 
(E3p53 Corollary, p. 306). In other words, it is also possible that the idea that 
acquiescentia in se ipse involves may belong to the knowledge of imagination. In short, 
E3p53 and its Corollary, E3 Definition 25&26, E4p52 and its Proof & Scholium all go 
against Melamed’s understanding. Therefore, Melamed’s argument is based on a 
misunderstanding of Spinoza’s concept of acquiescentia in se ipse. 
  Similarly, Rutherford (1999) also observes the importance of the concept of 
acquiescentia in se ipse. However, Rutherford sees the concept of acquiescentia animi, 
not acquiescentia in se ipse, as having a connection to the concept of the Amor. In the 
Ethics, the most important passage that supports Rutherford’s understanding is in 
E5p36 Scholium as follows: 
 
From this we clearly understand in what our salvation or blessedness or Freedom 
consists, namely, in the constant and eternal love towards God, that is, in God’s 
love towards men. This love or blessedness is called Glory in the Holy Scriptures, 
and rightly so. For whether this love is related to God or to the mind, it can properly 
be called spiritual contentment [animi acquiescentia]31, which in reality cannot be 
distinguished from glory (Def. of Emotion 25 and 30). For insofar as it is related 
                                                             
31 Rutherford seems to consider animi acquiescentia to be the same as acquiescentia animi. According 
to the present context, Rutherford is right: summa acquiescentia should be understood as being the 





to God, it is (Pr. 35, V) pleasure (if we may still use this term) accompanied by the 
idea of himself, and this is also the case insofar as it is related to the mind (Pr. 27, 
V). (E5p36 Scholium, pp. 378-9)32 
 
Here Spinoza is discussing the Amor and clearly claims that it can properly be called 
spiritual contentment (acquiescentia animi). In fact, Spinoza reveals a similar view in 
Part 4 as follows: 
 
Therefore it is of the first importance in life to perfect the intellect, or reason, as far 
as we can, and the highest happiness or blessedness for mankind consists in this 
alone. For blessedness is nothing other than that spiritual contentment 33 
[acquiescentia animi] that arises from the intuitive knowledge of God. (E4 
Appendix 4, p. 358) 
 
                                                             
32 Cf. ‘From this we clearly understand wherein our salvation, or blessedness, or Freedom, consists, 
viz. in a constant and eternal Love of God, or in God's Love for men. And this Love, or blessedness, is 
called Glory in the Sacred Scriptures—not without reason. For whether this Love is related to God or 
to the Mind, it can rightly be called satisfaction of mind [animi acquiescentia], which is really not 
distinguished from Glory (by Defs. Aff. XXV and XXX). For insofar as it is related to God (by P35), it 
is Joy (if I may still be permitted to use this term), accompanied by the idea of himself [as cause]. And 
similarly insofar as it is related to the Mind (by P27)’. (Spinoza, 1985, p. 612) 
 
33 Shirley is mistaken in translating the term here as ‘self-contentment’ (it is also not in accordance 
with his translation in E5p36 Scholium in which it is spiritual contentment). I have corrected it with 
some further support from the translations of Curley (Spinoza, 1985, p. 588), Elwes (Spinoza, 1951, p. 




We see that Spinoza’s thoughts in E5p36 Scholium are in accordance with his thoughts 
in E4 Appendix 434. Therefore, Rutherford (1999) is right, and it is acquiescentia animi, 
rather than acquiescentia in se ipse, that would be a better replacement for the Amor if 
Spinoza’s puzzle could be resolved in this way. 
  Rutherford (1999) helps to clarify Spinoza’s concept of acquiescentia animi. 
However, his paper does not focus on the doctrine of the Amor, and he does not 
investigate the relationship between the concept of acquiescentia animi and the concept 
of love any further. Now suppose that we blend Rutherford’s argument and Melamed’s 
approach together and accept the concept of acquiescentia animi as a replacement for 
the concept of the Amor. At this point, the problem of cause for the Amor seems to 
disappear since that which appears in the concept of acquiescentia animi is an internal 
cause rather than an external cause.  
  The remaining question now concerns whether or not Spinoza’s puzzle of the Amor 
could be resolved when we combine the approaches of Rutherford (1999) and Melamed 
(forthcoming). The answer is still ‘no’. As was discussed in Section 2.1, the formula 
aspect of the puzzle consists not only in the problem of cause but also the problem of 
transition. A further investigation will reveal that the concept of acquiescentia animi 
has these problems in a similar fashion to the concept of the Amor.  
  Spinoza establishes the connection of the concept of acquiescentia animi with 
                                                             
34 This passage seems to be contradictory: while blessedness is considered as consisting in the 
perfection of reason in the first sentence, in the second sentence it is identical with acquiescentia animi 
which consists in intuitive knowledge. The only possible solution here is that, for Spinoza, reason in its 




intuitive knowledge in E5p27, and claims that ‘[t]herefore (Def. of Emotion 25), from 
this kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible contentment [summa 
acquiescentia]’ (E5p27 Proof, p. 375). However, Spinoza still refers its definition to the 
definition of Emotion 25, i.e. acquiescentia in se ipse. One way to make sense of 
Spinoza’s claim here is to consider acquiescentia in se ipse as an umbrella term, under 
which one kind of acquiescentia in se ipse is accompanied by the inadequate idea that 
belongs to the knowledge of imagination. Another kind is accompanied by the adequate 
idea that belongs to rational knowledge. The third kind is accompanied by the adequate 
idea that belongs to intuitive knowledge, and this kind has the replacement name, 
summa acquiescentia 35 . Spinoza also uses one formula to define three kinds of 
acquiescentia in se ipse. Therefore, the concept of acquiescentia in se ipse has its own 
problem, which is similar to the problem facing the Amor. In the definition of Emotion 
25, Spinoza says that acquiescentia in se ipse ‘is pleasure arising from a man’s 
contemplation of himself and his power of activity’. Like the situation in the concept 
of love, the concept of pleasure is also at the core of the definition of acquiescentia in 
se ipse. As a kind of pleasure, it always involves a transition from a less perfect state to 
a more perfect state. However, acquiescentia animi refers to the highest state of 
contentment rather than to a transition from a less perfect state to a more perfect state. 
This is the problem of transition in the concept of acquiescentia in se ipse. Therefore, 
the problem in the formula of the concept of love also exists in the concept of 
                                                             




acquiescentia in se ipse. 
  Therefore, neither Rutherford (1999) nor Melamed (forthcoming), nor even the 
combination of their views, can resolve both the problem of cause and the problem of 
transition. However, their efforts once again highlight both the problem of cause and 
the problem of transition36. 
  In contrast to Melamed’s (forthcoming) proposal of an alternative technical term, 
Maxwell (1990) proposes an emendation of the formula of love. Maxwell confirms that 
the problem of cause cannot be resolved in its original formula. According to the 
original formula in E3 Definition 6, love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an 
external cause. For Spinoza, an idea of an external cause is only an inadequate idea 
whereas the Amor generated by the idea of God involves a wholly adequate idea. 
Maxwell believes that it is not possible for the idea of God to be considered an external 
cause. The original formula must be amended since Spinoza cites it to define the Amor 
‘directly in E5p15 Proof, E5p17 Corollary, E5p32 Corollary and indirectly in other 
proofs using these’ (Maxwell, 1990, p. 155). The correct formula for the Amor (and 
also, Maxwell implies, for our love towards God) should be pleasure accompanied by 
‘the idea of an internal [proximate] cause’, and Maxwell contends that ‘Spinoza would 
necessarily agree at once’ (ibid.). Maxwell believes that the reason for Spinoza’s failure 
to amend his formula of love is due to the fact that the whole of Part 3 in the Ethics 
focuses mainly on passive emotions and, as such, ‘Spinoza understandably concentrates 
                                                             
36 Their efforts also reveal that the concept of love seems to have the concept of acquiescentia in se 
ipse as its counterpart in the Ethics. If it has an alternative counterpart, why does Spinoza insist on 
using the concept of the Amor alone? I will answer this question in Chapter 7. 
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on definition by external cause’ when the formula of love is introduced (Maxwell, 1990, 
p. 156). Hoos also claims that Maxwell’s emendation of the formula of love ‘turns out 
to be helpful’ (Hoos, 2000, p. 217). 
  Maxwell (1990) also tackles the problem of transition. According to Maxwell, the 
problem of transition itself is not a real problem owing to the fact that both the human 
Amor and the divine Amor involve a transition from lesser to greater perfection 
(Maxwell, 1990, p. 153). It is worth noting that the main reason in support of Maxwell’s 
argument is once again the concept of acquiescentia in se ipse. Maxwell notes that, in 
E5p32 Proof, it is claimed that the highest possible contentment of mind [summa 
acquiescentia] that refers to E5p27, arises from intuitive knowledge, and he translates 
summa acquiescentia as ‘the supreme mental acquiescence’ (ibid.). Maxwell considers 
summa acquiescentia to be the same as acquiescentia in se ipse, which he translates as 
self-acquiescence, since Spinoza seems to imply this point in E5p27 Proof, as cited 
above37. According to the definition in E3 Definition 25, self-acquiescence is ‘pleasure 
arising from contemplation’ and pleasure, according to its definition, is always a 
transition from a lesser to a greater perfection. In other words, self-acquiescence 
involves a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection. On the one hand, this self-
acquiescence is accompanied by the idea of the mind itself in E5p27 Proof, which 
Maxwell believes refers to the human Amor, and on the other hand, it is accompanied 
by the idea of God as cause in E5p30, which Maxwell believes refers to the divine Amor 
                                                             
37 ‘Therefore (Def. of Emotion 25), from this kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible 
contentment [summa acquiescentia]’ (E5p27 Proof, p. 375). 
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(ibid.). Therefore, it seems natural to say that both the human Amor and the divine Amor 
involve a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection, and that it is an ‘error to deny 
a transition in this self-acquiescence and thus in the Amor itself (5p32Cor)’ (ibid.). This 
is a brief overview of Maxwell’s argument against the problem of transition. In short, 
Maxwell believes that the problem of transition, in fact, does not exist. 
  According to my reading, our critique of Melamed (forthcoming) above can also be 
employed against Maxwell: he also confuses acquiescentia in se ipse with summa 
acquiescentia, a problem that has been explored clearly by Rutherford (1999). 
Therefore, Maxwell’s argument against the problem of transition should be rebutted in 
the same way. 
  To summarize, Melamed (forthcoming), and Maxwell (1990) all employ a 
reformulated approach to the puzzle of the Amor, and they also note a connection 
between the concept of acquiescentia in se ipse and the concept of the Amor. 
Unfortunately, both Melamed (forthcoming) and Maxwell (1990) conflate 
acquiescentia in se ipse and summa acquiescentia. Rutherford (1999) is right to make 
the distinction between them, but his approach cannot resolve the problem of transition. 
Moreover, we found that the concept of acquiescentia suffers from the same difficulty 
confronting the Amor. Therefore, Maxwell’s (1990) claim that the problem of transition 
does not exist is false: the problem of transition remains. Furthermore, none of the 
above touch upon the problem of nature. The reformulated approach is, however, useful 
in its highlighting of both the problem of cause and the problem of transition. 
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2.2.3 The Epistemological Approach 
Some scholars propose to resolve the puzzle by making use of the close connection 
between Spinoza’s concept of love and Spinoza’s epistemology. They observe a basic 
correspondence between the three kinds of knowledge and the three kinds of love in 
Spinoza’s thought, and they argue that the puzzle is resolvable through clarification of 
the relationship between the concept of love and Spinoza’s epistemology. In other 
words, they claim that the puzzle can be fully resolved if we pay attention not only to 
the concept of love itself, but also to its relationship with the three kinds of knowledge. 
This is the basic idea of the epistemological approach. 
  Rice notes that ‘[n]one has done much to connect’ the Amor with its corresponding 
knowledge (Rice, 2002, p. 93). Rice believes that a right understanding of the essence 
of knowledge is the foundation for properly understanding the Amor given that Spinoza 
himself establishes a close connection between them in E2 Axioms 3. In E2 Axioms 3, 
Spinoza says that it is not possible for an individual to have any emotion unless the 
individual has the idea of an object that the emotion involves. Spinoza is obviously 
confident in this thought given that he considers it an axiom. According to Spinoza’s 
epistemology, which will be explored further in Chapter 5, to say that an individual has 
the idea of an object is to say that the individual has knowledge of the object since, for 
Spinoza, ‘knowledge’ is another name for ‘cognition’. In the case of passionate love, 
love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. Due to the idea of the 
external cause, a parallel cognitive state of imagination arises in the mind of the lover. 
As with the knowledge of imagination this is an inadequate idea, and accordingly our 
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passionate love ‘is not self-determined but passive’ (Rice, 2002, p. 95). The pleasure 
that we experience in our passionate love is passive, not active. Therefore, passionate 
love is often immoderate and obsessive, and may damage our health. However, even if 
imagination, as the first kind of knowledge, is inadequate it is not necessarily false and 
wholly negative. Similarly, the pleasure that we experience in our passionate love ‘is 
not in itself bad, but good’ since it is a transition from a less perfect state to a greater 
one, in which our power is increased (E4p41, p. 343). Moreover, in a few situations, 
passionate love can lead us to act in a kind and tolerant way (Rice, 2002, p. 96). 
Therefore, in the case of passionate love, the essence and core feature of the first kind 
of knowledge, imagination, shapes the essence and core feature of passionate love. This 
conclusion can also be extended to our love towards God and the Amor.  
  When the first kind of knowledge, imagination, is transformed into the second kind 
of knowledge, reason, obsessively passionate love disappears. However, properly 
passionate love is transformed into rational love, just as Rice concluded: rational love 
‘arises not from elimination of sensory love but rather in the rational understanding and 
control of it’ (Rice, 2002, p. 97). The pleasure in rational love is no longer passive: it is 
an active transition from a less perfect state to a greater perfect state. As the highest 
type of rational love, our love towards God comes about when we have rational 
knowledge of the idea of God. According to E5p19, Rice confirms that it is justifiable 
to claim that ‘a person who loves God cannot endeavor [that] God should reciprocate 
or love him in return’ otherwise this would entail that ‘God’s essence should be other 
than it is’ (Rice, 2002, p. 98). In other words, it is justifiable to claim that the notion of 
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divine love is in no sense at the level of reason. 
  Turning to the case of the Amor, Rice considers this as a kind of love that is 
completely different from our love towards God. Our love towards God and the Amor 
are different from each other due to the difference between the genitive subject and 
object (Rice, 2002, p. 100). Rice believes that the difference ‘between the idea of Peter 
which is Peter’s mind and the idea of Peter which is in Paul’s mind’, which will be 
discussed in Chapter 6, gives us a good way to explain the difference between our love 
towards God, which is not reciprocated, and the Amor, which is reciprocated (ibid.). 
With respect to the sub-types of the Amor, by E5p36 Rice agrees that the subjective, 
which is the human Amor, is identical with the objective, which is the divine Amor 
towards men, because the Amor is immanent. The Amor, as immanent love, is justified 
through intuitive knowledge, which is immanent knowledge, in which an adequate 
knowledge of an individual ‘is a part or expression of that very attribute’ (ibid.).  
  Rice is right to note the rigid connection between Spinoza’s concept of love and his 
theory of knowledge, and Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge are one of the keys to 
understanding Spinoza’s three kinds of love. What Rice emphasizes is that the 
incoherence among the concepts of Spinoza’s three kinds of love is justified because 
their corresponding three kinds of knowledge are different from each other. What Rice 
does not touch upon is why Spinoza tries to use a standard formula to define all three 
kinds of love, which Rice believes to differ in nature from each other. Rice does not 
analyze both the problem of cause and the problem of transition in detail. Moreover, 
Rice only explains the Amor at the level of epistemology and does not touch upon its 
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meaning at the level of ontology. Rice does not analyze how the Amor should be 
understood when Spinoza claims that God loves himself with infinite intellectual love 
in E5p35. In other words, Rice does not tell us what the nature of the Amor is, and this 
is the problem of nature. 
  Nadler (2017) also proposes a similar epistemological approach. However, according 
to Nadler, Rice is wrong to separate our love towards God from the Amor completely. 
Rice believes that such a separation is similar to the division between the idea of Peter, 
which is Peter’s mind, and the idea of Peter in Paul’s mind. Nadler notes that by E5p20 
Scholium ‘there is a sense in which both the ordinary love of God [our love towards 
God] and the intellectual love of God [the Amor] are one and the same’ (Nadler, 2017, 
p. 18). Nadler notes that Spinoza implies this point as follows: 
 
[W]e may conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all emotions, 
and insofar as it is related to the body it cannot be destroyed except together with 
the body. As to its nature insofar as it is related solely to the mind, this we shall 
examine later on. (E5p20 Scholium, p. 372) 
   
What Spinoza examines after E5p20 is his last three doctrines: the eternity of the mind, 
intuitive knowledge and the Amor. Here Spinoza’s thought is clear. Our love towards 
God can be destroyed together with the body and is, therefore, not eternal. However, 
Spinoza is implying that the nature of our love towards God is the kind of love that is 
eternal, which relates solely to the mind, and will be discussed after E5p20. This should 
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refer to the Amor. In other words, Spinoza seems to consider the Amor as the nature of 
our love towards God in E5p20 Scholium, and this is a new dimension with which we 
can consider the relationship between our love towards God and the Amor. Nadler’s 
insight reveals that remaining at the level of epistemology will not by itself be enough 
to provide a solution to the puzzle of the Amor: the doctrine of the eternity of the mind 
must also be considered. 
  At the same time, Nadler, like other scholars who propose the epistemological 
approach, fails to take either the problem of cause or the problem of transition seriously. 
He concedes that his approach does not resolve all of the problems by admitting that 
‘certainly some vagueness’ exists in Spinoza’s concept of the Amor (Nadler, 2017, p. 
17). Nadler ultimately believes that the Amor ‘is simply to have a deep intellectual 
understanding of oneself and of one’s place in Nature’, and is ‘nothing more than to 
experience the highest form of knowledge available to human beings’ (Nadler, 2017, p. 
22). Hoos (2000) also proposes a similar approach, and he also concedes that the 
problem of transition is merely ‘due to the lack of another term’ (Hoos, 2000, p. 219) 
  In short, Hoos (2000) and Nadler (2017) propose the epistemological approach but 
confess that the puzzle cannot be resolved by considering Spinoza’s epistemology 
alone. To one extent or another, they bring the doctrine of the eternity of the mind into 
their explanation. However, this approach does not tell us how the Amor should be 
understood in the first place given that Spinoza’s God is not a personal God and is 
identical with Nature. In other words, the problem of nature is not properly resolved. 
At the same time, these scholars do not take the problem of cause and the problem of 
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transition seriously due to the belief that the difference between the three kinds of 
knowledge is enough to explain the incoherence in the definitions of Spinoza’s 
concepts of love. 
  To summarize, now we see that the religious approach, the reformulated approach, 
and the epistemological approach each have their own advantages and disadvantages. 
The religious approach highlights the religious element in the doctrine of the Amor 
and tries to explain the doctrine of the Amor within itself. To some degree, they admit 
that the doctrine of the Amor is incoherent with the rest of the Ethics. This means that 
they fail to note the integrated nature of Spinoza’s philosophy.  
  The reformulated approach accepts a coherence between the doctrine of the Amor 
and the rest of the Ethics, and also claims that Spinoza’s formulae of the concepts of 
love are incoherent. This approach, then, highlights both the problem of cause and the 
problem of transition. It tries to resolve either the problem of cause or the problem of 
transition by amending Spinoza’s own formula. Our investigation revealed that, 
firstly, the reformulated approach does not resolve either the problem of cause or the 
problem of transition completely. Secondly, their emendation incurs some similar 
problems which the Amor has. Thirdly, this approach does not touch upon the problem 
of nature. 
  The epistemological approach proposes that the formula aspect of the puzzle can be 
resolved when Spinoza’s epistemology is included in the explanation. As such, this 
approach highlights both the importance of the doctrine of intuitive knowledge and 
even the doctrine of the eternity of the mind. However, this approach does not explain 
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either the problem of cause or the problem of transition properly. Moreover, the 
problem of nature is also not properly resolved. Furthermore, even though these 
scholars acknowledge that the doctrine of the eternity of the mind should be taken into 
account to some degree in the explanation, they fail to deal with either the puzzle of 
the doctrine of intuitive knowledge or the puzzle of the doctrine of the eternity of the 
mind as puzzles of their own. 
  Finally, none of these approaches touch much upon the problem of nature, and none 
of them answer the problem of how the Amor is to be understood within the 
pantheistic framework. If the doctrine of intuitive knowledge is to be included in the 
explanation, the puzzle of the doctrine of intuitive knowledge itself should be 
resolved in advance. In the same way, if the doctrine of the eternity of the mind is to 
be included in the explanation, the puzzle of the doctrine of the eternity of the mind 
itself should be resolved in advance. A successful approach needs not only to 
incorporate all of the advantages that the above approaches introduce, it must answer 
the problem of cause, the problem of transition, and the problem of nature properly, 
while also resolving the puzzle of the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the 
puzzle of the doctrine of intuitive knowledge. A Neo-Confucian approach, I believe, 





The Parallel between the Neo-Confucians’ and Spinoza’s 
Metaphysics 
In Chapter 3, I will explore the metaphysics of both Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza 
and their core concepts. I will argue that there is a parallelism between them. In Section 
3.1, I will explore the concept of Tian as the Ultimate Reality of Confucianism. In 
Section 3.2, I will introduce the basic framework of Neo-Confucian metaphysics. In 
Section 3.3, I will focus on its naturalistic dimension. In Section 3.4, I will focus on the 
concept of Li as the core concept of Neo-Confucianism and I will then clearly reveal 
Neo-Confucianism as rationalism. In Section 3.5, the two realms in the Ultimate Reality 
of Confucianism and their unity will be highlighted. In a parallel fashion, I will explore 
Spinoza’s metaphysics and its core concepts in every section.  
 
3.1 The Parallel between the Concept of Tian and the Concept of God  
3.1.1 The Concept of Tian in Confucianism 
The only concept in Confucianism that is comparable to the concept of God in the West 
is Tian. Tian had been considered as Ultimate Reality since the beginning stage of the 
Zhou Dynasty (1111 - 249 B.C.). This thought was inherited by Confucius and all 
Confucians thereafter. Confucians have continually developed the connotations of the 
concept of Tian.  
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  A popular translation of Tian into English is the term ‘Heaven’38, and another English 
term ‘Nature’ is also often used to refer to it (Yang, 2008, p. 562). Occasionally, it has 
also been translated as the English term ‘Sky’ (Mou, 2009, p. 145). I will use the term 
‘Tian’ rather than any translated term in this thesis since any translation will lead us to 
emphasize one aspect of its meaning and in so doing lose sight of the other aspects of 
its meaning. Other scholars who have made the same decision include Yang (2008) and 
Mou (2009). 
  The concept of Tian was linked closely with the origin of the character of Tian in 
ancient China. The character of Tian appeared in its original written form in the Oracle 
Bone (甲骨文), which is the oldest written character system to have been found in 
China. The character system of the Oracle Bone matured during the time of the Shang 
Dynasty (1751 - 1112 B.C.), and was written on animal bones or turtle shells. The 
inscription onto turtle shells was considered to hold divine power to some degree as the 
people of the Shang Dynasty believed that such shells could foretell the intentions of 
their gods. One of the main uses of the Oracle Bone was for the divination of the royal 
house of the Shang Dynasty. Ultimately, these divinations formed the first classical 
scripture in the Book of Changes (易经), which shaped the pantheistic framework of 
Chinese philosophy and became its cornerstone. Scholars do not have a consensus on 
the origin and development of the Chinese character of Tian. A possible explanation for 
the character of Tian is that it can be analyzed into the combination of two more basic 
                                                             
38 Two scholars, Fung (1953) and Chan (1963), who are very popular in the scholars’ circle of 




characters: ‘one’ (一 ) and ‘man’ (人 ) respectively. The combination has a literal 
meaning of ‘Great Man’ which means the ruler living in Heaven (Yao, 2000, p. 141). 
That is to say, its literal meaning embodies an element of transcendence. Therefore, the 
transcendental dimension of the concept of Tian has its etymological root in the oldest 
Chinese written character system. 
Scholars tend to believe that the rising of the concept of Tian was due to the 
replacement of the Shang Dynasty by the Zhou Dynasty (Yao, 2000, p. 143; Yang, 2008, 
p. 562). The Supreme Deity of the Shang Dynasty was Ti (帝, Lord) or ShangTi (上帝, 
Ultimate Lord) whereas the tribe deity of the Zhou tribe was a natural deity, ‘Tian’, 
when the Zhou tribe was still under the government of the Shang Dynasty. The Supreme 
Deity of the Shang Dynasty, ShangTi, was a personal god, and scholars believe that it 
may have been the ancestor god of the Shang Dynasty (Yang, 2008, p. 562). Chan 
believes that ShangTi was ‘the supreme anthropomorphic deity who sent blessings or 
calamities, gave protection in battles, sanctioned undertakings, and passed on the 
appointment or dismissal of offices’ (Chan, 1963, p. 4). Conversely, Tian, as the tribe 
deity of the Zhou tribe, has a non-personal meaning linking to the natural sky. Eno 
(1990) guesses that Tian refers to the natural destination of the ashes caused by 
cremation during a sacrifice (Yao, 2000, p. 142). The governors of the Zhou Dynasty 
realized that it would be important to combine the concept of ShangTi and the concept 
of Tian after the Zhou Dynasty replaced the reign of the Shang Dynasty. Therefore, a 
new title combining the concept of ShangTi and the concept of Tian for Supreme Deity, 
HuangTianShangTi (皇天上帝), which literally means the imperial Tian: the highest 
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Ruler, emerged. Consequently, the concept of Tian inherited the more personal 
character of the concept of ShangTi, and its transcendental dimension was developed 
thereafter. It is noteworthy that the Master of Tian (天主) is precisely the Chinese term 
that was chosen to refer to the God of Catholicism when it was translated into Chinese 
by the early Catholic missionaries in the Ming Dynasty, whereas ShangTi, as a rival, is 
precisely the Chinese term that was chosen to refer to the God of Protestantism when it 
was translated into Chinese by the later Protestant missionaries. Nowadays, the concept 
of the Christian God in China hinges mainly on the concept of ShangTi, and this is due 
to the larger influence of Protestantism in modern times. However, Catholics in China 
still retain their own original usage and continue to use the term the Master of Tian. In 
short, the concept of Tian was dominated by its transcendental dimension in the pre-
Confucius era and the classical era of Confucianism.  
The concept of Tian continued to develop thereafter. Its naturalistic and rationalistic 
dimensions arose in succession, and dominated the concept in the era of Neo-
Confucianism. In summary, Neo-Confucianism is a pantheistic monism, and is 
immanent rather than transcendent39. Therefore, the concept of Tian is complicated and 
its meaning is very rich and multidimensional (ibid.). With the help of written evidence, 
we now know that the concept of Tian has a history of nearly 4000 years, and that its 
meaning underwent a process of continued development. Therefore, the concept of Tian 
cannot be defined in a clear-cut way. This is not to say that it is a discursive concept. 
                                                             





On the contrary, its different dimensions are correlative with each other, and they were 
combined into a unified concept in Confucianism. When the Neo-Confucian movement 
was arising in the Song Dynasty (960 - 1279), Ch’eng I, one of the representatives of 
the Neo-Confucian movement, emphasized its unity as follows: 
 
Spoken of as one, Heaven is the Way (Tao [道]). This is the meaning when it is said 
that “Heaven will not be in opposition.” Spoken of in its different aspects, it is 
called heaven with respect to its physical body, the Lord (Ti) with respect to its 
being master, negative and positive spiritual forces with respect to its operation, 
spirit (Shen [神]) with respect to its wonderful functioning, and Ch’ien [乾] with 
respect to its nature and feelings. Ch’ien is the beginning of all things. Therefore it 
is Heaven, yang, father, and ruler. (Chan, 1963, p. 570; slightly different citation in 
Yao, 2000, p. 142)40 
 
Here Chan’s translation uses the term ‘Heaven’ to refer to the term ‘Tian’. Ch’eng I 
explained Tian’s physical aspect, transcendent aspect, operative aspect, functional 
aspect, and natural and feeling aspect as unified under the concept of Tian. All of these 
aspects had been developed before Ch’eng I, and were developed further by other Neo-
Confucians following Ch’eng I. 
                                                             
40 Cf. ‘Referring to its form, it is called heaven; considered as ruler or lord, it is called Shang-ti (God); 
viewed as functioning, it is called fate; as given to men, it is called disposition; as controlling the body, 




  While Chan’s translation uses the expression ‘different aspects’ to refer to the 
richness of the concept of Tian, I will use the expression ‘different dimensions’ in this 
thesis41. I believe the term ‘dimension’ emphasizes the considerable richness of the 
concept of Tian, and is more suitable for expressing its rich connotations. Following 
the development of Neo-Confucianism, I will investigate its main dimensions in this 
thesis. This investigation will help us to map out the basic framework of Neo-
Confucianism. I will focus on three of the dimensions42 of the concept of Tian: its 
naturalistic dimension, its rationalistic dimension, and its idealistic dimension.  
3.1.2. The Concept of God in Spinoza 
God is, and always is, the Ultimate Reality of Spinoza’s philosophy throughout his 
works, and this is the reason that he has been famously described as ‘a God-
intoxicated man’ by Novalis (Sprigge, 2006, p. 26). One of the most controversial 
aspects of Spinoza’s philosophy is his radical conception of God. Spinoza’s 
philosophy in his Ethics begins with his deliberation concerning a new definition of 
God. The definition of God and his43 main characteristics constitute the main content 
of the first chapter of Spinoza’s Ethics.  
                                                             
41 Yao (2000) uses the same expression ‘different dimensions’. 
 
42 The reason for choosing these three dimensions is that they shaped the basic framework of Neo-
Confucianism. This does not imply that the concept of Tian does not have other dimensions or that 
such other dimensions are not important. On the contrary, certain dimensions, such as its transcendental 
and mystical dimensions, are important and have a huge influence on daily life in China. I will push 
these dimensions aside since they do not relate directly to the topic of this thesis. 
 
43 Here it is convenient to use this term to refer to God, but this should not be taken to imply that God 
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(i) God as the Absolutely Perfect Being 
In his Ethics one term that Spinoza often uses to describe God is the term ‘perfection’, 
and Spinoza’s God is a perfect being. On the one hand, it is noteworthy that the term 
‘perfection’ and its antonymous term ‘imperfection’ are often used together in the 
Ethics, with the former used to describe God and the latter his modifications. On the 
other hand, according to Spinoza, God has the highest perfection. He claims that God 
embodies ‘absolute perfection’ (E1p11 Scholium, p. 223), ‘consummate perfection’ 
(E1p15 Scholium, p. 225), ‘supreme perfection’ (E1p33 Scholium2, p. 225), and 
‘infinite perfection’ (E5p35 Proof, p. 378). It is clear for Spinoza that the conception 
of the absolute has the same meaning as the conception of the consummate, the 
supreme, and the infinite since they are used interchangeably. Spinoza did not directly 
provide a definition of the term ‘absolute perfection’, but he made a special 
explanation for the ‘absolutely infinite’ in the explanation for the definition of God, in 
which he claims that ‘by God I mean an absolutely infinite being’ (E1Definition 6, p. 
217), as follows: 
 
I say “absolutely infinite”, not “infinite in its kind”. For if a thing is only infinite 
in its kind, one may deny that it has infinite attributes. But if a thing is absolutely 
infinite, whatever expresses essence and does not involve any negation belongs to 
its essence. (E1 Definition 6, p. 217) 
                                                             





Following the same logic here, we can use the term ‘absolutely perfect’, but not 
‘perfect in its kind’, to describe God. The conception of absolute perfection, which 
does not involve any negation, belongs to the essence of God. In other words, the 
conception of the absolute cannot be used to refer to anything except God himself and 
his equivalent concepts (Nature, absolute perfection, absolute infinity, absolute reality, 
absolute existence, absolute freedom…etc.). As a modification of God, any individual 
thing could not be absolutely perfect. 
  However, through the distinction between the ‘absolutely perfect’ and the ‘perfect 
in its kind’, it is also possible for Spinoza to use the term ‘perfect’ to refer to an 
individual thing. According to Spinoza, every individual thing is always imperfect in 
comparison to God, but should also be considered as being perfect in itself. For 
example, the common people always consider a blind man imperfect, but Spinoza 
claims that the blind man should be considered perfect in himself since ‘God’s 
intellect and will has assigned [such a lot] to him’ (Letter 21, p. 824)44.  
Moreover, Spinoza provides a formal definition of the term ‘perfection’. In the 
definitions at the beginning of Part 2, Spinoza states directly that ‘[by] reality and 
perfection I mean the same thing’ (E2 Definition 6, p. 244). Therefore, God is 
absolute reality since he is absolute perfection. To say God has absolute reality is to 
                                                             
44 This refers to Spinoza’s correspondence with his friends, which has been edited into Spinoza’s 




say that God himself is identical with Ultimate Reality, and this is why Spinoza 
defines God as the absolutely infinite being, or absolute existence.  
  Spinoza firmly believes that it is an eternal truth that ‘nothing comes from nothing’ 
(Letter 10, p. 783). Letter 10 was written in 1663 when he was only 31 years old. This 
reveals that, as one of the basic creeds in his Ethics, the notion of the absolute reality 
had been formed in the early stages of his philosophical career. From this basic creed, 
it is natural to conclude that any existence has positive value since to ‘be able to not 
exist is weakness; on the other hand, to be able to exist is power, as is self-evident’ 
(E1p11 A Third Proof, p. 222)45. Therefore, Spinoza believes that any existence is 
either God himself or in God, and God is absolute existence itself.  
  In short, God, as the perfect being, has the absolute reality, and he is Ultimate 
Reality itself. To say that God is Ultimate Reality itself is also to say that God has the 
highest or absolute perfection.  
(ii) God as the Self-caused Being 
In Spinoza’s KV, written in 1662 when he was 30 years old, his basic understanding 
of the a priori and a posteriori arguments for the existence of God was developed as 
follows: 
 
                                                             
45 Here we see one of the biggest differences between Spinoza’s philosophy and Buddhism. Buddhism 
advocates that Ultimate Reality is nothingness whereas Spinoza endows it with the highest value. 
Therefore, it is wrong to say that Spinoza is a Buddhist, such as Melamed (1933) has argued. 
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[We] can prove both a priori and a posteriori that God exists. Better, indeed, a 
priori. For things which are proved in the latter way [a posteriori] must be proved 
through their external causes, which is a manifest imperfection in them, inasmuch 
as they cannot make themselves known through themselves, but only through 
external causes. God, however, who is the first cause of all things, and also the 
cause of himself [causa sui], makes himself known through himself. Hence one 
need not attach much importance to the saying of Thomas Aquinas, namely, that 
God could not be proved a priori because he, forsooth, has no cause. (KV, p. 40, 
cited in Douglas, 2015, p. 91) 
 
For the existence of God, an a priori argument is always better than any a posteriori 
argument, according to Spinoza. Moreover, Spinoza firmly believes that it is possible 
for humans to have a priori knowledge of God because God makes himself known 
through himself. Spinoza’s view concerning how God makes himself known through 
himself is not completely unfolded in the KV, and in fact is not revealed in its entire 
meaning until the completion of his Ethics. However, Spinoza’s criticism of St. 
Thomas gives us an important clue as to how we can better comprehend his real view. 
Douglas (2015) provides a good interpretation of this clue through his historical 
research into the intellectual context of the early modern era.  
  Firstly, Douglas (2015) investigates the special meaning of the concepts of a priori 
and a posteriori in the early modern era. According to Douglas (2015), in the early 
modern era the terms a priori and a posteriori had different senses from what they 
have nowadays (Douglas, 2015, p. 87). The original meanings had to do with the 
relationship between cause and effect. To say an argument is a priori is to say that it 
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reveals the reason from cause to effect, whereas to say an argument is a posteriori is 
to say that it reveals the reason from effect to cause. Spinoza noted that there is an 
ancient saying that ‘true science proceeds from cause to effect’ (TIE, p. 24). An 
argument for proving the existence of God from the cause is a priori, whereas an 
argument for proving the existence of God from the effect is a posteriori. Therefore, 
owing to their implications concerning the relationship between cause and effect, 
Spinoza’s a priori and a posteriori arguments have different senses from their current 
usages in philosophy. 
Secondly, Douglas (2015) briefly investigates the historical development of the 
conception of God as self-caused. God as a self-caused entity has a negative meaning 
in traditional theology. To say that the existence of God is self-caused is, in fact, to 
say that the existence of God lacks a cause (Douglas, 2015, p. 88). It was St. Thomas 
who first made a decisive distinction between a priori and a posteriori proofs for the 
existence of God, and furthermore St. Thomas believed that it is impossible for us to 
know any a priori proof for the existence of God (Douglas, 2015, p. 87). However, 
God as self-caused is endowed with a positive sense in Descartes’ philosophy. It was 
then possible for Descartes and other philosophers thereafter to give an a priori proof 
for the existence of God. The thought that God as self-caused has to possess ‘every 
perfection’ is stated in Descartes’ Meditations (Douglas, 2015, p. 88, my italics). 
According to Douglas’ reading, Descartes implies that our knowledge of God is a 
priori. Douglas’ investigation directly echoes Spinoza’s criticism towards St. Thomas 
in the above citation. Spinoza takes up this thought of Descartes’ in earnest46. It is also 
                                                             
46 Spinoza has his ontological argument for God’s existence in mind, and he told his friend that ‘the 
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possible that Descartes’ notion of ‘every perfection’ had a direct influence upon 
Spinoza’s notion of God as absolute perfection. It is noteworthy that the definition of 
the concept of the self-caused was written at the very beginning of Spinoza’s Ethics. 
This reveals the extreme importance of the concept of the self-caused to Spinoza’s 
philosophy.  
  Douglas (2015)47 does not discuss Spinoza’s development of the thought of God as 
self-caused in the positive sense. Spinoza not only accepts Descartes’ thought of God 
as self-caused in a positive sense, but also absorbs it into his basic framework of 
philosophy and endows it with a new connotation. According to Spinoza, on the one 
hand, God as self-caused means that ‘whose essence involves existence or that whose 
nature can be conceived only as existing’ (E1Definition 1, p. 217). On the other hand, 
God as self-caused means that he is the efficient cause of the sensible realm48. The 
concept of the efficient cause is one of the key concepts in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
Spinoza claims that ‘God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but 
also of their essence’ (E1p25, p. 232). The concept of the efficient cause here can be 
                                                             
existence of God follows most clearly and forcefully from the idea of him’ (Letter 40, p. 865). It is not 
my aim to discuss Spinoza’s ontological argument in this thesis. For Spinoza’s ontological argument, 
see Earle (1951), Jarrett (1976), Garrett (1979), and Friedman (1982). 
 
47  St. Anselm of Canterbury (1033 - 1109) had introduced the so-called ontological argument in his 
Proslogion, which was written between 1077 and 1078, and Douglas (2015) does not investigate its 
relationship with Spinoza’s ontological argument. Nowadays it is not clear whether Spinoza’s 
ontological argument for God’s existence has any direct links with Anselm’s or not. 
 
48 For our current purposes, let us borrow this Platonic term, but it cannot be strictly understood in the 




interpreted from several perspectives. Firstly, Spinoza once told his friend that ‘an 
efficient cause can be internal as well as external’ (Letter 60, p. 913). God as an 
external efficient cause introduces things into existence49. God as an internal efficient 
cause endows things with their essence. Moreover, Spinoza claims that ‘God is the 
immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things’ (E1p18, p. 229). To exist as a thing is 
to exist within God - not without God. Finally, Spinoza also claims that the existence 
and essence of things are inferred by each other (E1p25 Scholium, p. 232). We should 
take care to note that Spinoza does not conclude that the existence and essence of an 
individual thing are one and the same, even though he does indeed claim that ‘God’s 
existence and his essence are one and the same’ (E1p20, p. 230). A question arises 
here: which aspect(s) of the existence and essence of things are inferred by each other 
and which aspect(s) of the existence and essence of things are different from each 
other? We will consider this question in due course.  
  In short, the concept of the self-caused refers to God himself, and the concept of the 
efficient cause refers to things in the sensible realm. However, the concept of the 
efficient cause follows from the concept of the self-caused, and it embodies one of the 
connotations of the concept of the self-caused since all things are within God, not 
without God. It is clear here that Spinoza indeed separates God, as a whole, into two 
different realms: the self-caused realm of God himself and the sensible realm of 
                                                             
49 For Spinoza, when we say that God is an external efficient cause, this does not mean that God, who 
stands outside of Nature, creates a thing from nothing, rather that other relevant things, as modes of 
God, bring a thing into existence in the infinite causal network in the sensible realm. 
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which God is the efficient cause, through the thought that God is self-caused in a 
positive sense. 
(iii) God as a Living Being 
So far, we can say that Spinoza’s God is a self-caused absolute existent. We now need 
to explore the issue of how God can be comprehended as absolute existence. Spinoza 
claims that God alone is a free agent because God is ‘constrained by none’ (E1p17, p. 
227). Following this logic, we are led to conclude that one of the important 
characteristics of the existence of God is that if it is possible for something to exist, it 
does exist. This means that any potency to exist in God is actualised. According to 
Spinoza, it is completely wrong to say that God chose to create some things and not to 
create other things by exercising his absolute will. It seems legitimate for us to say 
that God has created everything. Contrastingly, some may worry that if God were to 
create all possible things then he would seem to exhaust his infinite potency, and 
‘render himself imperfection’ (E1p17 Scholium, p. 228). The concern is that once God 
creates everything that is possible he ‘would not have been able to create anything 
more’ (ibid.). Spinoza considers this notion to be completely absurd and ‘inconsistent 
with God’s omnipotence’ (E1p17 Scholium, p. 229). According to Spinoza, since God 
is absolute existence itself, it is necessary that his omnipotence ‘has from eternity 
been actual and will remain for eternity in the same actuality’, using his favorite 
analogy, ‘just as from the nature of a triangle it follows from eternity to eternity that 
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its three angles are equal to two right angles’ (E1p17 Scholium, p. 228)50. If it is 
possible for anything that might possibly exist to remain inexistent, then it seems that 
we can conceive of a greater reality than the so-called ultimate reality that has been 
created. Therefore, the so-called ultimate reality would not be Ultimate Reality. Since 
God himself is identical with the so-called ultimate reality, this would mean that a 
greater God is conceivable. This is absurd. As absolute existence, it is impossible that 
anything more can be brought into existence, and it is also impossible that any 
possibly existent things remain inexistent. This is one of the meanings of God as 
absolute existence. 
Spinoza’s religious background provides us two clues with which to further 
comprehend the concept of God as absolute existence. The first clue comes from the 
name of God in Hebrew Scripture. According to Hebrew Scripture, God is ‘I AM 
WHO I AM’, and ‘I AM’ had sent Moses to the Israelites (Exodus 3:14 NIV). This 
thought was echoed by Jesus in the Gospel of John: ‘before Abraham was born, I am”, 
Jesus claimed (John 8:58 NIV). Therefore, God as absolute existence is one of the 
basic thoughts of Scripture, and Spinoza grew up under the influence of this thought.  
The second clue is Spinoza’s knowledge of Hebrew grammar itself. Spinoza 
believed that a certain amount of linguistic knowledge was a necessary foundation for 
a correct interpretation of the Bible. Spinoza was a master of Hebrew Grammar, but 
                                                             
50 Spinoza’s concept of eternity has a different meaning from its common meaning as being everlasting 
in time. I will discuss this point in due course. However, the way in which the concept is understood 




he confessed that he did not have a sufficient knowledge of Greek. This is the reason 
for his very long interpretation of the Old Testament in contrast to his very short 
interpretation of the New Testament (TTP, p. 498). For the same reason, Spinoza 
began to write the book ‘Hebrew Grammar’ in the later stages of his life, with the 
hope of helping others to comprehend the Old Testament better through a knowledge 
of Hebrew Grammar. In a chapter entitled “Of the life of God” in the CM, Spinoza 
states that God’s life should be comprehended as follows: 
 
Therefore by life we for our part understand the force through which things 
persevere in their own being. And because that force is different from the things 
themselves, we quite properly say that things themselves have life. But the force 
whereby God perseveres in his own being is nothing but his essence, so that those 
speak best who call God ‘life’. There are some theologians who hold the opinion 
that it is for this reason -- that God is life and is not distinct from life -- that the 
Jews when they swore an oath used to say “by the living Jehovah”, and not “by 
the life of Jehovah”, as Joseph, when swearing by Pharaoh’s life, said “by the life 
of Pharaoh.” (CM, p. 197) 
 
This book was published in 1663, and the thoughts embodied in the passage above are 
very rich51. The example in the last sentence above is from Genesis 42: 15-16. 
                                                             
51 The concept of a force through which things persevere in their own being was developed into the 




Spinoza claims that in Hebrew there is a kind of infinitive noun ‘which would express 
an action related to the active mood or to the imminent cause … which…means… 
causing oneself’ to do something (Hebrew Grammar, p. 629, my italics). The term of 
God as an infinitive noun in Hebrew has the same role as verbs in other languages. 
When we say that life is the essence of God, we are saying, in fact, that God is life 
itself and that God himself is life. As an infinitive noun, a living God also means that 
God is self-caused and that God is the imminent cause of everything. Therefore, the 
concept of being self-caused has the implication of the imminent cause in Hebrew 
Grammar itself. Therefore, it seems possible that Spinoza acquired his inspiration for 
the view of God as the imminent cause of things from his knowledge of Hebrew 
Grammar given that he ‘deserves to be called a philologist and a grammatical scholar’ 
of Hebrew (Morgan, 2002, p. 584). 
In short, as Ultimate Reality, Spinoza’s God is absolutely perfect existence itself. 
Spinoza claims that the reality of God and his perfection mean the same thing. God is 
existence itself, and its nature and its existence are one and the same. Spinoza’s God 
is also self-caused existence in the positive sense meaning that God himself is the 
cause of his existence rather than in the negative sense, meaning that God’s existence 
lacks a cause and thus that God’s existence cannot be proved a priori. God as self-
caused existence is suggested by Spinoza’s religious background and his knowledge 
of Hebrew grammar. As the absolutely perfect existence, Spinoza’s God is 
omnipresent, which means that any potency to exist in God has been actualised. 
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Therefore, it seems reasonable for us to say that, for Spinoza, God is existence, and 
existence is God.  
3.1.3 The Parallel between the Concept of Tian and the Concept of God 
When I say Tian, as the Ultimate Reality of Neo-Confucianism, is parallel to Spinoza’s 
God, I mean that there is both a parallel between the basic metaphysical frameworks of 
Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza, and a parallel between Tian’s naturalistic, rationalistic, 
and idealistic dimensions, and the corresponding dimensions of Spinoza’s God. I will 
reveal the parallel between the basic metaphysical frameworks in Section 3.2. I will 
explore the Neo-Confucian naturalistic dimension in Section 3.3. I will then argue that 
its rationalistic dimension is the dominant dimension in Section 3.4.  
  In a parallel way, as Ultimate Reality, Spinoza’s God also has its naturalistic, 
rationalistic, and idealistic dimensions. In what follows, I will explore its naturalistic 
dimension in Section 3.3 and argue that we need to understand the naturalistic 
dimension properly, given that it seems to have been overly emphasized in previous 
scholarship. In Section 3.4, I will argue that the rationalistic dimension is the dominant 
dimension. 
  The Neo-Confucian idealistic dimension will be discussed in Chapter 5. It is worth 
bearing in mind at this beginning stage that, in contrast to mainstream opinion that 
considers the idealistic dimension as a rival of the rationalistic dimension, such as in 
Fung (1953), Chan (1963), Yao (2000), etc., I will argue that, rather than being a rival 
of the rationalistic dimension, the idealistic dimension exists as an idealistic approach 
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toward the epistemology of Neo-Confucian rationalism. I will argue that this idealistic 
approach is, in fact, the rival of the empirical approach towards the epistemology of 
Neo-Confucian rationalism.  
  In a parallel way, I will discuss Spinoza’s idealistic dimension in Chapter 5, and argue 
that Spinoza also has an idealistic approach towards his epistemology. In other words, 
when I say that Spinoza’s God has its idealistic dimension, I mean that Spinoza employs 





3.2. The Parallel in the Basic Metaphysical Frameworks 
3.2.1. The Basic Metaphysical Framework of Neo-Confucianism 
As shown in Section 3.1.1, classical Confucians focused on religious, ideological and 
ethical discourses, but the philosophical foundation of such discourses was crude and 
unstable. The instability became obvious when Buddhism was introduced into China 
and rose in popularity from the Later Han Dynasty (25 - 220). The development of 
Buddhism was so successful that it became the dominant ideology in the hands of 
several emperors of the Tang Dynasty (618 - 907). At the same time, Taoism, rather 
than Confucianism, became the main rival of Buddhism during the development of 
Buddhism. Arguably, one of the reasons for Buddhism and Taoism overtaking 
Confucianism was their deeper philosophical foundations. 
In order to defend Confucianism as the dominant state ideology and confront the 
challenge of Buddhism and Taoism, Confucians needed to set up a firm philosophical 
foundation. A new movement was urgently needed. This movement did indeed appear, 
and produced a great fruit: Neo-Confucianism. During this great movement, the Neo-
Confucian basic framework of metaphysics, its naturalistic and rationalistic dimensions, 
and its idealistic approach towards epistemology, were developed in succession. Neo-
Confucianism arose during the Song Dynasty, overtook its Buddhist and Taoist rivals, 
and remained dominant throughout subsequent Chinese history52.  
                                                             
52 Two points should be noted here. The first point is that Neo-Confucianism made use of many of the 
insights of Buddhism and Taoism in the process of its own development. The second point is that since 
Neo-Confucianism became dominant in Chinese society, Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism now 
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Chou Tun-I was the forerunner of the Neo-Confucian movement. One of his main 
contributions was to lay down the Neo-Confucian basic framework of metaphysics in 
a short treatise, the T’ai-chi-t’u Shuo (太极图说, which literally means the Explanation 
of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate53, 太极图). The treatise does not extend beyond 
250 Chinese characters, but within it the metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism is outlined. 
Some basic ideas in this treatise had been scattered in the scriptures of classical 
Confucianism, especially in the Book of Changes. Furthermore, some scholars believe 
that Chou borrowed a similar diagram from Taoism to aid him in conceiving his own 
diagram. However, Chou was the first person in history to combine these basic ideas 
into a system and establish a holistic metaphysics within a brief framework for Neo-
Confucianism. 
According to Chou’s treatise, the main metaphysical concepts of Neo-Confucianism 
                                                             
occupy Chinese daily life in a harmonious and complimentary way even though their basic doctrines 
conflict with each other. It is not unusual for someone to be not only a Confucian but also a Taoist - and 
at the same time a Buddhist. Just as Küng and Ching (1993) depict, an official can be a standard 
Confucian in his office, but at the same time read the classics of Taoism and Buddhism when he is at 
home. He might have many Taoist and Buddhist friends, and he might often visit their temples in the 
holidays, or practice Taoist and Buddhist meditation at home. His wife is often a lay Buddhist who 
stays at home, and has a family hall for worshipping the Buddha. It is possible for her to worship at a 
temple of Confucius when hoping for her son to be successful in the state examination, for example, 
and at the same time it is also possible for her to worship at a Taoist temple when hoping for the 
longevity of the elders at home. If necessary, she might go to a Buddhist temple and pray for an early 
conception of a child (Küng and Ching, 1993, p. 225, cited in Lee, 2011, p. 232). Yao names this 
phenomenon as the ‘unity of three doctrines’ in Chinese society (Yao, 2000, pp. 224-9) 
 
53 Chou Tun-I uses a diagram named the Diagram of the Great Ultimate to discuss the Neo-Confucian 
basic framework of metaphysics. The introduction of the diagram is one of the key steps in the history 
of the development of Neo-Confucianism. Anyone interested in the diagram itself should consult 
Wang, R. (2005). Here I will not pursue this diagram since it is not directly relevant to my thesis. 
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can be listed in the two tables as below: 
 
Ultimate Reality / Tian (天) 
The essential realm The functional realm 
The Great Ultimate (太极) The myriad things (万物) 
Table 3 The Two Neo-Confucian Realms of Ultimate Reality. 
 
 
Table 4 The Two Neo-Confucian Aspects of Ultimate Reality. 
 
Firstly, Tian, as the Ultimate Reality of Neo-Confucianism, can be considered to have 
two realms: the essential realm and the functional realm. Briefly speaking, the essential 
realm focuses on the essence of Tian, and the concept of the Great Ultimate (太极) 
mainly refers to this realm. The concept of the Great Ultimate is one of the core 
concepts of Neo-Confucianism. The Great Ultimate is both the origin of the universe 
and its essence. The functional realm focuses on the sensible realm, and mainly refers 
Ultimate Reality / Tian (天) 
The bodily aspect The mental aspect 
• Ch’i (气) 
• Yin and Yang ( 阴阳 ) / Five 
Elements (五行) 
• physical form (形体) 
• Li (理) 
• The Li of Tian (天理) 




to the production and reproduction of the myriad things (万物). I will explore the two 
realms further in Section 3.5. 
  Moreover, Tian can also be considered to have two aspects: the bodily aspect and the 
mental aspect. The bodily aspect mainly refers to the concepts of Ch’i (气), Yin and 
Yang (阴阳) and the Five Elements (五行), and the physical form of a thing (形体). I 
will explore these in Section 3.3. The mental aspect mainly refers to the concepts of Li 
(理), the Li of Tian (天理) and the Li of a thing (事理). I will explore these in Section 
3.4.   
  Chou’s basic framework and its main concepts are followed by all Confucians (Chan, 
1963, p. 464). However, different Confucians have different understandings of these 
key concepts and their relationships to one another, and various doctrines have 
subsequently been developed. In line with these competing doctrines, different 
dimensions were developed and further extended. Among these doctrines, the 
naturalistic and rationalistic dimensions of Tian, and its idealistic approach towards 
epistemology, were particularly important. Following the order of Neo-Confucian 
development, the bodily aspect will be discussed through its naturalistic dimension, and 
the mental aspect will be discussed through its rationalistic dimension. Its idealistic 
approach towards epistemology will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
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3.2.2 The Basic Metaphysical Framework of Spinoza 
Spinoza lists the core concepts of his metaphysics in the beginning of his Ethics as 
substance, attribute, and mode (Shein, Fall 2013), and they can be summarized by the 
below table: 
 
Table 5 The Main Concepts of Spinoza’s Metaphysics. 
 
(i) An Attribute Expresses the Eternal and Infinite Essence of God  
Spinoza explicitly tells us that God is not only ‘a thinking thing’ (E2p1, p. 245), but 
also ‘an extended thing’ (E2p2, p. 245) in the beginning of the second part of his Ethics. 
Furthermore, since God is the only substance, then ‘thinking substance and extended 
substance are one and the same substance’: the thinking substance when comprehended 
under the attribute of Thought, and the extended substance when comprehended under 
the attribute of Extension (E2p7 Scholium, p. 247). Here one of the core concepts of 
Spinoza’s metaphysics, the concept of attribute, is heavily involved. According to 
Spinoza’s definition, an ‘attribute’ refers to that which ‘the intellect perceives of 
Ultimate Reality / God (Substance) 
The bodily aspect The mental aspect 
• Extension (Attribute) 
• Motion and Rest (Infinite mode) 
• The body (Finite mode) 
• Thought (Attribute) 
• The idea of God (Infinite mode) 
• The idea of a thing (Finite mode) 
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substance as constituting its essence’ (E1Definition 4, p. 217). There are several 
important issues in Spinoza’s theory of attributes.  
Firstly, God has infinite attributes. In Spinoza’s formal definition of his concept of 
God, the concept of ‘attribute’ has a core role since Spinoza believes that God, as the 
only substance, consists ‘of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and 
infinite essence’ (E1Definition 6, p. 217). As an attribute constitutes God’s essence, to 
say God has infinite attributes is to say that God has infinite essences. However, 
according to Spinoza, God’s essence and his existence are one and the same (E1p20, p. 
230). It does not seem to make sense to say that God has infinite existences in the sense 
of quantity, for instance as suggested by multiverse theory, because God as absolute 
existence is always one and absolute existence cannot be divided in Spinoza’s 
philosophy. Another possible explanation is that God, as absolute existence, has infinite 
aspects, or infinite ways of being, and that every aspect of existence is embodied by 
one of God’s attributes. Spinoza believes that the more reality a thing has, the more 
attributes it has (E1p9, p. 221). As such, God has infinite attributes since God has 
infinite reality. 
Secondly, people can only access the attribute of Thought and the attribute of 
Extension54 among God’s infinite attributes. What people are familiar with is God’s 
                                                             
54 Some scholars claim that it is not God who has these attributes, but that the human mind invents the 
attributes referenced in Spinoza’s philosophy (Shein, Fall 2013). In other words, what the intellect 
perceives in the definition of ‘attribute’ above is to be perceived by the human mind (Wolfson, 1934a, 
p. 146). This opinion could be called the subjectivist interpretation. One of the main reasons for 
supporting the subjectivist interpretation is that such scholars believe that the essence of God is simple 
and that any multiplicity implied by such attributes ‘is merely apparent but not real’ (Shein, Fall 2013). 
However, this subjectivist interpretation faces considerable difficulties. Firstly, it seems impossible for 
94 
 
attribute of Extension, and it is easy for them to believe that external objects exist 
because they can get in touch with these objects through their sense organs. They can 
see, listen, smell, taste, and touch these external objects. What the common people are 
not familiar with is God’s attribute of Thought. This is not to say that the common 
people are unfamiliar with their own minds or do not believe that others have similar 
minds. Rather, the common people cannot consider these things under the attribute of 
Thought as one real expression of existence. For example, there is a popular analogy 
that the human mind is like a mirror, and what is in the mirror is just the reflection of 
objects outside, but the reflection in the mirror does not itself exist55. Similarly, the 
common people also cannot believe that the existence of these things under the attribute 
of Thought is the same as the existence of external objects. In contrast, Spinoza believes 
that the existence of these things under the attribute of Thought is the same as the 
existence of external objects or, to use Spinoza’s terminology, the existence of these 
things under the attribute of Extension56 . Moreover, it is impossible for humans to 
                                                             
a finite human mind to know God as infinite existence. Secondly, God could not have infinite attributes 
if such attributes were invented by the human mind, given Spinoza’s view that men can only access 
two attributes. For these reasons, Shein concludes that the subjectivist interpretation ‘has fallen out of 
favor’ (Shein, Fall 2013). Contrastingly, other scholars believe that what the intellect perceives is to be 
discovered by the human mind, and this opinion could be called the interpretation of objectivism. I 
follow the interpretation of objectivism in this thesis. 
 
55 We will see that Neo-Confucians also like to use this analogy, but with a different meaning. 
 
56 But, to say that the existence of these things under the attribute of Thought is the same as the 
existence of external objects is not to say that whatever a person has in mind always exists in reality. 
According to Spinoza, it is only to say that whatever God has in his mind always exists. Spinoza claims 
that only some of the ideas in a human mind have their corresponding objects without, and Spinoza 
allows the existence of the ideas of nonexisting individual things in E2p8 (p. 248).  
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comprehend other aspects of God’s existence or, to use Spinoza’s terminology, other 
expressions of God’s existence, even if one accepts that the existence of the mind is the 
same as the existence of the body57.  
Thirdly, Spinoza believes that different attributes are really distinct from each other 
even if they belong to the same substance (E1p10 Scholium, p. 221). Therefore, on the 
one hand, each attribute must be conceived through itself (E1p10, p. 221), and on the 
other hand, the modes of any attribute involve the conception of their own attribute, 
and do not involve any conception of other attributes (E2p6, p. 246). In other words, 
the modes of different attributes are completely insulated from each other. It is 
impossible to have mutual cause and effect among different attributes. Ideas, as modes 
of the attribute of Thought, do not affect bodies, as modes of the attribute of Extension, 
and vice versa. Put simply, the mind does not affect the body, and the body does not 
affect the mind.  
This thought originated with Descartes. The mind and the body are two distinct 
substances in Descartes’ philosophy, and either can exist without the other. Spinoza 
transfers the concept of ‘substance’ in Descartes’ philosophy into the concept of 
‘attribute’ in his own philosophy. Similar to Descartes’ conception of distinct substances, 
Spinoza defends a conception of distinct attributes. In contrast to Descartes’ conception 
                                                             
 
57  There is a substantial gap between the two attributes that humans know and the infinite attributes 
that God has. The issue of this gap has been responsible for a longstanding undercurrent of interpreting 
Spinoza’s philosophy as some form of mysticism in the history of philosophy. I do not agree with the 
explanation of any kind of mysticism, but I propose that the gap provides good evidence to prove the 




of the interaction between the mind and the body in the pineal gland of the brain, 
Spinoza completely rules out the possibility of interaction, claiming that ‘[the] body 
cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or 
rest’ (E3p2, p. 279). Shein applies the phrase ‘cross attribute explanations’ for such 
interaction; for instance, if I were to explain my physical behavior of writing my thesis 
by reference to my mental desire to finish my thesis (Shein, Fall 2013). In contrast, 
according to Spinoza’s theory of attributes, my behavior of writing could be explained 
purely physically by antecedent physical behavior, and this antecedent physical 
behavior could be explained purely physically by its antecedent physical behavior, and 
so on ad infinitum. In the same situation, my desire to finish my thesis in my mind could 
be explained purely mentally by antecedent mental desires. For example, I want to 
finish my study early, and this antecedent mental desire could be explained purely 
mentally by its antecedent mental desire, and so on ad infinitum. Della Rocca refers to 
this as ‘a conceptual barrier’ given that the modes of one attribute can be conceived of 
without the aid of the modes of the other attribute (Della Rocca, 1996, pp. 9-17). 
Finally, Spinoza believes that different attributes are isomorphic58. The relationship 
                                                             
58 Some scholars refer to this as Spinoza’s parallelism. This so-called parallelism between the mind 
and the body in the literature relevant to the study of Spinoza should be distinguished carefully from 
my main argument in this thesis, the parallel between Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-Confucianism. 
For this distinction, I will always use the term ‘isomorphic’ in place of the term ‘parallel’ when 
referring to the relationship between the mind and the body in Spinoza’s philosophy. Although the term 
‘parallelism’ is popular in the literature relevant to the study of Spinoza, there are still many scholars 
who use the term ‘isomorphism’, such as Rosen (1968), Friedman (1974), Friedman (1983), Bennett 




between the mind and the body poses a real puzzle for Cartesian dualism due to their 
real distinction. In his philosophy, Spinoza has better theoretical resources to deal with 
the similar problem, since the attribute of Thought and the attribute of Extension belong 
to the same substance. However, Spinoza still needs to give us a further answer since 
he insists on the conceptual barrier, the impossibility of cross attribute explanation, 
whereas common sense seems to tell us that the mind and the body always act 
simultaneously. Spinoza’s answer is the isomorphism of the mind and the body given 
his claim that ‘[the] order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and 
connection of things’ (E2p7, p. 247).  
  In short, God has infinite attributes but men only access the attributes of Thought and 
Extension. All attributes are distinct from one another and it is impossible to have a 
cross attribute explanation. However, all attributes are also isomorphic. Therefore, 
Shein claims that attributes ‘are at the very heart of Spinoza’s metaphysics’ (Shein, Fall 
2013). It makes the doctrine of one substance with varieties of reality possible. 
Moreover, it is an elegant solution to the Cartesian puzzle of the relationship between 
the mind and the body59.  
                                                             
59 Nowadays the so-called relationship between the mind and the body is a usage in the philosophy of 
mind due to the influence of Cartesian dualism. However, according to Spinoza, this ought to be 
recognised as the isomorphism of the mode of the attribute of Thought and the mode of the attribute of 
Extension (or the isomorphism of the attribute of Thought and the attribute of Extension – to put it 




(ii) A Mode as an Affection of God 
According to Spinoza’s definition, the concept of a mode refers to ‘the affections of 
substance’ (E1 Definition 5, p. 217). What is meant by ‘the affections’ in Spinoza’s 
mind is that ‘which is in something else and is conceived through something else’ (ibid.). 
If we look back at the concept of substance, it will be easier for us to comprehend the 
concept of a mode given that Spinoza defines them in opposing manners. In contrast to 
the concept of a mode, the concept of substance means that which ‘is in itself and is 
conceived through itself’ (E1 Definition 3, p. 217). In other words, the conception of a 
mode depends on the conception of substance, but the conception of substance does not 
depend on any other conception. According to Spinoza, there are two kinds of modes. 
There are infinite modes, such as Motion and Rest in the attribute of Extension, and 
finite modes, such as a human body.  
The term ‘idea’ has a special role in Spinoza’s philosophy, and has a different sense 
from how the term is used nowadays. By ‘idea’ Spinoza means ‘a conception of the 
Mind which the Mind forms because it is a thinking thing’ (E2 Definition 3, p. 244). 
Spinoza does not provide a clear definition of the concept of the mind even though it is 
one of the core topics in the Ethics, and this implies that Spinoza accepts its normal 
usage. As a conception of the mind, the concept of an idea is familiar to us. Pollock also 
observed that ‘Spinoza’s idea seems equivalent to what we now call a concept’ (Pollock, 
1880, p.146, italics in original). What we are not familiar with is Spinoza’s notion that 
an idea is a mode of the attribute of Thought: on this understanding, an idea is a mode 
of the mind. According to E2p7, the order of, and connection between, the modes of 
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the attribute of Thought are the same as the order of, and connection between, the modes 
of the attribute of Extension, or any other attribute. In Spinoza’s terminology a mode 
of the attribute of Extension is the body, owing to the fact that by ‘body’ Spinoza means 
‘a mode that expresses in a definite and determinate way God’s essence insofar as he is 
considered as an extended thing’ (E2 Definition 1, p. 244). Therefore, the isomorphism 
of the attribute of Thought and the attribute of Extension exists between the idea and 
the body in Spinoza’s philosophy, rather than between the mind and the body as in 
Descartes’ philosophy. In other words, the relationship between the mind and the body 
in Descartes’ philosophy became the relationship between the idea and the body in 
Spinoza’s. We should bear this important distinction in mind. Furthermore, the 
isomorphism of the idea and the body does not imply that the idea of a mode and the 
mode of Extension are two modes of God. Rather, that they are the same mode - just 
like a single coin with two different sides or a person with two different names. 
A further question concerns the nature of the relationship between the mind and the 
idea in Spinoza’s philosophy. On the one hand, as the mode of the attribute of Thought, 
Spinoza considers an idea to be an instantiation of the mind in a special way. Therefore, 
it is right to say that an idea is the smallest unit of a mind, and such a mind could loosely 
be considered the collection of all of its ideas. On the other hand, the relationship 
between the mind and the idea is not quantitative, because it is also possible for a single 
idea to incorporate many different ideas simultaneously. 
It is now time to highlight a crucial point. As a linguistic habit, the mode of the 
attribute of Thought and the mode of the attribute of Extension are often loosely referred 
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to as the mind and the body respectively. With respect to God himself, Spinoza never 
uses the term ‘the mind of God’ or its other variants in his Ethics. For Spinoza, one 
similar usage is the term ‘the idea of God’ in the context of the Ethics. However, given 
that an idea is a conception of the mind, it is not possible for us to completely abolish 
the concept of mind when referring to God. Moreover, in the same way that Spinoza 
tries to avoid using the term ‘the mind of God’, he also tries to avoid using the term 
‘the body of God’. As alternatives, Spinoza uses other terms to refer to what God’s 
attribute of Extension is referring to, such as, ‘God is an extended thing’ (E2p2, p. 245), 
God’s ‘being the object of his own idea’ (E2p5 Proof, p. 246), ‘the things understood 
by God’ (E2p7, p. 247). The reason that Spinoza tries to avoid using the terms ‘the mind 
of God’ and ‘the body of God’ is perhaps owed to his criticism of anthropomorphism: 
Spinoza does not want to mislead his readers into supposing that God is similar to 
human beings. From a logical perspective, and in a similar fashion to the case of the 
concept of ‘the mind of God’ being used to mean ‘the idea of God’, it is also legitimate 
for us to use the term ‘the body of God’ to mean God as an extended thing. In other 
words, it is convenient for us to use the term ‘the body of God’ to loosely refer to God 
as an extended thing. I will continue to use the terms ‘the mind of God’ and ‘the body 
of God’ in relevant contexts, but their meanings should be comprehended as ‘the idea 
of God’ and ‘God as an extended thing’ respectively. 
In short, a mode is an affection of God. It is both in God and conceived through God. 
There are two kinds of modes: infinite mode and finite mode. An idea is a mode of the 
attribute of Thought, and its relationship with the mind is of a special kind for Spinoza. 
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The isomorphism of the attribute of Thought and the attribute of Extension is, in fact, 
the isomorphism of the idea and the mode of the body in Spinoza’s philosophy, rather 
than the isomorphism of the mind and the body in Descartes’ philosophy.  
3.2.3 The Parallel in the Basic Metaphysical Frameworks 
Now it is the time to reveal the parallel in the basic metaphysical frameworks of 




Ultimate Reality / Tian (天) Ultimate Reality / God (substance) 
The essential realm (The Great Ultimate) Natura naturans (The intellect of God) 
The functional realm (The myriad things) Natura naturata (Individual things) 




Ch’i (气) Extension (Attribute) 
Yin and Yang (阴阳) / Five Elements (五行) Motion and Rest (Infinite mode) 
physical form (形体) The body (Finite mode) 





Table 8 A Comparison of the Mental Aspect. 
 
As a summary, the tables above list the metaphysical frameworks of both the Neo-
Confucians and Spinoza, and the main concepts within those frameworks. The table 
reveals the stunning parallel between them in a visual style. In what follows, I will 
explain these parallels in detail.  
  Tian, as the Ultimate Reality of Neo-Confucianism, can be considered to have two 
realms: the essential realm and the functional realm. God, as the Ultimate Reality of 
Spinoza, can also be considered to have two realms: Natura naturans and Natura 
naturata. I will explore the two realms further in Section 3.5. 
  Tian can also be considered to have two aspects: the bodily aspect and the mental 
aspect. In a parallel way, God also has its bodily aspect and mental aspect. The parallels 
concerning the bodily aspect will be revealed in detail in Section 3.3, and the parallels 
concerning the mental aspect will be revealed in detail in Section 3.4.  
  The concept of the Great Ultimate in Neo-Confucianism, and the concept of the 
intellect of God in Spinoza, need to be explained further here. The concept of the Great 
Ultimate is at the very heart of Neo-Confucian metaphysics. In Neo-Confucianism, the 
Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
Li (理) Thought (Attribute) 
The Li of Tian (天理) The idea of God (Infinite mode) 
The Li of a thing (事理) The idea of a thing (Finite mode) 
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Great Ultimate is both the essence of Tian and the essence of everything. Chu says that 
‘[w]ith respect to heaven and earth, there is the Great Ultimate in them. With respect to 
the myriad things, there is the Great Ultimate in each and every one of them’ (Chan, 
1963, p. 638).  
Moreover, Neo-Confucians are divided into different schools concerning how the 
concept of the Great Ultimate is to be comprehended. Naturalistic Neo-Confucians 
believe that the Great Ultimate is nothing other than Ch’i. For example, as will be 
revealed in Section 3.3, Chang Tsai, as a representative of the naturalistic dimension of 
Neo-Confucianism, claims that the Great Ultimate is identical with Ch’i. By contrast, 
rationalistic Neo-Confucians believe that the Great Ultimate is nothing other than Li. 
Chu, as a representative of the rationalistic dimension of Neo-Confucianism, accepted 
Chou Tun-I’s whole metaphysical framework. At the same time, Chu developed the 
concept of the Great Ultimate through his theory of Li. According to Chu, ‘[the] Great 
Ultimate is nothing other than principle [Li]’ (ibid.). This thought is recognized by 
scholars as the central point of Chu’s entire philosophy (ibid.). This is the main reason 
for Chu being recognized as a rationalist - whereas Chang is recognized as a naturalist. 
The idealistic Neo-Confucians believe that the mind is identical with both Li and the 
Great Ultimate, which will be explored in Chapter 5. 
  In a parallel way, the concept of the intellect of God is at the very heart of Spinoza’s 
metaphysical framework. Spinoza does not provide a conclusive definition of the term 
‘intellect’ itself in his Ethics, however it occurs directly in the definition of ‘attribute’ 
at the beginning of his Ethics. In E1Definition 4, he states that an attribute is that which 
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the intellect perceives of substance as constituting the essence of substance. 
Furthermore, it is used throughout his Ethics. Therefore, it is reasonable to say that 
Spinoza’s usage of the term ‘intellect’ is not ad hoc. Spinoza touches on the concept of 
the intellect of God in E1p16, and he discusses it in the Scholium of E1p17 as follows: 
 
If intellect does pertain to the divine nature, it cannot, like man’s intellect, be 
posterior to (as most thinkers hold), or simultaneous with the objects of 
understanding, since God is prior in causality to all things (Cor. 1 Pr. 16). On the 
contrary, the truth and formal essence of things is what it is because it exists as such 
in the intellect of God as an object of thought. Therefore, the intellect of God, 
insofar as it is conceived as constituting God’s essence, is in actual fact the cause 
of things, in respect both of their essence and their existence. This seems to have 
been recognized also by those who have asserted that God’s intellect, will, and 
power, are one and the same. Since therefore the intellect of God is the one and 
only cause of things, both of their essence and their existence, as we have shown, 
it must necessarily be different from them both in respect of essence and existence. 
For that which is caused differs from its cause precisely in what it has from its 
cause. (E1p17 Scholium, p. 229, my italics) 
 
Here Spinoza emphasizes that God’s essence and the essence of things and their 
existence are constituted by the intellect of God, but also that God’s intellect, will, and 
power, are one and the same. Spinoza repeats this pivotal conclusion in Scholium of 
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E2p7, in which he suggests that this truth seems to have been glimpsed by some of the 
Hebrews60, who held that God, God’s intellect, and the things understood by God are 
one and the same. Therefore, God, God’s intellect, God’s will, God’s power, and the 
things understood by God, are all identical to each other in Spinoza’s metaphysics. 
Moreover, as we will see in Section 3.4, Spinoza establishes the identity of the concept 
of the intellect of God and the concept of the idea of God.  
  To summarize, God is considered to be the Ultimate Reality of Spinoza’s 
philosophy, whereas Tian is considered to be the Ultimate Reality of Neo-
Confucianism. The concept of the Great Ultimate is at the very heart of the 
metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism and, in a parallel way, the concept of the intellect 
of God is at the very heart of the metaphysics of Spinoza. The Great Ultimate is 
considered to be the essence of Tian, and the essence of the myriad things and the 
cause of their existence. In a parallel way, the intellect of God is considered to be the 
essence of God, and the essence of particular things and the cause of their existence. 
Therefore, the Great Ultimate in Neo-Confucianism and the intellect of God in 
Spinoza are parallel.  
                                                             
60 Morgan (2002) suggests that this refers most likely to Moses Maimonides (Morgan, 2002, p. 247). 
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3.3 The Parallel in the Bodily Aspect 
3.3.1 The Naturalistic Dimension in Neo-Confucianism 
Neo-Confucians have a special term ‘Ch’i’ to refer to one basic substance61 , out of 
which all things in the universe were made. Ch’i is the fundamental entity of the 
universe. It is a difficult task to find a suitable English term to translate this since it 
embodies a unique thought that seems not to have been conceived of in Western 
culture62. Ch’i as an everyday word has a normal meaning which refers to air, vapor, 
gas, etc. The meaning of Ch’i in philosophy is completely removed from its everyday 
meaning, but it is possible that the development of this concept has its etymological 
root in the invisibility of air and its tremendous variability. At the same time, Ch’i as it 
is used in Chinese medicine refers to the breath of humans. When a man takes his last 
breath, we say that he loses his Ch’i, and dies at that moment. From this usage, some 
scholars have translated it into the term ‘vital force’. Some scholars consider it as an 
energy-like or force-like matter owing to its active aspect. 
Fung (1953) translates it into the English term ‘Ether’ while Chan (1963) translates 
it into the English term ‘material force’. The translations of Fung and Chan are also 
liable to distort its real meaning since Fung’s translation may easily lead to an 
Aristotelian reading, and Chan’s translation may easily lead to a materialist reading. 
                                                             
61 It is noteworthy that Spinoza uses the term ‘substance’ in a different style, which refers to God 
himself. 
 




Neither of them succeeded in interpreting the entire meaning of the concept. Yao (2000) 
uses a simplified Chinese term ‘Qi’ to refer to it. 
Ch’i as a concept of philosophy had been adopted in the Book of Changes, in which 
things were claimed to be produced through the combination of Essence and Ch’i (Chan, 
1963, p.265). However, the popular concept of Ch’i links to the development of the 
naturalistic trend in Confucianism. 
  In classical Confucianism, Tian’s naturalistic dimension emerged since Tian is often 
identified as Nature. The English term ‘Nature’ has its corresponding Chinese term 
‘Ziran (自然)’, which literally means the ‘self-so’ (a thing coming into being both 
without any external cause and without any purpose) (Callahan, 1989, p. 171). The term 
was first coined by the founder of Taoism, Lao Tzu (老子, 6th B.C. or 4th B.C.?63), in 
his Tao-Te Ching (道德经). Therefore, the concept of Nature became one of the core 
concepts of Taoism, much like the concept of Tian in Confucianism. According to 
Taoism, the concept of Nature has special philosophical implications. The first 
implication is that there is no creator outside Nature: the existence of Nature does not 
have an external cause64. The second implication is that the existence of Nature does 
                                                             
63 Here the question mark denotes that we cannot know the actual date since the relevant historical 
evidence has been lost, and it is followed throughout this thesis. 
 
64 The creation myth of Pangu (盘古) is found in ancient Chinese literature. According to this myth, 
Pangu seems to be the creator of all. In contrast with the Biblical Genesis, Pangu seems to be more 
similar to humankind than to any god. This seems to imply that it was humankind, rather than a god, 
who created the universe. However, scholars have not taken the Pangu creation myth seriously in 




not have a final cause. The third implication is that Nature existed in the infinite65 past 
and will continue to exist into the infinite future.  
  In short, the concept of Nature was used by Taoism to refer to the state of as-it-is-
ness, that is, the state of Tao. The essence of Tao is as it is, and any artificial effort, or 
the efforts of gods, does not belong to the state of the Tao. The term ‘Nature’ is borrowed 
by Confucianism to refer to the universe itself. At the same time, the above implications 
of the concept of Nature in Taoism were also shared by most Confucians. The concept 
of Tian and the concept of Nature were often used interchangeably in the Confucian 
literature. 
Confucius once sighed, ‘What does Tian ever say? Yet there are the four seasons 
going round and there are the hundred things coming into being. What does Tian ever 
say?’ in the Analects 17:19 (Chan, 1963, p. 47)66. Confucius seems to suggest that Tian 
always runs its course following its own principle. In the hands of Hsun Tzu, the 
naturalistic explanation of Tian became the dominant trend. He stated the following 
naturalistic thought:  
 
                                                             
65 The conception of infinity here should be comprehended as ‘everlasting in time’ – as opposed to 
Spinoza’s concept of infinity. 
 
66 As one of the most important classics of Confucianism, the Analects was written by Confucius’ 
disciples - or the disciples of his disciples - after Confucius’ death. It was written in the form of daily 
dialogues between Confucius and his disciples and, also, among his disciples. Accurately speaking, it 
was edited, rather than written, since it is a recording of those dialogues. These dialogues happened on 
a daily basis: the style is utterly different from the Platonic style. In this thesis all citations from the 
Analects are taken from Chan (1963). 
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Nature (T’ien [Tian], Heaven) operates with constant regularity…. If the 
foundations of living (i.e., agriculture and sericulture) are strengthened and are 
economically used, then Nature cannot bring impoverishment. If people’s 
nourishment is sufficient and their labor in keeping with the seasons, then Nature 
cannot inflict sickness. If the Way is cultivated without deviation, then Nature 
cannot cause misfortune. … this is how the Way works’. (Chan, 1963, pp. 116-7) 
 
Such a thought is so clearly naturalistic that Chan feels that the term ‘Tian’ itself ‘has 
to be translated as Nature rather than as Heaven’ (Chan, 1963, p. 117). It should be 
noted here that the special terminology ‘the way of Tian’ (Tiantao, 天道 ) was 
introduced to refer to Tian’s own principle. This terminology was accepted by all 
Confucians thereafter. According to Hsun Tzu, the thought of Tian following its own 
principle is the way of Tian. The conception of the way of Tian here is very similar to 
the concept of the law of Nature in Western philosophy. Therefore, Hsun Tzu was 
considered to be the founder of naturalism in Confucianism (Chan, 1963, p. 115). 
  The naturalistic form of explanation approached maturity in the hands of Wang 
Ch’ung (王充 , 27-100?). Wang Ch’ung denied that the universe is in any way 
teleological. The way of Tian is ‘of spontaneity’, which means that the myriad things 
outflow in their own course, and ‘non-activity’, which means Tian lacks any purpose 
and the myriad things are created in their own course (Fung, 1953, p. 152). Wang 
Ch’ung’s thought is very close to Taoist naturalism.  
  Wang Ch’ung claimed that the life of a man is tied to his Ch’i and that he dies once 
110 
 
his Ch’i is gone. The death of a man is like the extinction of fire. No souls or ghosts or 
any other kind of spiritual entities exist. He argued against any mysterious or fantastical 
explanation of Nature (Chan, 1963, p. 292). His thinking is very materialistic on this 
point. These kinds of thoughts became the basic resource in the development of the 
naturalistic trend of Neo-Confucianism. 
This naturalistic trend was extended even further into the naturalistic dimension by 
Neo-Confucianism, especially in the hands of Chang Tsai. Wang Ch’ung used the 
concept of Ch’i at the level of matter, but not at the level of ontology. It was Chang Tsai 
who first raised this concept up to the level of ontology. According to Chang, Ch’i is 
identical with the Great Ultimate (Chan, 1963, p. 495). Ch’i, as the Great Ultimate 
itself, exists without any form (Yao, 2000, p. 102). Chang says that the active aspect 
(Yang) and the passive aspect (Yin) of Ch’i are generated through the movement of the 
Great Ultimate as Ch’i - whereas Chou Tun-I seems to say that the active Ch’i (Yang) 
and the passive Ch’i (Yin) are generated through the movement of the Great Ultimate, 
but that the Great Ultimate is not itself Ch’i. According to Chang, Yin and Yang are two 
aspects of Ch’i, and they are fundamentally identical (Chan, 1963, p. 495). In contrast, 
Yin and Yang are two kinds of Ch’i in Chou’s explanation. Chang considered the Five 
Elements as the five basic forces of Ch’i. The myriad things are generated through the 
integration of Ch’i, and disappear because of the disintegration of Ch’i. However, the 
Ch’i that constitutes a thing is not eliminated when the thing itself is destroyed: the Ch’i 
returns to its original state upon such disintegration.  
In brief, Chang and his followers established a whole system of philosophy to explain 
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the nature of the universe, the nature of man, the possibility of morality, and so on, 
under a naturalistic pattern through the identification of Ch’i with the Great Ultimate. 
This is the naturalistic dimension of the concept of Tian. It was the first dimension to 
become dominant in Neo-Confucianism after the basic Neo-Confucian framework of 
metaphysics was established. Even though the naturalistic dimension lost its dominant 
place when the rationalistic dimension was established, the thought that Tian is identical 
with Nature remained, and a pantheistic monism was accepted by all Neo-Confucians 
thereafter. 
3.3.2 The Naturalistic Dimension in Spinoza 
In comparison with the other dimensions, the naturalistic dimension of Spinoza’s God 
is more remarkable. Spinoza is also the most important philosopher who directly 
defines God as Nature. Of all of Spinoza’s terminologies, it is not controversial to say 
that the term ‘God or Nature (Deus sive Natura)’ is the most popular. The conjunction 
word ‘or’ in this term does not mean a relationship of choice, but rather the relationship 
of identity. Therefore, it is better for us to read the term ‘God or Nature’ ‘God, that is, 
Nature’, or ‘God, in other words, Nature’.  
The relationship of identity between God and Nature is a logical conclusion from 
Spinoza’s theory of one substance, which was developed in the first part of his Ethics. 
God is the sole substance and whatever is, is in God (E1p15, p. 224). As was revealed 
in Section 3.1, God is the absolute reality and Nature is his other name. With respect to 
Spinoza’s philosophy, I will not pursue its naturalistic dimension further as it seems to 
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be an axiom. 
However, it should also be noted that the naturalistic dimension is not the dominant 
dimension for Spinoza. Spinoza is often categorised as a naturalist, however Douglas 
(2015) has argued convincingly against this popular categorisation. I will not engage in 
the argument in this thesis as Douglas (2015) has already helped us to clarify this issue. 
My conclusion here is that Spinoza’s philosophy has its naturalistic dimension but is 
not naturalism. 
3.3.3 The Parallel in the Bodily Aspect 
What I should concede here is that I cannot argue that every part of the bodily aspect 
between Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza is parallel with the other. For example, we 
cannot find a concept in Spinoza that is parallel to the concept of the Five Elements in 
Neo-Confucianism. What I am arguing here is that the bodily aspect as a whole, and its 
core concepts, are all parallel to each other. Table 7 clearly reveals the parallels in the 
bodily aspect as a whole: 
  
Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
Ch’i (气) Extension (Attribute) 
Yin and Yang (阴阳) / Five Elements (五行) Motion and Rest (Infinite mode) 
physical form (形体) The body (Finite mode) 




With respect to the bodily aspect as a whole, they both have the naturalistic dimension 
as the important dimension of Ultimate Reality. Tian in Neo-Confucianism and God in 
Spinoza are identical with Nature in their own ways67. We saw that Tian is identical 
with Nature in Section 3.3.1. In a parallel way, it is self-evident that God is identical 
with Nature in Spinoza.  
With respect to the main concepts, there are three concepts referring to the bodily 
aspect of the metaphysical framework in Table 7: the concept of Ch’i, the concept of 
Yin and Yang (the Five Elements also), and the concept of physical form in Neo-
Confucianism, and the concept of the attribute of Extension, the concept of Motion and 
Rest, and the concept of the body in Spinoza. Firstly, the parallel between the concept 
of physical form in Neo-Confucianism and the concept of the body in Spinoza is 
obvious since they are both referring to the bodily aspect of the same sensible realm, 
and thus it is not necessary to explain this point further. Secondly, according to Neo-
Confucianism, Yang is motion and Yin is rest. The parallel between the concept of Yin 
and Yang in Neo-Confucianism and the concept of Motion and Rest in Spinoza seems, 
then, obvious. The detailed relationship between them is an interesting topic, which is 
deserving of further development in an independent paper. But it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis, and I will not pursue it further here. 
Finally, here my main task is to clarify the parallel between the concept of Ch’i in 
Neo-Confucianism and the concept of the attribute of Extension in Spinoza. The 
                                                             
67 In other words, the concept of Nature in Confucianism is not the same as the concept of Nature in 
Spinoza. Prof. Yujin Nagasawa reminded me of this point. 
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concept of Ch’i and the concept of the attribute of Extension are, of course, different 
given that Spinoza’s theory of attributes has no place in Neo-Confucianism and Ch’i, 
considered to be an independent entity, has no place in Spinoza. The parallel between 
them is mainly due to the way in which the bodily aspect of existence is established in 
both Neo-Confucianism and in Spinoza. Ch’i is the foundation of the bodily aspect of 
existence in Neo-Confucianism. No Ch’i, no physical form. Extension is also the 
foundation of the bodily aspect of existence in Spinoza: no Extension, no mode of the 
attribute of Extension, and therefore no body. Furthermore, this point can be further 
understood by viewing their shared denial of atomism.  
  According to atomism, the smallest elementary particles exist at the most 
fundamental layer of the universe and all macroscopic bodies are made up of different 
combinations of these elementary particles. Atomism had existed as a theory since 
ancient Greece, but it became very popular in Spinoza’s era due to the development of 
atomic physics. However, atomism is denied by both Neo-Confucians and Spinoza. 
They also do not believe that the body is made out of atom-like particles. 
Neo-Confucians consider Ch’i to be the basic substance, out of which the myriad 
things of the universe are constituted. However, Ch’i cannot be supposed to be just 
another name for Democritus’ atoms. The basic thought of atomism seems to penetrate 
the whole of Western philosophy but seems absent in ancient China. Ch’i cannot be 
conceived of as the smallest particle in any way because Ch’i is considered to have no 
form. According to Chang Tsai, Ch’i itself has no physical form (Chan, 1963, p. 501). 
The physical form emerges through the integration of Ch’i. Ch’i penetrates throughout 
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the universe because it is itself clear (Chan, 1963, p. 504). As the representative of the 
naturalistic dimension of Neo-Confucianism, Chang Tsai believes that once the 
physical form disappears through the disintegration of Ch’i, Ch’i itself still remains in 
existence and returns to its original status. In other words, according to the naturalistic 
Neo-Confucians, Ch’i is not extinguished but is instead recycled. By contrast, 
according to the rationalistic Neo-Confucians, Ch’i is extinguished when the physical 
form disappears. Ch’eng I claims that it is impossible for Ch’i to return to its source 
because ‘[the] universe is like a vast furnace’, and everything ‘will be burned to the last 
and no more’ (Chan, 1963, p. 558). There is no space for atomism in any of these Neo-
Confucian theories. 
In a parallel way, the body in Spinoza’s philosophy is just a mode of the attribute of 
Extension, and all bodies, then, ‘agree in certain respects’ (E2p13 Lemma 2, p. 252). 
Spinoza claims that ‘[bodies] are distinguished from one another in respect of motion-
and-rest, quickness and slowness, and not in respect of substance’ (E2p13 Lemma 1, p. 
252). This thought is astonishingly similar to the notion of Ch’i in Neo-Confucianism 
as detailed above, where physical forms emerge through the integration of Ch’i to 
different degrees whilst also originating from Ch’i itself. Spinoza did not directly 
criticize atomism in the Ethics. However, his critique of atomism is boldly displayed in 




The authority of Plato, Aristotle, and Socrates carries little weight with me. I 
should have been surprised if you had produced Epicurus, Democritus, Lucretius 
or one of the Atomists or defenders of the atoms. (Letter 56, p. 905)  
 
As the editor of Spinoza’s Complete Works, Morgan notes that atomism was ‘held in 
favor by seventeenth-century scientists’ (Morgan, 2002, p. 905 in a footnote). It is 
amazing that Spinoza, as a man of the seventeenth-century, stood alone against atomism 
based upon his own metaphysics. 
  To summarize, the bodily aspects of the metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism and 
Spinoza are parallel since they both have the naturalistic dimension as an important 
dimension. At the same time, neither of them could be called naturalism. Moreover, we 
have confirmed the parallels between their corresponding concepts, i.e. the concept of 
Ch’i in Neo-Confucianism and the concept of the attribute of Extension in Spinoza, the 
concept of Yin and Yang and the concept of Motion and Rest, and the concept of physical 






3.4 The Parallel in the Mental Aspect 
3.4.1 The Rationalistic Dimension in Neo-Confucianism  
(i) The Concept of Li 
In Neo-Confucianism, the concept of Ch’i has an opposite concept: Li. The 
development of the concept of Li was so successful that Neo-Confucianism is 
sometimes known as the doctrine of Li. For this reason, it is suitable for us to say that 
the concept of Li is the most central concept in Neo-Confucianism. Similar to the term 
Ch’i, it is not easy to find a corresponding English term for translating the term Li. 
Wang (1916), Bruce (1923), Warren (1924), and Bodde (1942) use the term ‘law’ to 
refer to it. However, the concept of law in Western philosophy is not suitable for 
expressing the dynamic character of the concept of Li. Moreover, the concept of Li still 
has many other characteristics.  
Fung (1953)68 , Chan (1963), and Yao (2000) use the term ‘principle’ for it. It is 
interesting to note that Wang (1916), Bruce (1923), Warren (1924), and Bodde (1942), 
who use the term ‘law’, are all Western scholars whereas Fung (1953), Chan (1963), 
and Yao (2000), who use the term ‘principle’, are all Chinese scholars. Chinese scholars 
seem to believe that the universal character of the concept of law is not suitable for 
expressing the individual character of the concept of Li. However, the term ‘principle’ 
                                                             
68 Fung (1953) claims that the term ‘Reason’ was once used to refer to the translation of the concept of 




also seems unsuitable for expressing the meaning of Li’s nonrepetitive and natural 
unfolding that occurs not only in the dimension of space but also in the dimension of 
time. Therefore, as with the concept of Ch’i, I will use its English pronounced term ‘Li’ 
in this thesis. 
The concept of Li may have originated from the observation of the grain of natural 
objects, such as a piece of wood, a stone, or a jade (Yao, 2000, p. 106). The quality of 
the grain of these items decides their value, and a beautiful pattern of grain is vital for 
decent wood furniture or a precious piece of jade. The beauty of the grain is twofold. 
On the one hand, the grain is not totally unorderly but embodies some orderly pattern, 
and this orderly pattern forms the basis of its beauty. On the other hand, this orderly 
pattern is natural, not man-made. Therefore, this orderly pattern is not artificial, fixed 
or dead, but dynamic and alive.  
Moreover, the use of the concept of Li in the hands of the Neo-Confucians was 
extended beyond natural objects. It is believed that every natural phenomenon has its 
own Li, such as waves. It is necessary for a surfer to learn the Li of waves in order to 
surf successfully. It is a vital skill for a sailor to know the Li of the waves on the sea. 
The Li of waves is the dynamic pattern unfolding not only in the dimension of space 
but also in the dimension of time.  
Furthermore, it is believed that every event or affair has its own Li. For example, a 
birthday party needs to be well-organized in its own way. At the same time, in Chinese 
the term Li is also used as a verb to express the meaning of forming an orderly 
environment. One of its usages in Spoken Chinese is ‘to do housework’. The housework 
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consists not only in cleaning the house but also in restoring the orderly arrangement of 
furniture, toys, personal belongings, and other items. However, the orderly arrangement 
does not fix every item in a dead and unchanging position. In other words, an orderly 
arrangement still has the potential to be rearranged into a better order. As a verb, the 
term Li is also often used to refer to the operation of government. It is always possible 
for a government to improve its operation even though its current administration may 
be very successful. Ziporyn (2008) also observed that Li as a verb refers to some human 
activities with purpose in the classic era. Therefore, the concept of Li embodies the idea 
of potential improvement.  
Needham claims that the concept of Li is a ‘dynamic pattern as embodied in all living 
things, and in human relationships and in the highest human values’, and insists on 
using the term ‘organism’ to express such a dynamic pattern (Needham, 1951, p. 209). 
Needham here correctly emphasizes the holistic character of the concept of Li. However, 
the concept of Li applies not only at the level of physics but also at the level of 
metaphysics in Neo-Confucianism (Chan, 1963, p. 637). 
  In Neo-Confucianism, the concept of Li was developed mainly by the Two Ch’eng 
brothers, Ch’eng Hao, and Ch’eng I. Among the Five Masters of the Northern Song 
Dynasty, the concept of Li was touched ‘only sketchily’ by Chou Tun-I, Shao Yung and 
Chang Tsai, and it was in the hands of the Ch’eng brothers that the concept of Li arose 
as the most crucial concept of Neo-Confucianism (Fung, 1953, p. 501). In particular, it 
was mainly due to the deliberation of the younger brother, Ch’eng I, that the concept of 
Li was developed.  
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For Ch’eng Hao, the Li of a thing is the natural way it is and the Li does not ‘conform 
to any (artificial) arrangement’ (Fung, 1953, p. 505). In other words, Ch’eng Hao 
considered the concept of Li as ‘the natural or spontaneous tendency’ of each of the 
myriad things (ibid.). It is not artificial and is independent of human deliberation. 
Moreover, it is due to Ch’eng Hao that the concept of the Li of Tian69 was first 
introduced (Fung, 1953, p. 506)70. Ch’eng Hao himself was very proud of this point 
(Fung, 1953, p. 506; Chan, 1963, p. 520). The concept of the Li of Tian is the 
combination of the concept of Tian and the concept of Li, and it firstly expresses the 
universal character of the concept of Li71. Eventually, the concept of the Li of Tian 
became used in Neo-Confucianism.  
Ch’eng I paid more attention to the concept of Li than his brother, Ch’eng Hao. 
Ch’eng I set out three core characteristics of the concept of Li. Firstly, it is eternal and 
unchangeable. It is believed that ‘[all] the Principles [Li72 ] are pervasively present’ 
                                                             
69 In Fung (1953), Chan (1963), and Yao (2000) it is called ‘Heavenly Principle’. 
 
70 However, the term the Li of Tian (天理) had already appeared in the Book of Rites, one of the 
scriptures in classical Confucianism, meaning that Tian distributes Li upon humankind, and lacking the 
connotation of universal character. (Chan, 1963, p. 520) 
 
71 At this point, the concept of the Li of Tian has been understood to have a similar meaning to the 
concept of Natural Law in Western philosophy (Hu, 1953, pp. 119-153; Chan, 1963, p. 519). 
 
72 If we follow English grammar, here we seem to be forced to use its plural, Lis. However, as our 
discussion of the concept of Li itself unfolds in due course we will see that, on the one hand, Li is One, 
and is identical with the Great Ultimate (and, further, that the Great Ultimate somehow exists in every 
individual thing in its entirety); and on the other hand, that every individual thing is considered as 
having its own Li. According to Chu, the particular Li of a thing is different to the particular Li of 
another thing. For the latter reason, in practice, scholars often use the word ‘principles’ to endorse its 
plural, when Li is translated into the word ‘principle’. However, it is not common to use the plural ‘Lis’ 
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(Fung, 1953, p. 503). Secondly, everything has its Li as the reason for its existence. 
Ch’eng I stated that ‘[when] anything exists, there must be a pattern for it’ (Fung, 1953, 
p. 503)73 . Finally, Li is one but ‘its manifestations are many’ (Chan, 1963, p. 521). 
Ch’eng I states that Li is ‘vast, and without divisions, yet within it … the myriad 
phenomena (of the universe) are all contained.’ (Fung, 1953, p. 503). Again, Ch’eng I 
states: 
 
As to this Principle [Li], ‘the loving see it and call it love (jen [Jen]). The wise see 
it and call it wisdom. The common people use it daily, yet without realizing it. This 
is why the Way of the Superior Man is seen by few’ (Fung, 1953, p. 502). 
 
The excerpt in the above citation is taken from the Book of Changes, and is very well-
known in Chinese history. In the era of classical Confucianism, the term ‘it’ in the 
excerpt is considered to refer to the concept of Tao. However, Ch’eng I believes that 
the concept of Li can also be paraphrased by this excerpt.  
A remaining problem is that Ch’eng I did not give further explanation as to how the 
                                                             
when the term ‘Li’ is used directly. I only note that Ziporyn uses the word ‘Lis’ in a relevant context 
(Ziporyn, 2008, p. 48). Following the established usage, I will use only the word ‘Li’ throughout my 
thesis, but its meaning should be comprehended accordant with its context. 
 
73 Fung claims that the concept of Li here is similar to the concept of the Platonic idea or form in 
ancient Greece (Fung, 1953, p. 507). However, both Chang (1957) and Chan (1963) disagree with this 
comparison (Chang, 1957, pp. 192-4; Chan, 1963, pp. 544-5). It is not my aim to engage with this 
debate here, but their arguments reveal that Li is considered the essence or internal cause of everything, 
through which everything comes into existence in time and space. 
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myriad things as phenomena in the universe are produced through Li as One. This 
problem was not dealt with until Chu emerged as the greatest Neo-Confucian. 
(ii) Neo-Confucianism as Rationalism 
Chu set out his doctrine of Li by dealing with three core relationships in the Neo-
Confucian basic framework of metaphysics. Firstly, Chu clarified the relationship 
between the concept of Li and the concept of the Great Ultimate. According to Chu, 
‘[the] the Great Ultimate is nothing other than principle [Li]’ (Chan, 1963, p. 638). Li 
itself is the Great Ultimate, and this thought is recognized as the central point of Chu’s 
whole philosophy by scholars (ibid.). This point will be revealed more obviously when 
we notice that Chang Tsai claims that it is Ch’i rather Li that should be identified with 
the Great Ultimate. This is the main reason that Chu is recognized as a rationalist 
whereas Chang Tsai is recognized as a naturalist. The concept of the Great Ultimate is 
the core concept of Chou Tun-I’s Diagram of the Great Ultimate. Chu accepted Chou 
Tun-I’s whole metaphysical framework in the Diagram of the Great Ultimate. Chu 
developed the thought of the Diagram of the Great Ultimate through his theory of Li. It 
is also noteworthy that, according to Chou Tun-I’s explanation of the Diagram of the 
Great Ultimate, the Great Ultimate directly involves activity and tranquility, through 
which the myriad things are produced. Chu disagrees with this point and claims that it 
is the operation of the Li that produces the myriad things, and that the Great Ultimate 
itself does not act (Chan, 1963, p. 641). There is a confused point here: on the one hand, 
Chu claims that it is the Li of activity and tranquility that produces the myriad things 
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whereas the Great Ultimate itself remains tranquil, and, on the other hand, he also takes 
them to be identical. The solution to this problem is that Li is immanent and there is 
necessarily a corresponding Ch’i in operation when there is Li. To say that the Li of 
activity and tranquility produces the myriad things is in fact to say that its corresponding 
Ch’i produces the myriad things through the Li of activity and tranquility (Yang, 2015, 
pp. 217-221)74. 
Secondly, Chu clarified the relationship between the concept of Li and the concept 
of Ch’i. According to Chu, from the perspective of the myriad things - it is impossible 
for Li and Ch’i to be separated at any moment. However, from the perspective of the 
essential realm, we are forced to recognize that Li is prior to Ch’i. Chu confirmed that 
‘[there] is principle [Li] before there can be material force [Ch’i]’ (Chan, 1963, p. 637). 
At the same time, Li does not ‘cease to exist’ even though a thing is gone due to the 
disintegration of its Ch’i (Chan, 1963, p. 638)75. The Li of a thing is unchangeable in 
any condition whereas its Ch’i undergoes constant change from the moment a thing 
comes into existence until the moment it ceases to exist. Chu insisted that Ch’i is 
extinguished completely when a thing ceases to exist. This thought is obviously 
                                                             
74 Yang (2015) only has a Chinese version. 
 
75 An important issue arises here, which is whether or not Chu is a dualist. Yes, and no. Chu seems to be 
a dualist since Chu considered Li and Ch’i as ‘certainly two different entities’ and not identical with each 
other (Chan, 1963, p. 637). Li and Ch’i are completely different in many aspects. At the same time, Chu 
seems to be a monist since Li and Ch’i ‘are merged one with the other and cannot be separated with each 
in a different place’ (ibid.). Therefore, Chan asserts that Chu is ‘neither a monist nor a dualist, or he is 




different from the naturalistic perspective of Chang Tsai, who believed that the Ch’i 
that constitutes a thing returns back to its original state and is not extinguished when 
the thing is gone. Chu claimed that a thing will never come back even though its Li 
remains eternally, and he said that ‘[it] is the end once a thing is gone’ (Chan, 1963, p. 
635). 
Moreover, according to the naturalistic Neo-Confucians, Li is the characteristic of 
the production and evolution of the myriad things in the universe, and Li is ‘inherent in’ 
Ch’i (Chan, 1963, p. 504). Therefore, in the relationship between Li and Ch’i, Ch’i is 
dominant and Li is the pattern of the integration and disintegration of Ch’i. By contrast, 
according to rationalistic Neo-Confucians, Li is dominant and is identical with the 
Great Ultimate. The integration and disintegration of Ch’i is governed by Li, and Li is 
unfolded through the integration and disintegration of Ch’i. Therefore, according to the 
rationalistic Neo-Confucians, Tian follows its own Li and the essence of Tian is Li. The 
myriad things flow out from the Li of Tian. Then, the behavior of the myriad things is 
governed by the Li of Tian.  
Finally, Chu clarified the relationship between the essential realm and the functional 
realm. According to Chu, the Great Ultimate does not directly involve activity and 
tranquility. Chu raised the concept of the Great Ultimate up to the essential realm, and 
drew a clear line between the essential realm and the functional realm of Ultimate 
Reality expressed in Chou Tun-I’s whole framework of metaphysics. The question 
remains as to how the essential realm and the functional realm are unified into the same 
Ultimate Reality. According to Chu, it is still the concept of Li that formulates their 
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unity. I will explore this point further in Section 3.4. 
In brief, Chu compiled Chou Tun-I’s thoughts on the Great Ultimate, Chang Tsai’s 
thoughts on Ch’i, and the Ch’eng brothers’ thoughts on Li into a systemic philosophy. 
Chu also developed the Neo-Confucian notion of the essential realm and the functional 
realm, and united them into one whole, which is Tian itself. Chu once confirmed that 
Tian ‘has no personal consciousness’ and its morality, rulings, blessings and evil-doings 
‘are merely deductions from principle [Li]’ (Chan, 1963, p. 636, my italics). This 
citation highlights Chu’s refusal to engage in anthropomorphism, and also sets some 
restrictions on the transcendental dimension of Tian to some degree. The rationalistic 
dimension of Tian is, then, prior to its transcendental dimension. At the same time, since 
everything is merely deduced from Li, the rationalistic dimension is also prior to its 
naturalistic dimension. Therefore, Li as the core concept dominates Chu’s whole 
philosophy, and Neo-Confucianism as rationalism was fixed finally in the hands of Chu. 
Through the investigation above, we know that Ch’eng I and Chu Hsi had the core 
roles in the development of this rationalistic dimension. It is also noteworthy that the 
term ‘Li (理)’ itself is at the core of the Chinese translation (理性主义) of the term 
‘rationalism’76. Following this usage, the School of Li is considered to be identical with 
rationalism. This is the reason why rationalistic Neo-Confucianism is known as the 
Ch’eng-Chu School of Li in particular. At the same time, Neo-Confucianism as a whole 
is also known as the School of Li in general due to the dominance of the rationalistic 
                                                             
76 Prof. Yujin Nagasawa reminded me of this important connection. For a Chinese person, it is very 
easy to forget this connection, just as a fish might forget that it is swimming in water. 
126 
 
dimension in Neo-Confucianism. 
3.4.2 The Rationalistic Dimension in Spinoza 
(i) The Concept of the Idea of God 
Before discussing the concept of the idea of God, we should firstly take care to 
distinguish Spinoza’s use of this notion from our modern understanding, in which it is 
commonly considered to be the same as the conception of God. The concept of the idea 
of God [Dei idea] is a unique piece of terminology in Spinoza’s philosophy. Kashap is 
right to say that it ‘must not be understood in such a way as to render God as an 
anthropomorphic entity believed, therefore, to have ideas which are conceptions of His 
mind’ (Kashap, 1977, p. 57). Spinoza does not give us a clear definition of the concept 
of the idea of God. He touches on this concept in the first part of his Ethics, and 
considers it to be a unique mode of the attribute of Thought. The idea of God, as an 
example of something that follows from the absolute nature of God, is used in the proof 
of Proposition 21, and to support the conclusion that ‘[a]ll things that follow from the 
absolute nature of any attribute of God must have existed always, and as infinite; that 
is, through the said attribute they are eternal and infinite’ (E1p21, p. 230). Spinoza’s 
example here is ‘the idea of God in Thought’ (E1p21 Proof, p. 230)77. Clearly, Spinoza 
views the idea of God as a mode of the attribute of Thought here78. However, this mode 
                                                             
77 Cf. This is ‘the idea of God expressed in the attribute of thought’ in the translation by Elwes 
(Spinoza, 1951). 
 
78 Wetlesen concludes that the idea of God is ‘the immediate infinite mode under the attribute of 
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is unique because it follows from the absolute nature of God. Spinoza implies that the 
idea of God is not only infinite but also eternal (E1p21 Proof, pp. 230-1). 
Moreover, Spinoza begins a direct discussion of the concept of the idea of God in the 
beginning of the second part of the Ethics, and considers it as the essence of God. 
Spinoza argued that ‘[i]n God there is necessarily the idea both of his essence and of 
everything that necessarily follows from his essence’ (E2p3, p. 245). According to E2p3, 
on the one hand, there is one idea in God as the essence of God. On the other hand, 
every individual thing has its idea in God. Here Spinoza seems to say that there are 
infinite ideas in God since there are infinite individual things. However, Spinoza 
immediately confirms that the idea of God ‘must be one and one only’ in E2p3. In other 
words, as the only idea in God, the idea of God is not only the essence of God but also 
the idea of an individual thing in God, and they are one and the same. This is the 
perspective of God himself. At the same time, from the perspective of individual things, 
the idea of an individual thing in God follows from the idea of God, and the latter is the 
essence of the former. Therefore, the relationship between the idea of God and the idea 
of an individual thing in God is a critical pivot for understanding Spinoza’s 
metaphysical system. Spinoza also uses some heavily religious terms to refer to the 
concept of the idea of God. Wetlesen is right to observe that the idea of God is 
sometimes called by such names as the eternal Son of God (Letter 73), and the Spirit of 
Christ (4p68Sch; also Letter 73) (Wetlesen, 1976, p. 42). 
Furthermore, the idea of God, as the essence of God, is identical with the intellect of 
                                                             




God. According to Spinoza, God’s ‘intellect and will are not distinct from his essence’ 
(E1p33 Scholium 2, p. 237)79. It should be noted that in his proof of E2p3, Spinoza 
seems to touch on the relationship of identity as follows: 
 
For God can … think infinite things in infinite ways, or (what is the same thing, by 
Pr. 16, I [E1p16]) can form the idea of his own essence [the idea of God] and of 
everything that necessarily follows from it. (E2p3 Proof, p. 245, my italics) 
 
Here the citation gives us another important reference to E1p16. In E1p16, Spinoza has 
said that ‘God is the efficient cause of all things that can come within the scope of the 
infinite intellect’ (E1p16 Corollary, p. 227, my italics). Spinoza is telling us that the 
intellect of God and the idea of God are the same thing. Once the relationship of identity 
is established, the attribute of Thought becomes dominant among all attributes of God 
since the idea of God is a mode of the attribute of Thought. Let us bear this point in 
mind. 
In short, the idea of God has several important characteristics as follows: (1) it is 
infinite; (2) it is eternal; (3) it is one and one only; (4) it is identical with the intellect of 
God; (5) it is the idea of an individual thing in God, and its essence also. Therefore, the 
concept of the idea of God is the backbone supporting Spinoza’s philosophy as 
rationalism. 
                                                             




(ii) Spinoza as a Rationalist 
It is the orthodox view to consider Spinoza as a rationalist, along the same line as 
Descartes and Leibniz. What I will do here is to explore the metaphysical aspect of his 
rationalism, or metaphysical rationalism80. Since this is the orthodox view, I will not 
pursue this point too much in this thesis. For our purposes, three points below are 
important.  
  Firstly, from the perspective of methodology, the Ethics itself is a unique deductive 
system81. The first impression that a reader of Spinoza’s Ethics encounters is the style 
of pure contemplation. All of its first Part is given to the purely metaphysical 
contemplation of the conception of God and its nature. It seems difficult for us to find 
any empirical fact in the contemplation of Chapter 1 of the Ethics82. This impression 
is enforced further by its written style, which borrows heavily from Euclid’s 
geometrical method throughout the Ethics. Spinoza believed strongly in the truth of 
Euclid’s geometry. This was the reason for his choosing to write the Ethics in line 
with Euclid’s geometrical method. The book is mainly composed of definitions, 
                                                             
80 According to Dasgupta, a metaphysical rationalist is ‘someone who endorses the Principle of 
Sufficient Reason (PSR), the principle that everything has an explanation’ (Dasgupta, 2016, p. 379). 
Dasgupta (2016) considers Spinoza as the model representative of metaphysical rationalism.  
 
81 Many scholars have argued that Spinoza’s deductive approach is not always successful in the Ethics. 
I put this issue away in this thesis given that at least Spinoza himself believed in this deductive 
methodology. 
 




axioms, propositions and their corollaries. Spinoza starts from some premises that he 
takes to be self-evident, and then through a deductive83 approach he reaches his 
conclusions. This style is unique among the great works in the history of philosophy. 
Every one of the definitions, axioms, propositions, and their corollaries is one part of 
his philosophy. Consequently, we cannot grasp the overview of his philosophy if we 
just stick to some of these definitions, axioms, propositions, and their corollaries - just 
like a blind man cannot know an elephant by touching just some part of the elephant. 
This causes huge difficulties for a reader wishing to grasp the whole of Spinoza’s 
thoughts in the Ethics.    
  Spinoza’s favoring Euclid’s geometrical method has its root in his metaphysics of 
rationalism. Because Spinoza firmly believes that Ultimate Reality is rational, he 
believes that the essence of God and the essence of an individual thing, as a mode of 
God, can be presented accurately through Euclid’s geometrical method. This leads us 
to the second point: Spinoza believes that God’s will necessarily follows from the laws 
of his own nature. According to Spinoza, God is absolute existence, which means that 
anything that is possible to exist does exist. If anything that is possible to exist does 
exist, does this mean that God would create a thing by a fabricated will, for instance, a 
square circle?84 Does it mean that some feigned things, such as unicorns, winged 
                                                             
83 Some scholars believe that Spinoza’s methodology is not deductive but rather holistic, such as 
Schliesser (2017). My opinion is that it is both holistic and deductive, and that the deductive approach 
and the holistic approach do not conflict with each other. 
 




horses, flying pigs, etc., also exist? The answer is, of course, ‘No’. According to 
Spinoza, the absolute free will that the ‘crowds’ habitually assign to God does not 
pertain to God. An absolute free will is an illusion when it means doing whatever the 
crowds desire to do. This is the kind of anthropomorphism that Spinoza completely 
objected to. God has only the freedom of necessity rather than the freedom of will that 
the crowds imagine. If we must assign the term ‘will’ to God for the convenience of 
discussion, then will and intellect ‘are one and the same’ (E1p17 Scholium, p. 229; 
E2p49, p. 273). Spinoza told his friend that it is absurd to say that God’s will is different 
from his essence and his intellect (Letter 56, p. 904). According to Spinoza, even if God 
is constrained by nothing else, his action still necessarily follows ‘from the laws of his 
own nature’ (E1p17, p. 227). To say God has the freedom of necessity is also to say that 
God is subjected to the necessity of his own nature, otherwise God would be mutable 
and thus imperfect.  
  The further question is what the necessity of God’s own nature is. If God’s own 
nature is not accessible to us, it remains impossible for us to confirm whether a thing 
does exist or not. This problem has been an important and highly debated topic. 
However, Spinoza actually did not run into this problem. This leads us to the final point, 
which is that Spinoza believes that God’s nature can be apprehended by the intellect. 
Spinoza gave us a clear standard for the existence of a thing. The standard is that it must 
be ‘within the scope of [God’s] infinite intellect’ when ‘infinite things in infinite ways 
[modis]’ come into existence by the necessity of the divine nature of God (E1p16, p. 
227). All things which can fall within the sphere of the infinite intellect do exist. 
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Moreover, Spinoza firmly believes that ‘God’s infinite essence and his eternity are 
known to all’ (E2p47 Scholium, p. 271).  
  Spinoza told his friend that ‘[we] cannot imagine God, but we can apprehend [God] 
by the intellect’ (Letter 56, p. 905). This is why Spinoza confirms to his friend that he 
has ‘as clear an idea of God as of a triangle’ but denies that he has ‘as clear a mental 
image of God as of a triangle’ (ibid.). Furthermore, according to Spinoza, our human 
intellect is one part of the intellect of God. Thus, when we say that a thing exists or does 
not exist, an adequate reason or cause in our human intellect must be assigned to it. For 
instance, we can be assured of the nonexistence of a square circle because the concept 
is self-contradictory, and therefore its existence is impossible (TIE, p. 24). In other 
words, if a thing does not exist there must be an adequate reason or cause ‘which 
prevents it from existence, or which annuls its existence’ (E1p11, p. 222). It is 
impossible for Spinoza to confirm that a ghost exists because we do not have ‘any 
intelligible property’ of a ghost; as he told his friend directly, who was arguing for the 
existence of ghosts, in saying that a ghost is made of a ‘very tenuous, rarefied and subtle 
substance, you seem to be speaking of spiders’ webs, air or mist’ (Letter 56, p. 905). 
We can also be assured of the nonexistence of unicorns because we cannot form a clear 
and distinct idea of a unicorn in our mind and thus the idea of a unicorn is not 
intellectual. I will not pursue this issue further since this point has become an 
epistemological issue. 
In short, Ultimate Reality is rational, and can be expressed through a deductive 
system. God as Ultimate Reality follows from the laws of his own nature, and God’s 
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will is also his intellect. The intellect of God is endowed in the human intellect. 
Spinoza’s opposition to anthropomorphism stands against human imagination but sits 
alongside a belief in the human intellect. Therefore, it is entirely correct to say that 
Spinoza is one of the best representatives of metaphysical rationalism. 
3.4.3 The Parallel in the Mental Aspect 
As with the parallel in the bodily aspect, what I should concede here is that I cannot 
argue that every part of the mental aspect between Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza is 
parallel with the other. For example, of course, the concept of Li in Neo-Confucianism 
and the concept of the idea of God in Spinoza are different from each other since 
Spinoza’s theory of attributes has no analogue in Neo-Confucianism. At the same time, 
Li in Neo-Confucianism is considered an independent entity which has no analogue in 
Spinoza. What I am arguing here is that the mental aspects as wholes, and their core 
concepts, are all parallel to each other. Table 8 clearly reveals the parallels in the mental 
aspect as a whole, and their core concepts: 
 
Table 8 A Comparison of the Mental Aspect. 
Firstly, with respect to the mental aspects as wholes, they both have the rationalistic 
Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
Li (理) Thought (Attribute) 
The Li of Tian (天理) The idea of God (Infinite mode) 
The Li of a thing (事理) The idea of a thing (Finite mode) 
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dimension as the dominant dimension. In other words, the mental aspect became the 
dominant aspect in both Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza.  
  Secondly, with respect to the main concepts, there are three concepts referring to the 
mental aspects of each metaphysical framework. These are the concept of Li, the 
concept of the Li of Tian, and the concept of the Li of a thing in Neo-Confucianism, and 
the concept of the attribute of Thought, the concept of the idea of God, and the concept 
of the idea of an individual thing in Spinoza. Therefore, the structure of their core 
concepts is parallel. The parallel between the concept of the Li of Tian in Neo-
Confucianism and the concept of the idea of God in Spinoza is due firstly to the fact 
that these concepts form the backbone of the mental aspect in both theories.  
Finally, they are also parallel due to the fact that the relationship between their mental 
aspects and their bodily aspects is the same. In the terminology of Neo-Confucianism, 
Ch’i and Li ‘are certainly two different entities’ (Chan, 1963, p. 637). However, they 
are never separable from each other so long as the thing retains its existence. According 
to Chu, it is impossible for Li and Ch’i to be separated at any moment in the functional 
realm. Chu claimed that ‘there has never been any material force [Ch’i] without 
principle [Li] or principle [Li] without material force [Ch’i]’ (Chan, 1963, p. 634). In a 
parallel way, as was discussed in section 3.1, the isomorphism of the attribute of 
Thought and the attribute of Extension is one of the most significant characteristics of 
Spinoza’s philosophy.  
  To summarize, the mental aspects of the metaphysics of both Neo-Confucianism and 
Spinoza are parallel since both Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza have the rationalistic 
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dimension as the dominant dimension. Moreover, they are parallel due to the parallels 
between the concept of the Li of Tian in Neo-Confucianism and the concept of the idea 
of God in Spinoza. Furthermore, they are parallel in their view of the relationship 
between their mental aspects and their bodily aspects, which is the same for both (albeit 
in their own ways). In the next section, we will find that their two realms of Ultimate 
Reality are also unified through the concept of the Li of Tian in Neo-Confucianism and 
the concept of the idea of God in Spinoza.  
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3.5 The Parallel in the Perspectives of the Two Realms 
3.5.1 The Essential Realm and the Functional Realm in Neo-Confucianism 
To say that there is an essential realm and a functional realm in Neo-Confucianism is, 
in fact, an explanation using the language of Western philosophy. There are two 
corresponding terms to refer to these realms in Chinese thought (Chan, 1963, p. 791). 
Neo-Confucians use the term ‘Ti’ or ‘BenTi’ (体 or 本体) to refer to the essential realm, 
and sometimes it is translated into the English term ‘essence’85. Another term ‘Yung’ 
(用) is used to refer to the functional realm, which sometimes is translated into the 
English term ‘operation’, but its best translation in English is the term ‘function’. 
According to Chu, there is not only Ti [the essential realm] but also Yung [the functional 
realm] of Ultimate Reality expressed in Chou Tun-I’s whole framework of metaphysics.  
There is a similar issue that was discussed in classical Confucianism, in which it was 
called the relationship between the Way (Tao) that is above the body (Xing-er-Shang, 
形而上) and the Instrument (器) that refers to the body (Xing-er-Xia, 形而下). The 
former is referring the realm beyond physics. That is the reason that metaphysics in 
China is also sometimes known as the theory of Xing-er-Shang (形而上学). The latter 
refers to the realm of physics. The relationship between the Way and the Instrument was 
not unfolded in any systematic way in classical Confucianism. The relationship 
between the essential realm and the functional realm in Neo-Confucianism is, then, a 
systematic development of the relationship between the Way and the Instrument in 
                                                             
85 Maybe its best translation in English is the term ‘substance’, but it is noteworthy that Spinoza uses 




  What is the relationship between the essential realm and the functional realm? Firstly, 
they are referring to the same Ultimate Reality that is Tian in Neo-Confucianism. With 
respect to its essential realm, the Great Ultimate is the original substance of the entire 
universe. The Great Ultimate is the true source of all transformations and changes in 
the universe. With respect to its functional realm, the functioning of the Great Ultimate, 
as fundamental and unceasing, comes forth forever. In other words, the sensible realm 
emanates from the Great Ultimate. The Great Ultimate is the immanent cause of Reality. 
By function we mean the operation of the original substance, or the Great Ultimate, and 
its creative force is strong and never exhausted, arising up anew again and again, whose 
transformation results in many manifestations.  
Moreover, the function is fulfilled through the integration or disintegration of Ch’i 
under the governance of its Li. It is the Li of Tian which unifies the essential realm and 
the functional realm. For Chu, the Li of Tian means the Great Ultimate, and the Li of 
the individual things means the Great Ultimate endowed in the myriad things. The 
Great Ultimate is One and the manifestations of the Great Ultimate are Many (Chan, 
1963, p. 639). This is the thought that the Li of Tian, or the Great Ultimate, is One and 
its manifestations are Many. This thought probes the classical philosophical relationship 
between the One and the Many.  
To understand Chu’s thoughts on the relationship between the One and the Many, it 
is important firstly to remember that this is not the relationship between the whole and 
its parts. Chu denied that the myriad things partake of the Great Ultimate in the sense 
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of every individual thing as its part, with the Great Ultimate then split into infinite parts. 
Rather the Great Ultimate is One and cannot be split. Chu argued that everything is 
endowed with the Great Ultimate in its entirety somehow, and that the embodied Great 
Ultimate is the Li of a thing. A popular metaphor is that the Great Ultimate as the One 
is like the moon in the sky where its manifestations, as the Many, are like the moons 
that can be found in infinite rivers and lakes. Every moon found in every river or lake 
is always a complete moon, not a part of the moon (Fung, 1953, p. 541; Chan, 1963, p. 
638; Yao, 2000, p. 106). Fung (1953) claims that Chu’s metaphor found its inspiration 
in Buddhism, and Chan (1963) agrees with this point (Fung, 1953, pp. 541-2; Chan, 
1963, p. 639). Yang (2015) criticizes this metaphor as misleading because the moon in 
a river or a lake is only the reflection of the moon in the sky, and it is not the real moon 
itself (Yang, 2015, pp. 225-6). This metaphor seems to imply that the Li of Tian, the 
Great Ultimate in an individual thing as its essence, is empty. Yang argues that this 
metaphor is only suitable for some schools of Buddhism but is not suitable for Neo-
Confucianism. A better metaphor, which can be found in Chu’s literature, is that the 
Great Ultimate is like the internal essence of a seed, from which hundreds of seeds will 
be produced when it is planted. Millions of seeds will then be produced when these 
hundreds of seeds are planted again, and so on ad infinitum. The internal essence of the 
first seed and the internal essence of the infinite consequential seeds are of one nature. 
In a similar way, every concrete thing ‘has within it the Great Ultimate’ in its entirety 
somehow, and this is the Li of the concrete thing (Chan, 1963, p. 639). This is the reason 
why it is wrong to say that the relationship between the One and the Many is the 
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relationship between the whole and its parts. 
However, it is also incorrect to say that the Li of Tian as the Great Ultimate, in the 
essential realm, and Li as the internal essence of concrete things, in the functional realm, 
are identical with one another86. But Fung (1953) and Chan (1963) explain that it seems 
right for Chu to say that everything has the Li of all things, but the Li of all things is 
‘not equivalent to the actual physical things themselves or even to the existence in 
potentia of these things’ (Fung, 1953, p. 542; Chan, 1963, p. 639). Here the 
interpretation of Fung (1953) and Chan (1963) is not very clear. What I take from this 
is that the Li of all things is nothing but the Li of Tian, which is the original essence of 
all things. Every concrete thing, as a function or expression of the Great Ultimate, is 
endowed with its own Li when the Li of Tian is unfolded in a particular area of space-
time.  
In short, there are the essential realm and the functional realm in the framework of 
the metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism. They are referring to the same Ultimate Reality. 
They are unified through the Li of Tian. The relationship between the essential realm 
and the functional realm is, in fact, the relationship between the One and the Many. This 
relationship is neither quantitative nor qualitative. It is an active relationship embodied 
in the process of moving from the substance to its unfolding function (Yang, 2015, pp. 
225-6). 
                                                             
86 The Hua-yen school of Buddhism holds a similar thought, but not Neo-Confucianism. Fung (1953) 
summarizes the Hua-yen school’s thought as so: ‘within any given individual concrete object, all other 
concrete objects are actually present’ (Fung, 1953, p. 541). The Tian-tai School (天台宗) of Buddhism 
also has a similar thought, according to which everything has within itself the Absolute in its totality, 
i.e. that everything ‘has within itself the nature pertaining to all other things’ (ibid.). 
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3.5.2 Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata in Spinoza 
After finishing his proof of Proposition 29 in Part One of his Ethics, it seems odd that 
Spinoza introduces a pair of concepts using a special style of oral presentation as 
follows: 
 
Before I go any further, I wish to explain at this point what we must understand by 
“Natura naturans” and “Natura naturata.” I should perhaps say not “explain,” but 
“remind the reader,” for I consider that it is already clear from what has gone before 
that by “Natura naturans” we must understand that which is in itself and is 
conceived through itself; that is, the attributes of substance that express eternal and 
infinite essence; or (Cor. 1 Pr.14, and Cor.2 Pr.17), God insofar as he is considered 
a free cause. By Natura naturata I understand all that follows from the necessity 
of God’s nature, that is, from the necessity of each one of God’s attributes; or all 
the modes of God’s attributes insofar as they are considered as things which are in 
God and can neither be nor be conceived without God. (E1p29 Scholium, p. 234) 
 
Here Spinoza emphasizes two points. The first point is that it is necessary for us to 
comprehend Proposition 29 and its proof through a pair of concepts: Natura naturans 
and Natura naturata. The second point is that Spinoza’s purpose in the definitions of 
both Natura naturans and Natura naturata is not to explain them but to remind the 
reader of them.  
What Spinoza is saying is that the concept of Natura naturans refers to the attributes 
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of God, or God himself when he is considered a free cause, and that the concept of 
Natura naturata is referring to the modes of God’s attributes. Therefore, the concept of 
Natura naturans and the concept of Natura naturata refer to two different realms of the 
same substance, God. They are the realm of attributes 87 and the realm of modes, 
respectively. Therefore, they could be called the realm of Natura naturans and the realm 
of Natura naturata, or simply put, Natura naturans and Natura naturata. In other words, 
behind Spinoza’s substance-attribute-mode metaphysical framework, there are two 
different realms: Natura naturans and Natura naturata.  
Following this point, the pair of concepts, Natura naturans and Natura naturata, 
does not seem very different from the pair of the concepts, attribute and mode. 
Moreover, an attentive reading reveals that the pair of concepts occurs only in two 
propositions (E1p29 and E1p31) of the Ethics, and there is no direct reference to them 
in the rest of the book. Thus, this pair of concepts seems to be redundant for Spinoza’s 
system of philosophy. Why does Spinoza introduce them if they are redundant? Why 
does Spinoza feel the need to remind the reader of these concepts rather than explain 
them in the citation above?  
One tentative answer is that Spinoza believes that it is easier for the reader to 
comprehend his philosophy through this pair of concepts. Maybe the pair of concepts 
                                                             
87 It is also noteworthy that Natura naturans also refers to God himself when he is considered a free 
cause (without reference to God’s attributes). I believe that Spinoza was talking about the same thing 
when he listed ‘God’s attributes’ and ‘God himself when God is considered a free cause’ together since 
Spinoza used the conjunctive term ‘or’ here. Therefore, it is not necessary for us to become trapped in 




was commonly known in his era. Spinoza wishes for people to comprehend his concepts 
of both attribute and mode better through a comparison with their familiar conceptions88.  
The pair of terms ‘Natura naturans’ and ‘Natura naturata’ is not Spinoza’s own 
terminology. They are medieval terms (Harley, 1995, p. 329), and Thomas Hobbes also 
used them (Condren, 2002). Spinoza invents an alternative pair of terminologies, that 
is, sub specie aeternitatis and sub specie temporis. As a Latin term, sub specie 
aeternitatis, first occurring in E5p22, is translated into the term ‘under the form of 
eternity’ by Elwes (Spinoza, 1951), and ‘under a form of eternity’ by Shirley (Spinoza, 
2002). Nadler considers it to mean under the ‘aspect’ of eternity (Nadler, Fall 2016). 
Since the philosophical term ‘under the form of eternity’ has become so popular I will 
use it throughout this thesis. Its preliminary form, sub quadam specie aeternitatis, is 
introduced in Corollary 2 of E2p44, and this Latin terminology literally means ‘in the 
light of eternity’. Spinoza claims that ‘[it] is in the nature of reason to regard things as 
necessary, not as contingent’ (E2p44 the Proof of Corollary 2, p. 270). For Spinoza, 
everything is determined under the light of eternity89. Therefore, the term sub specie 
                                                             
88 Spinoza introduced the pair of concepts, Natura naturans and Natura naturata, in his KV that was 
written around 1662, and was considered the draft of his later Ethics (KV, p. 58). However, it is also 
clear that Spinoza’s thoughts on the concepts of Natura naturans and Natura naturata underwent 
significant change from the KV to the Ethics. 
 
89 This thought is echoed in E4p62, in which Spinoza claims that ‘insofar as the mind conceives things 
according to the dictates of reason, it is affected in the same way, whether the idea be of a thing future, 
past, or present’ (E4p62 Proof, p. 352, my italics). Spinoza seems to imply here that the concept of 
eternity means the everlasting of time from the past, through the present, into the future. How this 





aeternitatis also corresponds to the term Natura naturans when it is referring to God 
himself when God is considered as a free cause. 
  Spinoza claims that the concept of eternity cannot ‘be defined by time, or be in any 
way related to time’ when he formally introduces the concept, sub specie aeternitatis 
(E5p23 Scholium, p. 374). The concept ‘eternity’ here is not the same as the concept 
‘everlasting’, or the common concept ‘immortality’ in the sense of never dying. What 
can be related to time or defined by time is referred to by another terminology sub 
specie temporis: under the form of time. The terminology sub specie temporis means 
to explicate through duration or, using Spinoza’s terminology, ‘from the point of view 
of duration’90 (ibid.). Spinoza provides a clear definition of duration as ‘the indefinite 
continuance of existing’ (E2 Definition 5, p. 244). The concept of duration must refer 
to Natura naturata or, using Spinoza’s phraseology, the modes of the attributes of God 
given that it is referring to indefinite existence91. It is our common pattern of thinking 
to consider everything under the form of time. Under the form of time there is birth, 
growing up, and death, and there is the past, the present, and the future.  
  Therefore, it seems legitimate to say that Natura naturans is identical with sub specie 
aeternitatis and Natura naturata with sub specie temporis. Spinoza states the following: 
                                                             
90 Cf. ‘under the category of duration’ (Spinoza, 1951). 
 
91 The concept of time itself is ‘a mode of thinking serving to explicate duration’ (CM, p. 186), and he 
believes that the cause-effect network of individual things has no beginning and no end, and ‘so ad 
infinitum’ (E2p9, p. 249). Therefore, in Spinoza’s philosophy, time is everlasting even if it is only a 
mode of thinking. That is to say, the concept, sub specie temporis, does not only mean under the form 





We conceive things as actual in two ways: either insofar as we conceive them as 
related to a fixed time and place, or insofar as we conceive them to be contained in 
God and to follow from the necessity of the divine nature. Now the things that are 
conceived as true or real in this second way, we conceive under a form of eternity, 
and their ideas involve the eternal and infinite essence of God, as we demonstrated 
in Pr. 45, II. See also its Scholium. (E5p29 Scholium, p. 376) 
 
Here Spinoza clearly states his own perspectives: sub specie aeternitatis [under the 
form of eternity] and sub specie temporis [under the form of time]. 
A small difference that can be discerned between them is that the pair of concepts, 
Natura naturans and Natura naturata, seems to imply that there are two divided realms 
of Ultimate Reality, whereas the pair of concepts, sub specie aeternitatis and sub specie 
temporis, seems to imply that there are two perspectives towards the same Ultimate 
Reality. Perhaps Spinoza felt that it was important to emphasize the unity of Ultimate 
Reality rather than its two divided realms. This is a possible reason for Spinoza 
mentioning the former but eventually replacing them with the latter92.  
  When we consider how the Ethics unfolds as a deductive system, it is easy to 
conclude that Spinoza’s philosophy always focuses on the realm of Natura naturans, 
                                                             
92 Cf. ‘[W]e distinguish two inseparable complementary aspects within the concrete total being of God 
or Nature; if we distinguish God as self-creating from God as self-created, Natura Naturans from 
Natura Naturata; and if we identify the first with God’s ‘essence’ and the second with his ‘existence’’ 
(Joachim, 1940, p. 40) 
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i.e. it seems natural for us to suppose that Spinoza always delineates his philosophy 
within the realm of Natura naturans. However, this impression comes from just one 
part of the whole story found at the beginning of Spinoza’s Ethics. In fact, he switches 
to the realm of Natura naturata in Part Three and Part Four when he focuses on the 
topic of the nature and power of human emotion. His perspectives are combined in Part 
Two and Part Five. The key switching points are Proposition 10 in Part Two, and 
Proposition 21 in Part Five. In the whole framework of his Ethics, Spinoza’s general 
perspective undergoes a switching process from the realm of Natura naturans to the 
realm of Natura naturata, ending with their combination in the last stage of Part Five. 
Wetlesen argues that ‘the temporal dimension [Natura naturata] is predominant’ in the 
context of Parts Two and Three of the Ethics (Wetlesen, 1976, p. 77). While I agree 
with Wetlesen’s opinion that Spinoza’s perspective of Natura naturata is predominant 
in Part Three, my opinion is that Spinoza’s perspectives are combined in Part Two. Thus, 
I completely agree with Wetlesen’s below conclusion: 
 
It reminds us also that when we interpret 2p13, we should not omit the eternal 
dimension [Natura naturans] from the essence of the mind; and it reminds us that 
when we interpret 5p29Dem, we should not omit the temporal dimension [Natura 
naturata]. (Wetlesen, 1976, p. 79) 
 
Wetlesen should also agree with my conclusion that Spinoza’s perspectives are 
combined in Part Five because he argues that ‘[the] essence of the mind is constituted 
through the power of conceiving things from the viewpoint of eternity [Natura 
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naturans], as well as from the viewpoint of time [Natura naturata]’ (Wetlesen, 1976, 
p. 80). Joachim nicely summarizes Spinoza’s aim as being ‘to conceive the Whole 
both as an eternal changeless Individual and as enduring, perpetually changing, and 
comprising an infinite variety of parts---i.e. we are to reconcile these Opposites, to 
hold them intelligibly together in our thought’ (Joachim, 1940, p. 79). 
  In brief, Spinoza uses his own terminology, sub specie aeternitatis and sub specie 
temporis, to replace the old terminology, Natura naturans and Natura naturata, from 
Part Two of his Ethics onwards. His phraseology sub specie aeternitatis became 
commonly used in the history of philosophy, and this fact demonstrates the huge 
influence of Spinoza’s philosophy. I will deploy them respectively in suitable contexts 
in this thesis. However, the above investigation of the sub specie aeternitatis and sub 
specie temporis pairing makes Spinoza’s distinct perspective clearer for us. Spinoza 
himself develops his philosophy by frequently switching perspective throughout the 
book.  
3.5.3. The Parallel in the Perspectives of the Two Realms 
In this section, I will reveal the parallel in the perspectives of the two realms between 
Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza. Table 9 clearly reveals the parallel in the perspectives 








BenTi (本体) (The essential realm)  sub specie aeternitatis (Natura naturans) 
Yong (用) (The functional realm) sub specie temporis (Natura naturata) 
Table 9 A Comparison of the perspectives of the two realms. 
 
Firstly, for both the Neo-Confucians and Spinoza Ultimate Reality has two realms. One 
realm is the essential realm in Neo-Confucianism and the realm of Natura naturans in 
Spinoza. The essential realm / Natura naturans is the realm of Ultimate Reality under 
the form of Oneness, or wholeness, or eternity, or essence. The other realm is the 
functional realm in Neo-Confucianism and the realm of Natura naturata in Spinoza. 
The functional realm / Natura naturata is the realm of Ultimate Reality under the form 
of Manyness, or individuals, or time, or the sensible realm. As such, there are two 
perspectives corresponding to the two realms respectively. There is the perspective of 
BenTi in Neo-Confucianism and the perspective of sub specie aeternitatis in Spinoza, 
and they are parallel with each other. There is also the perspective of Yong in Neo-
Confucianism and the perspective of sub specie temporis in Spinoza, and they are 
parallel with each other also. 
  Secondly, the two realms for each of the Neo-Confucians and Spinoza are unified 
into the same Ultimate Reality. The Ultimate Reality in the essential realm is not 
different from the Ultimate Reality in the functional realm. In Neo-Confucianism, the 
essential realm is the Great Ultimate. However, the Great Ultimate is not an 
independently existing being outside the universe, ‘but a general name for the principles 
148 
 
[Li] of heaven and earth and the myriad things’ (Chan, 1963, p. 638). Furthermore, Chu 
claims that the Great Ultimate had no such name originally, but it is the Great Ultimate 
once ‘all principles [Li] of heaven and earth and the myriad things are put together’ 
(Chan, 1963, p. 641). That is to say, the same Ultimate Reality is the Great Ultimate in 
the essential realm, and the same Ultimate Reality is also the sensible world in the 
functional realm. The essential realm and the functional realm are one and the same, 
and they refer to the same Ultimate Reality.  
In a parallel way, Spinoza’s theory of one-substance is at the heart of his metaphysics. 
God is not a substance outside Nature; instead God is Nature itself. This is why 
Spinoza’s philosophy is known as pantheism. Spinoza asserts that God, the intellect of 
God, and the things understood by God are one and the same. It is the intellect of God, 
or the attributes of God, or in the realm of Natura naturans, and it is also the sensible 
realm, or the modes of God, or in the realm of Natura naturata. Natura naturans and 
Natura naturata are one and the same. 
As such, there is a combined perspective towards Ultimate Reality both in Neo-
Confucianism and Spinoza since the two realms of the Ultimate Reality are one and the 
same. 
Finally, in Neo-Confucianism, the essential realm and the functional realm are also 
unified through the mental aspect. The relationship between the essential realm and the 
functional realm is, in fact, the relationship between the One and the Many. In Section 
3.5.1 we concluded that the essential realm and the functional realm are unified through 
the Li of Tian in Neo-Confucianism. This relationship is neither quantitative nor 
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qualitative (when ‘qualitative’ is taken to imply a static situation). It is a dynamic 
relationship embodied in the process from the substance to its unfolding function. 
  In a parallel way, behind Spinoza’s two realms of Natura naturans and Natura 
naturata, there is the same philosophical relationship between the One and the Many. 
Spinoza, in fact, dealt with this relationship using the conceptions of Natura naturans 
and Natura naturata. The former is the One whereas the latter is the Many. The former 
is unchangeable whereas the latter is active.  
  Spinoza unifies the realm of Natura naturans with the realm of Natura naturata 
through his concept of the idea of God. Spinoza claims that infinite things follow from 
the idea of God in infinite ways in E2p3. This proposition seems to be comprehendible 
in two different ways. The first way is to say that everything follows from the idea of 
God in infinite ways. In other words, everything has infinite possibilities. The second 
way is to say that everything follows from the idea of God in a definite way and, as the 
whole, infinite ways are expressed through infinite things following from the idea of 
God. According to Spinoza’s determinism, the second way is correct. Therefore, it is 
reasonable for us to say that this proposition claims that everything is a definite way to 
express the idea of God. According to Spinoza, the essence of a thing is the idea of a 
thing in God. On the one hand, as the essence of a thing, the idea of a thing in God can 
be said to be the same as the idea of God in the essential realm. Therefore, everything 
is God in the essential realm, and the idea of a thing and the idea of God is one and the 
same93. On the other hand, the idea of a thing is only one expression of the idea of God 
                                                             
93 Wetlesen claims that the ‘whole is reflected in each part, and each part in each other part’ (Wetlesen, 
150 
 
in the functional realm. Therefore, each thing is one way, or one expression, or one 
function, of God’s existence in the functional realm. Therefore, the relationship 
between the idea of a thing in God and the idea of God is also not quantitative, and not 
qualitative. For Spinoza, it is a dynamic relationship embodied in the process of God’s 
self-caused existence.  
  As such, the combined perspective towards the Ultimate Reality of Neo-
Confucianism is chiefly related to the concept of Li of Tian, and the combined 
perspective towards the Ultimate Reality of Spinoza is chiefly related to the concept of 
the idea of God. 
To summarize, for both the Neo-Confucians and Spinoza Ultimate Reality has two 
realms. The two realms are also unified into the same Ultimate Reality. Furthermore, it 
is the mental aspect, i.e. the Li of Tian in Neo-Confucianism and the idea of God in 
Spinoza, that unifies the two realms into the same Ultimate Reality. As such, there are 
two different perspectives corresponding to the two realms. There is the perspective of 
BenTi in Neo-Confucianism and the perspective of sub specie aeternitatis in Spinoza, 
and they are parallel with each other. There is also the perspective of Yong in Neo-
Confucianism and the perspective of sub specie temporis in Spinoza, and they are 
parallel with each other also. Furthermore, given that the two realms are one and the 
same, there is a combined perspective towards Ultimate Reality both in Neo-
Confucianism and Spinoza. The concept of Li of Tian is at the core of the combined 
                                                             
1976, p. 65). Here I agree with Wetlesen for the former part, but do not agree with him for the latter 
part, which implies ‘all things in all things’, a reading of Buddhism. See Footnote 86. 
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perspective of Neo-Confucianism, and the concept of the idea of God is at the core of 
the combined perspective of Spinoza. In order to best understand Spinoza’s Ethics, it is 






The Neo-Confucian Approach towards Understanding the 
Doctrine of the Eternity of the Mind 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism and 
Spinoza are in many ways parallel. This parallelism can help us better comprehend 
Spinoza’s philosophy; I label this a “Neo-Confucian approach”. In this chapter I will 
discuss the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind in detail, and set out 
the Neo-Confucian approach toward comprehending the doctrine.  
4.1 The Puzzle of the Doctrine of the Eternity of the Mind 
In the last part of the Ethics, Spinoza claims that the mind is in some sense eternal. In 
E5p23, Spinoza boldly asserts that ‘[the] human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed 
along with body, but something of it remains, which is eternal’ (E5p23, p. 374). Two 
important problems arise during Spinoza’s discussion of his doctrine of the eternity of 
the mind. 
  Firstly, Spinoza emphasizes the fact that the body could be destroyed whereas the 
mind is eternal in E5p23. This thought seems to be close to immortality as conceived 
by mainstream religions. However, this thought seems to conflict with the basic creed 
of the isomorphism between the mind and the body, developed by Spinoza in E2p7 
Scholium, in which he claims that ‘a mode of Extension and the idea of that mode are 
one and the same thing, expressed in two ways’ (p. 247). What we have seen in Chapter 
3 is that the idea of a mode and the mode of Extension are not two modes of God: they 
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are one and the same. Why, then, does Spinoza claim that the mind cannot be absolutely 
destroyed along with the body? In other words, how can the doctrine of the eternity of 
the mind be reconciled with the creed of the isomorphism between the mind and the 
body? This could be called the problem of isomorphism. 
  Secondly, Spinoza makes some puzzling statements in his discussion of the doctrine 
of the eternity of the mind. In his definition of the concept of eternity, Spinoza asserts 
that eternity ‘cannot be explicated through duration or time, even if duration be 
conceived as without beginning and end’ (E1 Definition 8 Explication, p. 217). He 
repeats that eternal existence ‘cannot be defined by time, that is, cannot be explicated 
through duration’ in E5p23 Scholium (p. 374). In these statements, three conceptions, 
eternity, duration and time, are entangled with each other. Here, the concept of duration 
is identical to the concept of time, which contrasts with the concept of eternity. Spinoza 
defines duration as ‘the indefinite continuance of existing’ in E2 Definition 4 (p. 244). 
According to Spinoza, the indefinite continuance of existing ‘can in no wise be 
determined through the nature of the existing thing, nor again by the thing’s efficient 
cause’ (E2 Definition 5 Explication, p. 244). At our current stage, Spinoza’s explication 
seems not to shed much light on the concept of duration. It seems that Spinoza’s 
indefinite existence should be comprehended as contingent existence, and he 
distinguishes it from the existence that the essence94 of a thing holds. What we know 
is that Spinoza already uses the essence of a thing as an instance of the eternal thing in 
                                                             




his definition of the concept of eternity (E1 Definition 8 Explication, p. 217). In other 
words, Spinoza emphasizes again that the conception of duration is not relevant to the 
concept of eternity, even though it means everlasting in the sense of being without 
beginning and end. However, before commencing the discussion of his last three 
doctrines, Spinoza reminds us that he will be concerned with ‘the duration of the mind 
without respect to the body’ (E5p20 Scholium, p. 373, my italics). If this statement is 
taken seriously then Spinoza’s arguments in the last three doctrines should be 
considered relevant to the duration of the mind. How should we understand the notion 
that the mind’s eternity is relevant to the duration of the mind? Moreover, Spinoza 
asserts that ‘we feel and experience that we are eternal’ in E5p23 Scholium (p. 374, my 
italics). Such feeling and experience must occur when the body remains alive given that 
Spinoza denies the notion of the soul. How can we have the experience of eternity when 
eternity cannot be explicated through duration? These statements seem to conflict with 
one another. This could be called the problem of duration.  
  In short, Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind entails the problem of 
isomorphism and the problem of duration, and these two problems are entangled with 
each other95. This is the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind. Any 
                                                             
95 Some scholars have highlighted another problem. According to Spinoza’s definition in the earlier part 
of the Ethics, the concept of eternity seems to be a concept that should be ascribed to God alone because 
it is ‘existence itself insofar as it is conceived as necessarily following solely from the definition of an 
eternal thing’ (E1 Definition 8, p. 217). Here the concept of eternity is ascribed to a thing whose existence 
and essence cannot be separated, and God, having necessary existence, is the only such thing. God’s 
essence is identical with God’s existence. By contrast, a mode, such as a man, seems not to have the 
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successful approach towards the puzzle should solve both problems, rather than only 
one of them. Some scholars claim that this is just another case of Spinoza’s rigmarole 
(as with the criticisms of his doctrine of the Amor explored in Chapter 2). Other scholars 
suggest that the problem arises from Spinoza’s use of ambiguous religious language as 
a tactical concession towards established religious tradition. There are also a few 
scholars who believe that the issue is an expression of some mystical experience hidden 
in Spinoza’s subconscious. For example, Hubbeling claims that there is a mystical 
structure in Spinoza’s philosophy (Hubbeling, 1978, p. 323), and Wetlesen argues that 
there is a mystical experience at the bottom of Spinoza’s philosophy (Wetlesen, 1978a, 
p. 493). However, once the full importance of the doctrine of the eternity of the mind is 
emphasized, it is difficult for us to swallow these tentative views. It is clear that the 
latter two opinions are also examples of the religious approach, which was introduced 
in Chapter 2, and will not be pursued further here. I will investigate some specific 
approaches towards the puzzle of the mind’s eternity later in this chapter. 
  Before these specific approaches are investigated, a pair of concepts concerning the 
                                                             
quality of eternity since Spinoza believes that the ‘essence of man does not involve necessary existence’ 
(E2 Axiom 1, p. 244). We saw in Chapter 3 that the existence of an individual thing is always distinct 
from its essence. In other words, a mode’s essence is distinct from its existence. Following this logic, it 
seems difficult for Spinoza to ascribe the concept of eternity to an individual. Is the mind’s eternity, then, 
possible? This could be coined ‘the problem of possibility for Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the 
mind’. I do not believe that this problem is serious since the essence of a thing was already used as an 





notion of eternity must be introduced. Wolfson suggests that there are two ways to 
explain the concept of eternity in the history of western philosophy: the so-called 
Platonic way and the so-called Aristotelian way, and they both influenced Spinoza’s 
thought of eternity (Wolfson, 1934a, p. 358). The Platonic eternity is timeless, or is 
unrelated to the temporal dimension, with examples including the eternity of numbers, 
geometric figures, and Platonic Forms. Spinoza seems to bear the conception of the 
Platonic eternity in mind when, in E1 Definition 8 Explication, he emphasizes the point 
that eternity cannot be explicated through duration or time, even if duration is conceived 
as without beginning and end. The Aristotelian eternity is identical to everlasting time, 
and it is sometimes also known as sempiternity. Spinoza seems to bear the conception 
of sempiternity in mind when he reminds us, in E5p20 Scholium, that his last three 
doctrines concern the duration of the mind without respect to the body. Scholars who 
take the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind seriously are divided 
regarding their preferred choice between the Platonic eternity and the Aristotelian 
eternity. 
  Pollock claims that ‘Spinoza’s eternal life is not a continuance of existence but a 
manner of existence’, and it ‘can be realized here and now as much as at any other time 
and place’ (Pollock, 1888, p. 291). Here, eternity is considered to be antithetical to 
temporal passage, and Pollock makes use of the Platonic way of explaining Spinoza’s 
doctrine of the eternity of the mind. In the TIE, Spinoza believes that the highest good 
in life is ‘the knowledge of the union which the mind has with the whole of nature’ (TIE, 
p. 6). Following from this thought, Hampshire argues that upon acquiring genuine 
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knowledge of the mind’s eternity, the individuality of a man ‘as a particular thing 
disappears’, and the mind ‘becomes so far united with God or Nature’ (Hampshire, 1951, 
p. 132). Hampshire seems to imply that the mind’s eternity refers to the eternity of God 
alone, given that the mind has united with God. What is eternal is not an individual 
thing (the individual itself has disappeared), but God himself. Fdti also claims that 
‘[m]an can love God only insofar as, in intellectual love, his own being is absorbed into 
God (Fdti, 1979, p. 441). In a similar manner to Pollock, Hampshire and Fdti seem to 
take the Platonic way since they believe that God alone is eternal.  
  Hampshire and Fdti are right to notice that the mind’s eternity somehow involves 
union with God, but they are wrong to say that individuality disappears when such a 
union is realized. According to Spinoza, the knowledge of the mind’s eternity is 
intuitive knowledge, which refers not only to knowledge of God, but also to knowledge 
of particular things (E5p36 Scholium, p.379). This point will be explored further in 
Chapter 5. Furthermore, how would it be possible for Spinoza to say that we feel and 
experience that we are eternal, if the individuality of a man as a particular thing 
disappears upon such union?  
  Contrary to the Platonic reading, Kneale (1973) proposes the Aristotelian reading. 
Spinoza’s pantheistic framework of metaphysics is a good foundation for Kneale to 
emphasize his Aristotelian reading. Moreover, Kneale reminds us that Spinoza says, 
‘although we have no recollection of having existed before the body, we nevertheless 
sense that our mind… is eternal’’ in E5p23 Scholium (p. 374). Spinoza also urges that 
‘we should consider the mind as if it were now beginning to be and were now beginning 
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to understand things under a form of eternity’ in E5p31 Scholium (p. 377). Kneale 
believes that the tone behind these statements suggests that the mind’s eternity ‘entails 
the pre-existence as well as the post-existence of the human mind’ (Kneale, 1973, p. 
239). If the mind’s eternity entails its existence prior to that of the body, Spinoza’s 
concept of eternity should be identical to everlasting time since the body only exists for 
a particular duration. However, Kneale knows that his Aristotelian reading is difficult 
to reconcile with some of Spinoza’s more Platonic statements. Kneale’s tactic is to deny 
the coherence of Spinoza’s system and assert that no approach ‘is consistent with 
everything that Spinoza says’, further claiming that Spinoza ‘changed his mind about 
the relation between eternity and duration’ (Kneale, 1973, p. 238, italics in original). In 
short, Kneale’s approach does not deal with all of the problems entailed by Spinoza’s 
doctrine of the eternity of the mind. Moreover, Kneale concludes that Spinoza’s thought 
entails ‘the doctrine of universal salvation’, which means that salvation is available for 
everyone (Kneale, 1973, p. 240). Kneale’s approach is necessarily wrong if this 
stunning conclusion is in fact the logical consequence of his approach, since it is 
Spinoza’s final conclusion that only the wise ‘never cease to be’ whereas the ignorant 
‘cease to be at all’ (E5p42 Scholium, p. 382).  
  Donagan (1973) shares much with Kneale’s Aristotelian reading. At the same time, 
Donagan also tries to take some of Spinoza’s Platonic statements seriously. Donagan 
argues that Spinoza’s Platonic statements are only valid sub specie aeternitatis, instead 
of asserting that Spinoza changed his mind during his writing process (Donagan, 1973, 
p. 247). In other words, Donagan introduces the different perspectives of sub specie 
159 
 
aeternitatis and sub specie temporis to deal with the problem of duration. According to 
Donagan, Spinoza’s Platonic statements are only valid sub specie aeternitatis, and his 
Aristotelian statements are only valid sub specie temporis.  
  Moreover, Donagan also deals with the problem of isomorphism in detail through a 
pair of concepts: formal essence and actual essence. Spinoza introduces the concept of 
formal essence in E2p8, and he fine-tunes it again in E5p23 Proof as ‘[in] God there is 
necessarily a conception, or idea, which expresses the essence of the human body’ (p. 
374). In other words, the formal essence of the mind is nothing but the idea of the body 
in God. This formal essence of the mind is eternal since it is an idea in God. Donagan 
finds that in E2p8 Spinoza introduces a special conception; the idea of a nonexisting 
individual thing, which could be considered as an instance of something whose 
existence is irrelevant to the body. Spinoza claims that ‘[the] ideas of nonexisting 
individual things or modes must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the 
same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the 
attributes of God’ (E2p8, p. 248). The formal essence is the eternal part of the mind 
because the idea of the formal essence in God is the same as the ideas of nonexisting 
individual things in men.  
  With respect to the concept of actual essence, Spinoza tells us, in E3p7, that every 
individual thing endeavors to unfold its existence in temporal passage, which is its 
actual essence. This actual essence is its conatus, which is one of the most important 
concepts of Spinoza’s philosophy96. Donagan finds that the eternal part of the mind is 
                                                             
96 I will deal with this concept further in Chapter 8. 
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its formal essence because ‘the idea of its formal essence is part of the idea of its actual 
essence’ (Donagan, 1973, p. 251). As such, the mind is eternal in the sense that its 
formal essence is eternal. The mind and the body are isomorphic when the formal 
essence is considered as one part of the actual essence. The formal essence, as one part 
of the mind, is eternal, and this is similar to the case of the ideas of nonexisting 
individual things. This is Donagan’s answer to the problem of isomorphism. 
  To summarize, Donagan’s approach answers the problem of duration to some degree 
since he shows that Spinoza’s Platonic statements are only valid sub specie aeternitatis, 
and that his Aristotelian statements are only valid sub specie temporis. However, 
Donagan does not clarify why Spinoza asserts that we can feel and experience the 
eternal. Donagan is right to notice that Spinoza’s notion of the ideas of nonexisting 
individual things sheds light on his doctrine of the eternity of the mind. However, using 
the notion of a nonexisting individual thing to prove the eternity of the mind seems to 
abuse this notion. For Spinoza, the idea of a nonexisting individual thing is an idea in 
the way of knowledge of the second kind, reason, which is abstract knowledge, and it 
exists only in the human mind, not in God. This kind of idea itself is not eternal. 
Furthermore, Donagan’s approach also fails to give us much insight into the 
relationship between Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind and his doctrine of 
intuitive knowledge or his doctrine of the Amor.  
  So far, I have not found a persuasive approach dealing with all of the problems 
associated with the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind. What I will 
try to establish in the next section is a Neo-Confucian approach. I believe that, once the 
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parallel relationship is set up between Neo-Confucian and Spinozian metaphysics, the 
puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind can be understood through the 




4.2 The Neo-Confucian Approach 
At first glance, there seems to be a similar puzzle in Neo-Confucianism. On the one 
hand, Li and Ch’i are never separable from each other. According to Chu, there has 
never been any Ch’i without Li or Li without Ch’i. On the other hand, it is also a truism 
in Neo-Confucian rationalism that Li is eternal whereas Ch’i is mortal. So, how do Neo-
Confucians deal with this puzzle? Three points in Neo-Confucianism should be 
emphasized here. 
Firstly, Li and Ch’i are not identical to each other. Li and Ch’i ‘are certainly two 
different entities’ in Chu’s thought (Chan, 1963, p. 637). They are not identical to each 
other even if they are not separate from each other when considered from the 
perspective of the functional realm. Once the conclusion that they are not identical to 
each other emerges, it is possible for us to say that the Li of a thing is eternal whereas 
its physical body is mortal.  
This conclusion also leads me to investigate the real relationship between the mind 
and the body in Spinoza. What I found is that, in a parallel way, the mind and the body 
are also not identical to each other. Moreover, according to E2p7, in which we are told 
that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things, 
the relevant isomorphism is between the idea and the body, not between the mind and 
the body. I have investigated Spinoza’s Complete Works and found that Spinoza never 
directly states that the mind and the body are isomorphic. What we see is only that the 
isomorphism between the idea and the body seems to imply the isomorphism between 
the mind and the body. As shown in Section 3.2, this implication is incorrect. In short, 
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I found that there is still theoretical room for Spinoza to claim the doctrine of the 
eternity of the mind.  
Secondly, Li is dominant. Chu confirmed that there is Li before there can be Ch’i, 
and before ‘Heaven and Earth came into being, it [Li] already was as it is’ (Chan, 1963, 
p. 637). Some Scholars, such as Chan (1963), believe that Li has a logical priority over 
Ch’i (Chan, 1963, p. 634). Unfortunately, no one has given us a clear explanation of the 
meaning of the logical priority here. I believe that this logical priority may be explained 
in several ways. The first way is that it is Li rather than Ch’i which is to be identified 
with the Great Ultimate. The second way is that it is Li rather than Ch’i which unifies 
the essential realm and the functional realm together. The third way is that Li is the 
immanent cause of things. Things operate, nourish, and develop following their Li 
rather than their Ch’i. These are the main conclusions of Neo-Confucian rationalism. 
Chu explains their relationship through a metaphor: Li attaching upon Ch’i is similar to 
a man ‘[who] sits astride a horse’ (Fung, 1953, p. 543). In short, even when Li and Ch’i 
are considered in some ways not separate, Li is dominant. Following this point, it seems 
that Chan’s (1963) claim that Li has a logical priority should be comprehended as a 
claim about ontological priority. The confirmation of Li as the dominant role is the 
ontological foundation of the doctrine of the eternity of Li. 
This conclusion led me to investigate whether or not the attribute of Thought is 
dominant in Spinoza’s theory. I found that, in a parallel way, Spinoza’s attribute of 
Thought is the dominant attribute among God’s infinite attributes. According to E2p3, 
infinite things follow from the idea of God in infinite ways. In other words, the origin 
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of all things is due to the idea of God, which belongs to the scope of the attribute of 
Thought.  
A corresponding question is whether it is also possible for us to say that all things 
follow from the attribute of Extension in God (or to put simply, the body of God), in 
just the same way that they follow out from the idea of God; according to Spinoza, God, 
the idea of God, and the body of God are one and the same. Spinoza does not discuss 
this question directly in his Ethics. However, he tells us boldly that ‘the formal being 
of things that are not modes of thinking does not follow from the nature of God’ (E2p6 
Corollary, p. 246). Spinoza’s claim in this statement has two important implications. 
The first implication is that the formal being of things, as the modes of the attribute of 
Extension, does not follow from the nature of God since the bodies of things are not the 
modes of Thought. In other words, an individual’s body does not follow from the nature 
of God. Following the same logic, the formal being of things as the modes of any other 
attribute of God does not follow from the nature of God. Therefore, this leads us to the 
second important implication: only the ideas of things follow from the nature of God. 
The essence of things is formed by God as a thinking thing. The existence of things as 
the modes of the attribute of Extension, i.e. the bodily existence of things, is not the 
same as the essence of things. What we have seen here is that Spinoza does not consider 
the attribute of Thought to have the same status as any other attribute, for example 
Extension. Rather, the attribute of Thought is placed at the core of God’s infinite 
attributes and the idea of a thing, rather than the mode of any other attribute, is the 
essence of things. According to Spinoza, the existence of an individual thing and its 
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essence are inferred by, but differentiated from, each other. Spinoza makes this 
conclusion by distinguishing the different status of Thought and Extension (or any other 
attribute). 
Spinoza was pressed to answer a similar question in his penultimate letter as follows: 
 
With regard to your question as to whether the variety of things can be 
demonstrated a prior solely from the conception of Extension, I think I have already 
made it quite clear that this is impossible. That is why Descartes is wrong in 
defining matter through Extension; it must necessarily be explicated through an 
attribute which expresses eternal and infinite essence. (Letter 83, p. 958) 
 
This view should be regarded as representative of Spinoza’s mature thought given that 
his death was to come just seven months after writing this letter. His friend was asking 
the following: ‘I fail to see how from an Attribute considered only by itself, for example, 
Extension, an infinite variety of bodies can arise’, so ‘how, from Extension as conceived 
in your philosophy, the variety of things can be demonstrated a priori’ (Letter 82, pp. 
956-7). Spinoza’s answer to his friend is that this is ‘impossible’. The essence and 
variety of things could be defined only through the attribute of Thought. Here Spinoza 
even goes so far as to criticize the notion of defining matter through Extension in 
Descartes’ philosophy, and argues that it can be explicated only through Thought. To 
combine his friend’s question and Spinoza’s answer, it is clear that the status between 
Thought and Extension or any other attributes does not remain equal, and that Thought 
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is dominant. In short, I found that Spinoza can argue that something is eternal if it 
belongs to the scope of the attribute of Thought since Thought is the dominant attribute 
of God. 
  Finally, the relationship between Li and Ch’i is variable depending upon the realm of 
one’s perspective on Ultimate Reality. When we say that Li and Ch’i are never separable 
from each other, we are focusing on the perspective of the functional realm. If our 
perspective turns to the essential realm, it is only Li which can be identified with the 
Great Ultimate. Therefore, Li and Ch’i are separable in the essential realm.  
  This point inspires in me a new approach towards Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity 
of the mind. What I see is that, in a parallel way, in Spinoza the relationship between 
the idea of a thing and its body is also variable depending upon one’s perspective on 
Ultimate Reality.  
  In the realm of Natura naturata, or to use Spinoza’s own terminology, under the form 
of time, the human body and mind are mortal. Spinoza makes this claim clearly, as 
follows: 
 
Therefore, our mind can be said to endure, and its existence to be defined by a 
definite period of time, only to the extent that it involves the actual existence of the 
body, and it is only to that extent that it has the power to determine the existence 
of things by time and to conceive them from the point of view of duration. (E5p23 




Spinoza asks us to remember that it is impossible that ‘we existed before the body’ 
(ibid.). It is also impossible for us to exist after the body. There is no soul-like entity 
existing independently of the human body. Once the body is gone, the human mind is 
gone simultaneously.  
  Turning to the realm of Natura naturans or, to use Spinoza’s own terminology, under 
the form of eternity, some scholars have argued that, similarly to the eternity of the 
mind, the human body will also be eternal because God, God’s intellect, and the things 
understood by God are one and the same. For instance, Pollock argues that ‘the human 
mind is in a certain sense eternal… and everything else too’ (Pollock, 1880, p. 291). In 
other words, as with the mind, the human body is also eternal since every mode is one 
part of God and God is invariable and eternal.  
  However, an important premise is ignored in the argument above. According to 
Spinoza’s definition, Natura naturans refers to God and his attributes, and Natura 
naturata refers to God’s modes. Therefore, we cannot discuss the issues that belong to 
God’s modes in the realm of Natura naturans since God’s modes do not belong to this 
realm. It is a category mistake to claim the eternity of an individual body in the realm 
of Natura naturans, i.e. under the form of eternity. Strictly speaking, we can only say 
that the idea of an individual thing in God, i.e. the idea of God, is eternal in the realm 
of Natura naturans since the idea of God is identical to the intellect of God. This is the 
reason that Spinoza claims that the mind is in a certain sense eternal. This conclusion 
is parallel with the rationalistic Neo-Confucian doctrine in which only Li is identical 
with the Great Ultimate and there is no Ch’i in the essential realm. 
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  So far, our Neo-Confucian approach has helped to answer the problem of 
isomorphism. However, the problem of duration seems to remain. As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the concept of duration in Spinoza’s philosophy means ‘under the form of 
time’, sub specie temporis. Spinoza reminds us that he will be concerned with the 
duration of the mind without respect to the body in E5p20 Scholium. This statement 
seems to conflict with Spinoza’s own discussion since he repeats several times that it 
is under the form of eternity that he sets out his last three doctrines. This statement also 
seems to conflict with my approach, which explains the doctrine of the eternity of the 
mind under the form of eternity. Moreover, in the Scholium of E5p23, Spinoza claims 
that ‘we nevertheless sense that our mind, insofar as it involves the essence of the body 
under a form of eternity, is eternal’ (E5p23 Scholium, p. 374). On the one hand, in this 
statement Spinoza claims that this conclusion is valid from the perspective of the form 
of eternity. On the other hand, Spinoza claims that we can somehow sense the eternity 
of the mind. I have said that we only have pure reflection towards the realm of Natura 
naturans; the problem, then, concerns how we can experience the eternity of the mind, 
given that it seems that any experience occurs only in the realm of Natura naturata, 
under the form of time. These apparently contradictory statements still have no 
reasonable explanation. 
  To deal with the above problem, let us return to Neo-Confucianism again. As we 
have pointed out, Ultimate Reality itself is unified in Neo-Confucian rationalism. The 
two realms originate from our different perspectives, through which we observe 
Ultimate Reality itself. This is the reason why Chu claims that Li has a logical priority 
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to Ch’i, and that they are also never separable from each other. This is also the reason 
why Chu claims that the Li of a thing is invariable whereas its Ch’i undergoes constant 
change from the moment the thing comes to exist until it ceases existing. These 
conclusions originate from the combined perspective of observing Ultimate Reality as 
the whole. 
  In a parallel way, I suggest that the combined perspective must be employed in order 
to explain these apparently contradictory statements97. As I pointed out in Section 3.5, 
for Spinoza Ultimate Reality itself is unified, and Spinoza employs the combined 
perspective in Chapter 5 in the Ethics. In other words, Spinoza states his last three 
doctrines from the combined perspective. The logic of the doctrine of the eternity of the 
mind in Spinoza is parallel with the Neo-Confucian doctrine that the Li of a thing is 
eternal. From the combined perspective, these apparently contradictory statements 
make sense and the doctrine of the eternity of the mind stands up. 
  Donagan (1973) is right to introduce the different perspectives to deal with the 
problem of duration. He is also right to say that Spinoza’s Platonic statements are only 
valid sub specie aeternitatis. However, Donagan is wrong to say that Spinoza’s 
Aristotelian statements are only valid sub specie temporis. I have pointed out that the 
mind and body are mortal sub specie temporis. Donagan’s approach fails to deal with 
all of the problems because he fails to realize that there is also a combined perspective 
in addition to sub specie temporis and sub specie aeternitatis. Donagan’s Aristotelian 
                                                             
97 ‘If he holds both perspectives at once, he lives in the intersection between time and eternity’. 
(Wetlesen, 1976, p. 19) 
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explanation, in which eternity is identical to an everlasting time, seems to be similar to 
my explanation of the combined perspective. However, there are three important 
differences. Firstly, Donagan’s approach cannot explain how Spinoza can argue for 
both the eternity of the mind and the mortality of the mind at the same time. Donagan’s 
approach also cannot explain how Spinoza can legitimately claim that we can feel and 
experience the eternity of the mind. According to my explanation, Spinoza employs a 
combined perspective to discuss his doctrine of the eternity of the mind. During the 
process of his discussion, he employs the perspective of sub specie temporis in some 
places, the perspective of sub specie aeternitatis in other places, and the combined 
perspective in yet other places. Secondly, Donagan’s approach does not identify 
Thought as the dominant attribute in Spinoza’s metaphysics. Donagan’s approach does 
not explain how Spinoza can employ different perspectives when discussing the 
doctrine of the eternity of the mind. In other words, Donagan does not tell us the reason 
for Spinoza’s changing perspective. My approach points out that Thought is the 
dominant attribute and that the idea of the body, as one part of the mind, is identical to 
the idea of God sub specie aeternitatis. The mind is not separate from the body sub 
specie temporis. From the combined perspective, Spinoza can claim both that the 
formal essence of the mind is eternal, and that we can feel and experience the eternity 
of the mind 98 . Thirdly, according to my explanation, even from the different 
perspectives, Ultimate Reality is one and the same. This means that the formal essence 
                                                             
98 Nadler claims that the experience of this kind of eternity of the mind occurs in the present life, 
neither before birth nor after death (Nadler, 2006, p. 272). That this present life combines with the 
intuitive knowledge of the eternity is an instantiation of the combined perspective. 
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and the actual essence of the mind are also one and the same in the ontological sense. 
The difference between them is purely epistemological. This means that we cannot fully 
comprehend the doctrine of the eternity of the mind until Spinoza’s epistemology is 
properly explored. This is the reason for my criticism of Donagan’s approach: it does 
not adequately recognize the relationship between Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of 
the mind and his doctrine of intuitive knowledge. 
  To summarize, in this chapter I have presented a Neo-Confucian approach to 
Spinoza’s puzzle of the doctrine of the eternity of the mind. Following the parallelism 
of the metaphysical frameworks of Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza, the Neo-Confucian 
doctrine of Li led me to investigate Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity of the mind in a 
new way. I claim that (1) the mind and the body are not identical to each other; Spinoza 
has theoretical room to claim the doctrine of the eternity of the mind; (2) Thought is the 
dominant attribute, and Spinoza can argue that the mind is in a certain sense eternal 
given that it belongs to the scope of the attribute of Thought; (3) the relationship 
between the mind and the body is variable with respect to the perspective on Ultimate 
Reality that one adopts. From the combined perspective, it is reasonable to say that that 
the mind is in a certain sense eternal and the body is mortal for Spinoza, just as one can 
say that Li is eternal whereas Ch’i is mortal in Neo-Confucian rationalism. The eternal 
part of the mind is its formal essence. The formal essence is also its actual essence sub 
specie temporis. The difference between the formal essence and the actual essence is 
epistemological. Therefore, in the next step, Spinoza’s epistemology needs to be 




The Parallel Structure between the Doctrines of Intuitive 
Knowledge of Wang and Spinoza 
In Section 5.1, I will explore the epistemology of Neo-Confucianism. I will focus on 
Wang’s concept of the investigation of things, and his doctrine of intuitive knowledge. 
In Section 5.2, I will explore the epistemology of Spinoza and highlight Spinoza’s own 
doctrine of intuitive knowledge. In Section 5.3, I will argue that there is a parallelism 
between the structures of Wang’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge and Spinoza’s 
doctrine of intuitive knowledge.  
5.1 The Theory of Knowledge of Neo-Confucianism 
The epistemology of Chinese philosophy arrived at its peak in Neo-Confucianism, 
especially in the hands of Chu and Wang. In Section 5.1.1, I will demonstrate that Chu 
unfolds his theory of knowledge through his explanation of the concept of the 
investigation of things. Wang, as Chu’s rival, proposes a new explanation of the concept 
of the investigation of things. Following that, in Section 5.1.2, I will argue that Wang 
developed an idealistic approach towards Neo-Confucian epistemology through his 
doctrine of intuitive knowledge. Neither Chu nor Wang focuses entirely on the theory 
of knowledge itself, and what they bear in mind is that knowledge is the means for 
moral self-cultivation (Fung, 1953, p. 562). It is important for us to be aware of this 
point from the beginning. 
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  The starting point of Neo-Confucian epistemology is the Great Learning. The Great 
Learning is one of the Four Books, and its original text is one chapter of the Book of 
Rites, one of the Five Classics of classical Confucianism99. The Great Learning is 
believed to be the work of Tseng Tzu (曾子, 505- c.436 B.C.), one of Confucius’ 
disciples. As such, the basic thought of the Great Learning is attributed to the teachings 
of Confucius himself even though it was written after the death of Confucius. It is a 
very short100 but marvelous piece in the history of Chinese philosophy. Chu picked it 
out from the Book of Rites, re-edited it in accordance with his own understanding of the 
text, and finally promoted it as one of the Four Books. Chu edited and wrote 
commentaries on the Great Learning throughout his career. Chu’s commentary itself 
became one of the core parts of his philosophy. Moreover, Chu’s commentary 
(alongside his commentaries upon the Analects, the Book of Mencius, and the Doctrine 
of the Mean) became the standard answers in examinations for the state civil service 
from 1313 until 1905 in China. 
5.1.1 The Concept of the Investigation of Things 
One of the main thoughts of the epistemology of Neo-Confucianism lies in the concept 
of the so-called ‘Ko-Wu’ (格物 ) in the Great Learning. The term ‘Ko-Wu’ is a 
combination of the two basic words ‘Ko’ (格) and ‘Wu’(物). In the Chinese grammar, 
                                                             
99 De Bary (2009) claims that the Four Books are the New Testament of Confucianism where the Five 
Classics are the Old Testament of Confucianism. 
 
100  The work as a whole is around 1750 words long in the original Chinese, and only around 200 




the former is a verb, and its meaning is variable in different contexts. Chu reads it as 
‘to investigate’, and argues further that ‘to investigate’ means ‘to study thoroughly’. 
The latter is a noun, and its literal meaning is ‘things’. Consequently, Chu interprets the 
term ‘Ko-Wu’ as ‘the investigation of things’.  
  The ‘Ko-Wu’ is the first step of moral cultivation in the text of the Great Learning. 
The whole process of moral cultivation has eight steps arrayed in a gradational order; 
(1) investigating things, (2) extending knowledge, (3) being sincere of will, (4) 
rectifying the mind, (5) cultivating the self, (6) regulating the family, (7) ordering the 
state, (8) pacifying the world. Following this gradational order, it is clear that the 
extension of knowledge (the second step) builds upon the investigation of things (the 
first step), and that they are two distinct steps. Chu believes that ‘[when] things are 
investigated, knowledge is extended’ (Chan, 1963, p. 86).  
  According to Chu, knowledge in the concept of ‘the extension of knowledge’ refers 
to the Li of things. Chu claims the following: 
 
Only by investigating the thing and arriving at the thing itself can the principle [Li] 
of the thing be known completely. When the principle of the thing is known 
completely, our knowledge of it is extended and focused. (Huang, 1978, p. 138) 
 
Here it is clear that to investigate things is to study the Li of things thoroughly. 
Knowledge cannot be extended except through investigating things. In other words, the 
acquisition of knowledge lies in the investigation of things. Chu believes that a 
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thorough study of the Li of things through investigation leads to the extension of 
knowledge, and that it would not be possible to extend knowledge without such a 
thorough investigation of things. Therefore, Chu’s approach of epistemology is 
empirical. 
  As the rival of Chu, Wang is the main representative of the School of the Mind of 
Neo-Confucianism, and his philosophy represents another, final, peak of Neo-
Confucianism. Wang’s philosophy became more popular than Chu’s orthodox 
philosophy and dominated China for nearly 150 years after Wang’s death (Chan, 1963, 
p. 654). Wang criticizes Chu’s doctrine of the investigation of things as follows: 
 
What Chu Hsi meant by the investigation of things is “to investigate the principle 
[Li] in things to the utmost as we come in contact with them” …. This means to 
apply one’s mind to each individual thing and look for principle in it. This is to 
divide the mind and principle into two. To seek for the principle in each individual 
thing is like looking for the principle of filial piety in parents. If the principle of 
filial piety is to be sought in parents, then is it actually in my own mind or is it in 
the person of my parents? If it is actually in the person of my parents, is it true that 
as soon as the parents pass away the mind will lack the principle of filial piety? .... 
What is true here is true of all things and events. From this we know the mistake 
of dividing the mind and principle into two. (Wang, 1963, pp. 98-9) 
 
Here Wang accuses Chu’s doctrine of dividing the mind and Li into two and argues that 
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this is not coherent with the core belief of Neo-Confucianism, i.e. that Li is One101. 
Wang’s argument seems persuasive as far as the example of filial piety is concerned102. 
However, Wang cannot generalize his argument to all things. Wang’s interpretation of 
Chu’s doctrine of the investigation of things is only partly correct. For Chu, Li lies not 
only in things external to the mind but also in the mind. In fact, Chu maintains that the 
Li in man’s mind and the Li in external things are one and the same. For awaking the 
Li in the mind, Chu argues that one should investigate things external to the mind, and 
this is an empirical approach. It is unfair to accuse Chu of dividing the mind and Li into 
two merely on the basis of Chu’s proposal of investigating of things external to the 
mind and looking for the Li of things. 
Wang’s attack upon Chu’s thought is one aspect of his argument. Another aspect of 
Wang’s argument is to establish his own doctrine of the theory of knowledge. Wang’s 
epistemology derives from his new interpretation of the Great Learning. Wang’s 
method is to rephrase the concept of ‘Ko-Wu’ itself in the Great Learning. Whereas Chu 
considers the word ‘things’ (the Chinese word ‘Wu’) to refer to things and affairs, which 
are objective and independent of the mind, Wang considers it to refer to events, in which 
                                                             
101 Also see Huang (1978, p. 143). 
 
102 Lee (1987) argues that Wang’s logic in this argument is flawed. According to Lee (1987), even 
though the Li of filial piety actually does not lie in parents, it is not necessary to conclude that the Li of 
filial piety lies in the mind because it is also possible that the Li of filial piety lies elsewhere, such as 
‘in the Platonic world’ (Lee, 1987, p. 32). However, it is a basic fact that the metaphysical framework 
of Wang (and almost every Neo-Confucian, including Chu) is monistic, and the thought of dualism, 
such as Platonism, does not have its place in Neo-Confucianism. As such, Lee seems to misunderstand 
Wang’s metaphysics in this criticism. 
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the mind is involved. An event involves not only the object outside but also the subject 
inside. Wang himself has his definition of things as follows: 
 
A thing is an event. For every emanation of the will there must be an event 
corresponding to it. The event to which the will is directed is a thing. (Wang, 1963, 
p. 279) 
 
Since a thing is defined as an event towards which the will is directed, and the will is 
one function of the mind, there can be nothing completely external to the mind. This is 
the meaning of Wang’s slogan, ‘There is Nothing External to The Mind’. Wang believes 
that it is not possible for anything to exist separately from the mind. Here, one of the 
biggest differences between Chu and his rival, Wang, is revealed. ‘Things’ are 
transformed from objective things and affairs, in Chu’s concept of the investigation of 
things, to events, towards which the will is directed and with which the mind is involved, 
in the hands of Wang. 
   Wang’s new interpretation of the concept of ‘Ko-Wu’ is founded on new definitions 
of not only the word ‘Wu’, but also the word ‘Ko’. For Chu, the word ‘Ko’ refers to 
investigation, and this interpretation became orthodox. In contrast, Wang argues that it 
should refer to rectification as follows: 
  
To investigate is to rectify. It is to rectify that which is incorrect so it can return to 
its original correctness. To rectify that which is not correct is to get rid of evil, and 
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to return to correctness is to do good. This is what is meant by investigation. (Wang, 
1963, p. 279) 103 
 
For Wang, in order to acquire the Li it is not necessary to investigate things external to 
the mind because the mind itself holds the Li. The Li is embodied a priori in the mind 
in its entirety somehow. The mind knows the Li clearly, but it may be blocked or 
distorted by surplus desires. It is also not necessary, for Wang, to investigate the Li in 
the mind since the Li is always there as it is. The method of acquiring the Li is nothing 
more than dispelling surplus desires in order to restore the original state of the mind: 
this is the meaning of ‘Ko’ as rectification. One of Wang’s favorite analogies is that the 
mind is like a mirror, and surplus desires are like specks of dust stuck on the mirror. 
What we need to do is to sweep away the dust, and the mirror will be clear. Rectifying 
the mind is similar to sweeping away dust on a mirror. The Li itself will show 
simultaneously once surplus desires are rectified. Therefore, it is better for Wang to 
interpret the word ‘Ko’ (格) as ‘to rectify’. Wang emphasizes not the investigation of 
the Li in things external to the mind, but the rectification of the surplus desires in the 
mind.  
  With the combination of Wang’s new definitions of the two Chinese words ‘Ko and 
‘Wu’, the concept of ‘Ko-Wu’ in the hands of Wang means to rectify the mind, in contrast 
                                                             
103 Cf. ‘To investigate is to correct [Cheng]. To correct what is incorrect is called restoring correctness; 
to correct what is incorrect is called dispelling evil; restoring something to correctness is called 




to the orthodox interpretation of the investigation of things in the hands of Chu. 
Whereas Chu maintains that one extends the knowledge of the Li of things by the 
investigation of things, Wang argues that one reclaims the knowledge of the Li of events, 
which are innate in the mind, by rectifying the surplus desires in the mind. 
5.1.2 Wang’s Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge 
Chu maintains that to extend knowledge is to attain new knowledge, and that there is a 
gradual order between the investigation of things and the extension of knowledge. In 
contrast, since the concept of the investigation of things was interpreted in a new way 
by Wang, the concept of the extension of knowledge has different implications. In fact, 
rectifying the mind and extending knowledge are two different aspects of the same thing 
in Wang’s doctrine: they are not two different steps in the gradual order of moral self-
cultivation and social and political practices, as Chu proposes. In the example of the 
mirror, the mirror becomes clear immediately when the dust is swept away. They 
happen at the same time. As with his concept of the investigation of things, Wang also 
has a new explanation of the concept of the extension of knowledge. For Wang, 
extending knowledge is to extend so-called Liang-chih to events. Liang-chih is the core 
concept of Wang’s philosophy. Wang discusses the concept as follows: 
 
The sense of right and wrong is knowledge possessed by men without deliberation 
and ability possessed by them without their having acquired it by learning. It is 
what we call innate knowledge [Liang-chih]. This knowledge is inherent in the 
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human mind whether that of the sages or of the stupid person, for it is the same for 
the whole world and for all ages. (Wang, 1963, pp. 166-7) 
 
Here the concept of Liang-chih refers not only to men’s innate knowledge without 
deliberation but also to men’s inborn ability that does not need to be acquired through 
learning.  
  The term ‘Liang-chih’ consists of two basic Chinese words: Liang (良), which has 
the literal meaning of ‘the good’ in Chinese, and Chih (知), which has the literal 
meaning of ‘knowledge’ in Chinese. The term incorporates these literal meanings, i.e. 
‘the good knowledge’. However, due to its varied applications and rich implications, 
the term itself cannot be easily translated accurately into English. Since Wang (1916) 
systematically introduced Wang’s philosophy to the Western world, Liang-chih has 
generally been known as ‘intuitive knowledge’. Cady (1928) and Fung (1953) followed 
this translation. However, Wing-tsit Chan, a specialist of the philosophy of Wang, 
provided a new translation of Liang-chih as ‘innate knowledge’ (Chan, 1960; Chan, 
1962; Chan, 1963; Wang, 1963). Thereafter, Chan’s new translation became popular 
due to his huge influence on the study of Wang’s philosophy. It is also worth noting that 
Iki (1961) translates it as ‘innate knowledge of the good’. Every translation has its 
advantages and disadvantages. These advantages and disadvantages will be revealed 
further in due course. Briefly speaking, the translation ‘innate knowledge’ highlights 
the metaphysical commitments of Wang’s doctrine of Liang-chih. The translation 
‘intuitive knowledge’ highlights its epistemological commitments, and the translation 
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‘innate knowledge of the good’ highlights its moral commitments.  
  In this thesis I shall use the translation ‘intuitive knowledge’, and it will be used 
throughout except in some citations in which other translations have been used in their 
original texts. My reason for this is that the most important value of Wang’s doctrine of 
Liang-chih lies in its new approach towards the epistemology of Neo-Confucianism, 
and the term ‘intuitive knowledge’ highlights this approach.   
  The term ‘Liang-chih’ itself was not first used by Wang, but rather by Mencius, who 
is well-known for proposing the doctrine of the Goodness of Human Nature. According 
to Mencius (7A: 15), ‘[the] ability possessed by men without their having acquired it 
by learning is innate [intuitive] ability, and the knowledge possessed by them without 
deliberation is innate [intuitive] knowledge’ (Chan, 1963, p. 80). Here, Mencius 
emphasizes not only men’s intuitive knowledge without deliberation but also intuitive 
faculty without learning. As such, for Mencius, intuitive knowledge and intuitive 
faculty have an intimate relationship and cannot be discussed separately. Wang’s 
concept of intuitive knowledge inherits both Mencius’ concept of intuitive knowledge 
and his concept of an intuitive faculty, and combines them into an integrated concept104.  
  For Wang, the term ‘Chih’ (knowledge) in the doctrine of ‘Chih-chih’ (the extension 
of knowledge) in the Great Learning is the same as the term ‘‘Liang-chih’ (intuitive 
knowledge) in the Book of Mencius, and the extension of knowledge should, therefore, 
                                                             
104 The integration of intuitive knowledge and intuitive faculty further supports us a foundation to 





be comprehended as the extension of intuitive knowledge to events. In other words, 
Wang grafts the thoughts of the Book of Mencius onto his interpretation of the Great 
Learning, and forms a new doctrine of the extension of knowledge himself (Chan, 1963, 
p. 656). Wang proposes that the conception of knowledge in the doctrine of the 
extension of knowledge refers to his concept of intuitive knowledge. This sounds a little 
bit odd, and some further explanations are needed for us to understood Wang’s doctrine 
of intuitive knowledge.  
  Firstly, intuitive knowledge is a priori. To say that intuitive knowledge is a priori is 
also to say that intuitive knowledge is identical with the Li in the mind at the ontological 
level, and that it belongs to everyone. According to Wang, intuitive knowledge is 
inherent in the mind of not only the sages but also the stupid people. Intuitive 
knowledge, as the essence of the mind, is the same for all men throughout the entire 
world and through all ages. Wang argues that not only adults, but even infants, know to 
love their parents and to respect their brothers and sisters (Wang, 1963, p. 76). Everyone 
has intuitive knowledge from birth. 
  Moreover, intuitive knowledge does not change. In Chu’s doctrine of the extension 
of knowledge, new knowledge will be attained through the investigation of things. By 
contrast, in Wang’s doctrine of the extension of knowledge, knowledge, as intuitive 
knowledge, is not widened since intuitive knowledge does not change. Wang claims 
that ‘[people] cannot add or subtract even an iota from the original substance of innate 
knowledge [intuitive knowledge]’ (Chan, 1963, p. 683) 105 . In other words, an 
                                                             
105 Cf. ‘The original nature of the intuitive faculty from the very beginning cannot have the least added 
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experiential practice could not have any influence on intuitive knowledge itself. In the 
example of a mirror, whatever we do to sweep out the dust that sticks onto the mirror, 
the mirror itself does not change. In other words, for Wang, to extend knowledge is not 
to attain new knowledge, but to reclaim innate knowledge which was already embodied 
in the mind. The mirror itself is clear, and the action of sweeping away the dust cannot 
add to its clearness. What we can do is to recover the clearness of the mirror. Wang 
argues that ‘[the] extension of knowledge is not what later scholars [Chu and his 
followers] understand as enriching and widening knowledge’ (Chan, 1963, p. 665).    
  Finally, intuitive knowledge also refers to the knowledge of good and evil at the 
moral level. With respect to this point, Wang’s intuitive knowledge is, in fact, referring 
to what Mencius meant by our sense of right and wrong as follows: 
 
This innate knowledge of the good [intuitive knowledge] is what Mencius meant 
when he said, “The sense of right and wrong is common to all men.” The sense of 
right and wrong requires no deliberation to know, nor does it depend on learning 
to function. This is why it is called innate knowledge [intuitive knowledge] (ibid.). 
 
Here, Wang is citing Mencius’ account of our sense of right and wrong to interpret his 
intuitive knowledge106. According to Mencius, ‘a man without the feeling of right and 
                                                             
or taken away from it’ (Wang, 1916, p. 237) 
 
106 It is a Chinese academic tradition to cite classical texts to introduce a new doctrine owing to the fact 




wrong is not a man…. the feeling of right and wrong is the beginning of wisdom’ (Chan, 
1963, p. 65). The sense of right and wrong is endowed to every man by Tian and it is a 
part of the original nature of the mind. The sense of right and wrong corresponds to the 
knowledge of good and evil. In other words, for Mencius, the sense of right and wrong 
seems to be conscience. That Wang understands his intuitive knowledge as the 
knowledge of good and evil discloses its moral characteristic. Every man possesses the 
knowledge of good and evil, even an inferior man because ‘although an inferior man 
may have done all manner of evil, when he sees a superior man he will surely try to 
disguise this fact, concealing what is evil and displaying what is good in himself’ (Chan, 
1963, p. 665). Wang’s thought of intuitive knowledge as the knowledge of good and 
evil is summarized in one of his famous Four Axioms107: intuitive knowledge is to know 
good and evil. 
  In short, intuitive knowledge is a priori and unchangeable. At the moral level, 
intuitive knowledge refers to the knowledge of good and evil. Wang’s doctrine of the 
extension of knowledge aims not to enrich knowledge itself but rather to extend 
intuitive knowledge to events.  
  To summarize, the theory of knowledge of Neo-Confucianism and all its basic 
                                                             
107 Wang’s famous Four Axioms (四句教) is one of the best summaries of his philosophy and is as 
follows: 
 
   ‘In the original substance of the mind there is no distinction between good and evil. 
   When the will becomes active, however, such distinction exists. 
   The faculty of innate knowledge [intuitive knowledge] is to know good and evil. 




concepts, the investigation of things, the extension of knowledge, intuitive knowledge, 
the knowledge of good and evil, etc., derive from the classical texts of classical 
Confucianism. At the same time, two rival branches of the theory of knowledge were 
developed in the hands of the two main representatives of Neo-Confucianism, through 
their rival interpretations of the concepts of the investigation of things and the extension 
of knowledge respectively. As the representative of the School of Li, Chu advocates an 
empirical approach, i.e. the extension of knowledge through the investigation of things. 
It is a gradual process from the investigation of things to the extension of knowledge. 
Contrastingly, as the representative of the School of the Mind, Wang advocates an 
idealistic approach, i.e. to investigate things is to rectify the mind, and the extension of 
knowledge is to extend intuitive knowledge to events. To rectify the mind and to extend 
intuitive knowledge to events are two aspects of the same thing.   
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5.2 Spinoza’s Theory of Knowledge 
Spinoza’s discussion of the theory of knowledge is notoriously brief. He did not write 
a monograph on epistemology108 and nor did he write a single chapter on epistemology 
in his Ethics. He introduced his theory of knowledge only as a supplemental piece in 
E2p40 Scholium 2, and through several propositions about intuitive knowledge in Part 
Five of the Ethics. This parsimonious discussion itself, on the one hand, highlights the 
inherited character of Spinoza’s epistemology, which he takes from the Western 
tradition of epistemology. On the other hand, it reveals that Spinoza’s epistemology 
must be understood in its full context as part of his radical metaphysics and moral 
philosophy. In Section 5.2.1, I will introduce Spinoza’s basic theory of knowledge. In 
Section 5.2.2, I will focus on his doctrine of intuitive knowledge. 
5.2.1 Spinoza’s Basic Theory of Knowledge 
According to E2p40 Scholium 2, there are three kinds of knowledge: imagination 
[opinion vel imagination]; reason [ratio]; and intuition [scientia intuitiva] (E2p40 
Scholium 2, p. 267). Spinoza provides the following example with which to illustrate 
them: 
 
Three numbers are given; it is required to find a fourth which is related to the third 
                                                             
108 Due to the influence of Descartes’s Discourse on Method, Spinoza’s first philosophical piece, the 
TIE, seems to tend to consider epistemology as its main content. Unfortunately, it is unfinished and the 




as the second to the first. Tradesmen have no hesitation in multiplying the second 
by the third and dividing the product by the first, either because they have not yet 
forgotten the rule they learnt without proof from their teachers, or because they 
have in fact found this correct in the example of very simple numbers, or else from 
the force of the proof of Proposition 19 of the Seventh Book of Euclid, to wit, the 
common property of proportionals. But in the example of the given numbers 1, 2, 
3, everybody can see that the fourth proportional is 6, and all the more clearly 
because we infer in one single intuition the fourth number from the ratio we see the 
first number bears to the second (E2p40 Scholium 2, pp. 267-8, my italics)109. 
                                                             
109 Cf. This example in the TIE is as follows:  
 
Three numbers are given; a fourth is required, which is to the third as the second to the first. Here 
tradesmen generally tell us that they know what to do to find the fourth number, for they have not 
forgotten the procedure which they merely learned without proof from their teachers. Others 
formulate a universal axiom from their experience with simple numbers when the fourth number 
is self-evident, as in the case of the numbers 2, 4, 3, 6. Here they find that when the second is 
multiplied by the third and the product is divided by the first, the answer is 6. Seeing that the same 
number is produced which they knew to be the proportional number without going through the 
procedure, they conclude that this procedure is always a good way to find the fourth proportional. 
But mathematicians, because of the force of the demonstration of Proposition 19 of Book 7 of 
Euclid, know what numbers are proportional to one another from the nature and property of 
proportion, which tell us that the product of the first and fourth numbers is equal to the product of 
the second and third. However, they do not see the adequate proportionality of the given numbers, 
and if they do see it, they see it not by the force of that proposition but intuitively, without going 
through any procedure. (TIE, p. 8, my italics) 
 
It is noteworthy that in the Ethics, his mature writing, Spinoza states in his example that everybody can 
have intuitive knowledge, whereas in the TIE, his less mature writing, he states that only 
mathematicians can have such knowledge in the same example. As such, according to Spinoza’s 





Spinoza favors this example: it occurs not only in the Ethics, which is arguably his 
most mature work, but also in the TIE, his earliest work, and in his KV. With this 
simple mathematical example Spinoza illustrates the differences among his three 
kinds of knowledge. The first two ways of finding the answer form knowledge of the 
first kind, imagination. The third way forms knowledge of the second kind, reason. 
The last way forms knowledge of the third kind, intuition. It is clear in this case that 
Spinoza’s threefold classification of knowledge rests on the method of knowledge 
being acquired. Knowledge of the first kind is acquired through the experiential 
method, and knowledge of the second kind is acquired through the rational method. 
Knowledge of the third kind is acquired through the intuitive method.  
  Spinoza’s threefold classification of knowledge in the Ethics has its initial fourfold 
classification in his TIE, in which knowledge of the first kind has two types. One type 
refers to hearsay, and another type refers to experience (TIE, pp. 8-9). Spinoza 
continued to follow this taxonomy of knowledge in his KV. It is interesting to note that 
in his Ethics Spinoza still divided his knowledge of the first kind into two different sub-
kinds, in style with the TIE. The first type, hearsay, was developed into sign-based 
knowledge, and the second type, experience, was developed into sense-based 
knowledge that is ‘from casual experience’ (E2p40 Scholium 2, p. 267). This treatment 
reveals that, on the one hand, Spinoza does not forget his initial fourfold classification. 
On the other hand, Spinoza does not believe that there is any essential difference 
between the sign-based knowledge and the sense-based knowledge in the Ethics. For 
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convenience, I will consider both types of knowledge of the first kind, imagination, as 
being experiential knowledge hereafter.  
  Spinoza’s taxonomy of knowledge reveals its characteristic of following the Western 
tradition of epistemology. The fourfold classification of knowledge has its roots in Plato, 
and was further developed by Aristotle, and later by various Jewish, Islamic, and 
Christians philosophers (Wolfson, 1934b, p. 133). However, it is not my purpose here 
to pursue its historical development. My interest here concerns the inner logic of 
Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge and the relationship between his epistemology and 
his metaphysics and moral philosophy.  
(i) The Standard of Truth 
Before we pursue Spinoza’s theory of knowledge further, we should explore Spinoza’s 
standard of truth, which is his criterion for distinguishing truth from falsity. We will see 
that Spinoza employs an internal standard of truth rather than an external one. In 
Spinoza’s terminology, the smallest unit of the human mind is an idea, and he says that 
‘by idea I understand a conception of the Mind’ (E2 Definition 3, p. 244). Therefore, 
we can say that Spinoza equates “knowledge” with ideas. Traditionally speaking, the 
truth of an idea in the mind has been considered to lie in the fact that it corresponds 
with its external object, a corresponding ideatum. The agreement of an idea with its 
ideatum was considered to be the so-called external standard of truth. However, Spinoza 
gave up this external standard, and turned to the so-called internal standard of truth 
grounded in the intrinsic characteristics of a true idea. Spinoza claims that the truth of 
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an idea is not related to its external object (or state of affairs) but rather to its intrinsic 
characteristics (E2 Definition 4, p. 244). In the same place, Spinoza emphasizes that ‘I 
say “intrinsic” so as to exclude the extrinsic characteristics’ (E2 Definition 4 
Explication, p. 244). Once one turns to the internal standard, it seems that there must 
be some ideas that are a priori true themselves, or at least one idea that is a priori true, 
since otherwise the problem of an infinite regress would emerge. That is, the truth of 
an idea needs to be verified against falsity through the truth of the second idea, and the 
truth of the second idea needs, further, to be verified against falsity through the truth of 
the third idea, and so on ad infinitum. This kind of skepticism has no place in Spinoza’s 
philosophy because ‘just as light makes manifest both itself and darkness, so truth is 
the standard both of itself and falsity’ (E2p43 Scholium, p. 269). According to Spinoza, 
‘truth…. needs no sign’ (TIE, p. 11). Moreover, ‘truth reveals both itself and the false’ 
(Letter 76, p. 949). Furthermore, ‘truth is its own standard’ (E2p43 Scholium, p. 269). 
For Spinoza, a true idea does not need another idea in order to be verified: it is itself 
the standard of truth. Spinoza’s confidence in the truth of an idea is based on his 
philosophy of the nature of the human mind, and he argues that ‘[a] true idea in us is 
one which is adequate in God insofar as he is explicated through the nature of the human 
mind’ (E2p43 Proof, p. 268). A true idea has its final guarantee from God since the 
nature of the human mind derives from God. The problem of the nature of the 
relationship between God and the human mind will be developed in due course.  
  A further question concerns the “intrinsic characteristics” of a true idea. Spinoza does 
not explicitly deal with this question in his Ethics, but he discusses it in his CM. He 
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claims that there are two intrinsic characteristics of a true idea: ‘(1) that it is clear and 
distinct, (2) that it removes all doubt, or, in a word, that it is certain’. (CM, p. 187). Here 
it is reasonable to say that Spinoza had some inspiration from Descartes given that the 
CM was presented as an appendix to the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy, and that 
Descartes introduced both clearness and distinctness as the standards of truth in his 
Meditation III. 
  For Spinoza, a true idea is self-evident. He does not assert that some ideas, or a 
unique idea, are true and can serve as the foundation of knowledge. Rather, any idea 
that has the intrinsic characteristics above is always true110.  
  However, it should be noted that Spinoza has his own metaphysical justification for 
his use of the internal standard. In Spinoza’s metaphysics, God has infinite attributes, 
but among them man can access only the attributes of Thought and Extension. An idea 
is a thinking mode of the attribute of Thought of God, and the corresponding bodily 
mode of the attribute of Extension of God could be loosely called its ideatum. What is 
unique about Spinoza’s metaphysics is that the attribute of Thought and the attribute of 
Extension insulate one another. Strictly speaking, it is impossible that there be any 
causal relationship between the mind and the body, not only a physical causal 
relationship, but also a logical causal relationship. The causal relationship exists only 
in the inside of an attribute. An idea causes the second idea, and the second idea causes 
the third idea, and so on ad infinitum. In the same way, a bodily mode causes the second 
bodily mode, and the second bodily mode causes the third bodily mode, and so on ad 
                                                             
110 In other words, Spinoza is not a foundationalist in epistemology. 
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infinitum. In the strictest sense, it is incorrect to claim that there exists a bodily mode 
ideatum corresponding to an idea of the thinking mode. This is why Spinoza uses the 
term ‘conception’ rather than ‘perception’ in his formal definition of the concept of idea: 
he feels that the term ‘perception’ has the implication that ‘the Mind is passive to its 
object’ (E2 Definitions 3, p. 244). In fact, strictly speaking, the mind does not have any 
relation to the body. Logically speaking, it would be wrong to try to verify an idea 
through its so-called ideatum, an external object, and the external standard of truth, 
therefore, is inappropriate for Spinoza given his core claims and commitments.  
  In brief, with respect to his theory of knowledge, Spinoza employs the internal 
standard of truth rather than the external standard. For Spinoza, the basic form of truth 
is a true idea. Following Descartes, Spinoza also believes that a true idea is clear and 
distinct. In contrast to Descartes, Spinoza believes that a true idea is the standard both 
of itself and falsity, and that is does not need to be verified further by another item of 
true knowledge. As such, a true idea is self-evident, and Cartesian skepticism has no 
place in Spinoza’s epistemology. 
(ii) Imagination and Reason  
For Spinoza, a thinking mode and its corresponding bodily mode are one and the same. 
They are two different aspects of the same thing. Ontologically speaking, an idea itself 
is its ideatum and an ideatum itself is also its idea. From this perspective, a radical 
consequence follows: it is impossible to say that a single idea itself is false. For example, 
with the statement, ‘when we gaze at the sun, we see it as some two hundred feet distant 
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from us’, the error does not come from our conception of seeing the sun as some two 
hundred feet distant from us, but from the belief that the sun exists at such a distance 
from us (E2p35 Scholium, p. 264). The conception of seeing the sun as some two 
hundred feet distant from us itself is always true since it itself is a single idea, and this 
conception is isomorphic to the fact ‘that the affection of our body involves the essence 
of the sun only to the extent that the body is affected by it’ (ibid.). A single idea by itself 
is always true. The belief that the sun exists two hundred feet away from us is a 
combined false idea. 
  Here we arrive at another important taxonomy behind Spinoza’s threefold 
classification of knowledge: the twofold classification of knowledge of inadequate 
ideas and knowledge of adequate ideas or, put simply, inadequate knowledge and 
adequate knowledge. Knowledge of the first kind is always of inadequate ideas whereas 
knowledge of the second and third kinds is always of adequate ideas. The crucial notion, 
then, concerns the concept of ‘adequate’ as used in this context. Spinoza does not 
explicitly answer this question but provides a definition in an indirect way when he 
refers to ‘an adequate cause whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived 
through the said cause’ (P3 Definitions 1, p. 278, my italics). Here, Spinoza clearly 
repeats his internal standard of truth.  
  An inadequate idea is the origin of falsity in Spinoza’s epistemology. Consequently, 
knowledge of the first kind as inadequate knowledge is ‘the cause of falsity’ whereas 
knowledge of the second and third kinds as adequate knowledge are ‘necessarily true’ 
(E2p41, p. 268). What should be stressed here is that knowledge of the first kind is not 
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necessarily false: Spinoza’s claim in E2p41 is merely that it is the cause of falsity. 
Turning back to the example of gazing at the sun, a man who does not have scientific 
knowledge of the sun could incorporate the conception in his system of knowledge and 
believe it to be true that the sun is two hundred feet from him. His conception of seeing 
the sun as being two hundred feet away is a single idea, and this conception by itself is 
always true. His conviction that the sun really is two hundred feet away is not a single 
idea but a combined idea, and this confirmation is false. His mind incorporates these 
fragmentary and confused ideas. As a result, his knowledge becomes inadequate and 
falsity follows (E2p35, p. 264). In this kind of situation, he has a tortuous and confused 
mind. This is why Spinoza claims that knowledge of the first kind is inadequate rather 
than false.  
  According to Spinoza, inadequate knowledge often leads to falsity. Consequently, 
there is a special issue of ‘false knowledge’ in Spinoza’s epistemology. Generally 
speaking, knowledge is always considered to be true, and the conception of false 
knowledge is self-contradictory. With respect to this issue, it is worth noting that in his 
works Spinoza makes use of the original Latin term cognitio, and some scholars, such 
as Bennett (1984) and Garrett (2010), interpret this as ‘cognition’ instead of 
‘knowledge’. In any case, the translation as ‘knowledge’ is popular and well-established 
among Spinoza scholars. I will put this issue aside, and continually use the term 
‘knowledge’ to refer to the Latin term cognitio in this thesis. What we should remember 
is that false knowledge is possible given Spinoza’s terminology. Spinoza’s real 
intention is to show that, on the one hand, knowledge of the first kind in the meaning 
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of a single idea is always true, but that, on the other hand, it is often the case that the 
combination of ideas lead to falsity. Therefore, Spinoza views knowledge of the first 
kind as inadequate rather than false whereas knowledge of the second and third kinds 
as always being adequate and true.  
  What is the criteria of truth for the first kind of knowledge given that it can be false? 
According to Spinoza, knowledge of the second and third kinds can help us to clarify 
the truth of knowledge of the first kind given that they are always true (E2p42, p. 268). 
In the above example of a man gazing at the sun, upon gaining scientific knowledge of 
the sun he will not accept the conception of seeing the sun as being two hundred feet 
away as a true idea into his system of knowledge, even if it is possible for him to 
continue seeing it as being closer than it in fact is. Rather, his old inadequate idea will 
be restored and become an adequate idea. 
  To turn to knowledge of the second kind, reason, Spinoza formally defines it as being 
‘common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things’ (E2p40 Scholium 2, p. 
267). Spinoza directly describes it as ‘abstract knowledge’ in Part Five (E5p36 
Scholium, p. 379). Common notions are those things that ‘are common to all things and 
are equally in the part as in the whole’ (E2p38, p. 265). Any idea in the human mind is 
always a thinking mode, and it is also one and the same mode of a human body involved 
in the affection between the human body and external bodies, or among different 
component parts in the human body. The affections between the human body and 
external bodies, or among different component parts in the human body, whatever these 
affections are, cannot change the truth of these ideas of common notions because they 
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are common to all things and are equally in the part as in the whole. For Spinoza, if an 
idea is the idea of a mode that is common to all things and is equally in the part as in 
the whole, the idea will always be an adequate idea because there is necessarily a 
corresponding idea in the idea of God. The corresponding idea in the idea of God 
guarantees its eternal truth. As known in Chapter 3, there are two kinds of mode in 
Spinoza’s metaphysical system: finite mode and infinite mode. In Spinoza’s 
terminology, those ideas that are common to all things and that are equally in the part 
as in the whole are the ideas of the ‘infinite mode’. Spinoza only lists a few infinite 
modes in his works, such as motion and rest as an infinite mode in the attribute of 
Extension. But Spinoza believes that they ‘are the basis of our reasoning process’ 
(E2p40 Proof, p. 267). As such, these common notions are the foundation of knowledge 
of the second kind.  
  While common notions are common throughout all things, properties are common to 
a group of things111. A property refers to an affection that ‘is common and proper to the 
human body and to any external bodies by which the human body is customarily 
                                                             
111 However, Spinoza is a nominalist rather realist in a general sense. We used to talk about these 
things that are considered as the so-called universals, such as ‘man, horse, dog, etc.’ in the traditional 
sense (E2p40 Scholium 1, p. 267). However, Spinoza does not endorse the actual existence of these 
universals, and considers them as the confused notions that only exist in our mind. The so-called 
universals are formed only in our mind through enormous similarly affections, and ‘not all men form 
these notions in the same way’ (ibid.). Moreover, every man has his different image towards these 
universal, for example ‘a different common image of man’ (ibid.). Spinoza is considering that 
universals derive from knowledge of the first kind. They are not true, and do not belong to knowledge 
of the second kind. A universal seems similar to a common notion, but it does not have any place in 
Spinoza’s philosophy. However, Spinoza refuses the truth of the so-called universals, and he is a 
metaphysical nominalist rather metaphysical realist. 
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affected, and which is equally in the part as well as in the whole of any of these bodies’ 
(E2p39, p. 265). Spinoza believes that the idea of this affection in the mind is also 
adequate because there ‘will be in God an adequate idea … both insofar as he has the 
idea of the human body and insofar as he has ideas of those posited external bodies’ 
(E2p39 Proof, p. 265). As such, knowledge of these ideas is knowledge of the properties 
of things.  
  In brief, knowledge of the first kind is inadequate knowledge and often leads to falsity. 
However, inadequate knowledge is not necessarily false: some instances of it are true, 
such as in the case of a single idea. In contrast, knowledge of the second kind, reason, 
and knowledge of the third kind, intuition, are always true, and are called adequate 
knowledge. Spinoza believes that the truth of knowledge of the first kind needs to be 
verified by knowledge of the second and third kinds. Common notions lie at the core 
of reason. From the perspective of metaphysics, they refer to infinite modes. On the one 
hand, common notions themselves are one form of reason. On the other hand, they are 
the foundation of reason. At the same time, Spinoza also accepts the concept of property, 
which refers to the mode in common within a group of things. Here, reason refers to 
the adequate ideas of the properties of things. The following table will be helpful for 
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the adequate ideas of 
the properties of things 
3 Intuition 
God and his attributes 
The essence of things 
Table 10 Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge. 
 
5.2.2 Spinoza’s Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge  
So far, I have focused on Spinoza’s knowledge of the first kind, imagination, and his 
knowledge of the second kind, reason. In this section, I will turn to Spinoza’s 
knowledge of the third kind, Intuition. Intuitive knowledge has three basic 
characteristics. 
  Firstly, intuitive knowledge ‘proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence 
of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ (E2p40 
Scholium 2, p. 267, my italics). Spinoza repeats this definition almost verbatim and 
says that intuitive knowledge ‘proceeds from the adequate idea of certain attributes of 
God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things’ in E5p25 Proof (p. 375). It is 
noteworthy that he asks us to look back to its definition in E2p40 Scholium 2 when 
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E5p25 Proof is discussed. This point reveals that Spinoza does not consider his two 
definitions as being different to each other in nature. In this definition, intuitive 
knowledge refers not only to God and his attributes, but also to the mode of God, i.e. 
particular things. Intuitive knowledge combines them together in a special way. This 
characteristic will be developed further in the next section. 
  Secondly, intuitive knowledge is the highest graded knowledge. When Spinoza 
divides knowledge into three kinds in terms of the method of acquired knowledge, he 
also considers them as three different grades. Consequently, Spinoza’s three kinds of 
knowledge are also known as three grades of knowledge, such as in Joachim (1901), 
three stages of knowledge, such as in Wolfson (1934b), or three levels of knowledge. 
To use Spinoza’s terminology himself, intuitive knowledge is ‘the highest virtue of the 
mind’. With respect to the concept of virtue, Spinoza has his own understanding: ‘[by] 
virtue and power I mean the same thing’ (E4 Definitions 8, p. 323). Intuitive knowledge 
is, then, the highest power of the mind. In turn, from intuitive knowledge ‘there arises 
the highest possible contentment’ in the sense of self-contentment (E5p27, p. 375), 
which Spinoza also labels ‘spiritual contentment’ (E5p36 Scholium, p. 379). As shown 
in Chapter 2, the concept of self-contentment is also involved in Spinoza’s doctrine of 
the Amor. Therefore, the doctrine of intuitive knowledge can also be considered to 
connect to the doctrine of the Amor through the concept of self-contentment. 
  Finally, intuitive knowledge is the knowledge of the essence of things. In E5p36, 
Spinoza clearly states that intuitive knowledge refers to knowledge of particular things 
and that it is preferable to knowledge of the second kind, i.e. abstract knowledge (E5p36 
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Scholium, p. 379). What we have discussed is that reason is derived from common 
notions and the properties of things. Common notions do not ‘constitute the essence of 
any one particular thing’ (E2p37, p. 265). Therefore, knowledge of the second kind 
cannot tell us the essence of things; only intuitive knowledge can do this.   
  To summarize, on the one hand, Spinoza inherits the mainstream thoughts and the 
corresponding basic conceptions of epistemology of Western philosophy from Plato 
onwards. On the other hand, Spinoza gives these traditional thoughts and conceptions 
new definitions and incorporates them into his own philosophical framework. Spinoza 
arranges them into an ordered gradation in his theory of knowledge. Imagination, 
reason, and intuition are Spinoza’s three kinds of knowledge. Imagination is inadequate 
knowledge whereas reason and intuition are adequate knowledge. Intuition is concrete 
knowledge whereas reason is abstract knowledge. Among them, intuition is privileged 
in Spinoza’s theory of knowledge. It is the highest graded knowledge, from which there 
arises the highest possible spiritual contentment.   
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5.3 The Parallel Structure between the Accounts of Intuitive Knowledge of Wang 
and Spinoza 
Spinoza’s epistemology seems different, at a glance, from the epistemology of Neo-
Confucianism. However, behind the apparent difference there is a parallel structure 
between the doctrines of intuitive knowledge defended by Wang and Spinoza. In 
Section 5.3.1, I will show that epistemological rationalism is their common foundation. 
I will then reveal the parallel structure between them in Section 5.3.2. 
5.3.1 The Parallel of Rationalism as the Foundation 
With respect to the metaphysical aspect, I have argued that metaphysical rationalism112 
is the dominant for both Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza in Chapter 3. With respect to 
the epistemological aspect, I will further argue that rationalism is also the dominant for 
them in this section. 
  With respect to Neo-Confucianism, we should investigate its two main rival branches. 
We will firstly investigate the School of Li. As the representative of the School of Li, 
Chu is, of course, a rationalist. As a rationalist, his epistemology has a deductive side. 
However, through the employment of an empirical approach and the scientific 
method113, Chu’s epistemology also has an inductive side. As a result, some scholars, 
                                                             
112 See Footnote 80. 
 
113 About this point, Chan agrees with Hu who claims that ‘Neo-Confucianists had the scientific spirit 
but not the scientific method’ when Chan considers the scientific method as being a specific tradition 
inherited only from the ancient Greeks (Chan, 1963, p. 611). I cannot accept this view. Chu’s research 
of natural phenomena is remarkable if we read Chu Tzu Yu-lei (朱子语类) seriously. 
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such as Hocking (1936), claim that Chu is an empiricist as well as a rationalist. I will 
argue, however, that this claim is not compelling. I maintain that Chu is a rationalist 
rather an empiricist.  
  Firstly, Chu believes that the Li of Tian is objective and that all things that derive 
from the Li of Tian are also objective. To Chu, the word ‘things’ in the concept of ‘the 
investigation of things’ refers to the Li of both things and affairs. The existence of the 
things and affairs is objective since the existence of the specific Li of both things and 
affairs is objective. Moreover, even if Chu believes that everything has its specific Li, 
and that empirical knowledge derives from the specific Li, Chu is interested in the Li 
of Tian that exists behind the specific Li of things. Furthermore, the extension of 
knowledge is not Chu’s final purpose in his doctrine of the investigation of things; it is 
only an intermediate step towards further Neo-Confucian moral and political purposes, 
since the eight steps (investigating things, extending knowledge, being sincere of will, 
rectifying the mind, cultivating the self, regulating the family, ordering the state, 
pacifying the world) are considered to be a gradationally ordered process. Chu does not 
shape his theory of knowledge itself into an independent area of philosophy. In short, it 
is safe to say that Chu is a rationalist embracing the empirical approach but not an 
empiricist of the modern Western kind (such as David Hume). 
  Turning to Wang, the case is more complicated, and more exploration is needed. As 
the representative of the School of the Mind, Wang is considered as a Neo-Confucian 
idealist by the mainstream scholars of the philosophy of Wang, such as Wang (1916), 
Cady (1928), Fung (1953), Chan (1963), Wang (1963). However, here I will argue that 
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he is nevertheless a rationalist rather than an idealist.  
  The concept of Li is the core concept of Neo-Confucianism, and its popular slogan 
is that ‘Tian is Li’. The School of the Mind completely accepted this basic creed of Neo-
Confucianism, and at the same time developed the further slogan ‘The Mind is Li’, from 
which the School of the Mind attains its epithet. If we combine these two slogans, then 
the mind is in fact identical with Tian114. Wang inherits the basic thoughts of the School 
of the Mind, and has the further slogan that ‘There is Nothing External to The Mind’. 
This slogan seems to imply that the mind alone exists. As such, Wang is regarded as an 
idealist115. 
  An idealistic reading seems to acquire support from the passage below: 
 
Man is the mind of heaven [Tian], and earth; mind is the lord and master of heaven, 
earth, and all things; mind is heaven. In saying ‘mind’ you have thereby suggested 
heaven, earth and all things, and have done it in an intimate, simple way (Wang, 
1916, p. 425) 
 
Here the mind is considered to be identical with Tian, and embraces all things. However, 
Wang also claims that ‘[the] mind of man is heaven [Tian] and it is the abyss, for there 
is nothing that does not belong to the original nature of the mind (Wang, 1916, p. 154, 
                                                             
114 Cats are animals, and dogs are animals, but cats are not dogs. However, a = b, and c = b, then a = c. 
These two slogans should be understood in the latter way. Dr. Christopher Bartley reminded me of this 
point. 
 




my italics). In other words, when Wang says that the mind is Tian, he is saying that the 
original nature of the mind is the Li of Tian.  
  A famous story that is often cited to demonstrate Wang’s philosophy as idealistic is 
as follows: 
 
The Teacher [Wang] was roaming in Nan-chen. A friend pointed to flowering trees 
on a cliff and said, “[You say] there is nothing under heaven [Tian] external to the 
mind. These flowering trees on the high mountain blossom and drop their blossoms 
of themselves. What have they to do with my mind?” The Teacher said, “Before 
you look at these flowers, they and your mind are in the state of silent vacancy. As 
you come to look at them, their colors at once show up clearly. From this you can 
know that these flowers are not external to your mind. (Wang, 1963, p. 222116)117 
 
Wang’s friend is challenging his slogan that ‘There is Nothing External to The Mind’. 
Wang seems to defend his slogan successfully since his answer is that these flowers are 
not external to the mind. This answer has the implication that whatever we encounter 
                                                             
116 The same in Chan (1963, p. 685). Also, its Chinese version in Wang (2014, p. 122) (Wang Yang-
ming Ch'uan-chi [Wang Yang-ming’s Complete Works], Shanghai Classic Publishing House (王阳明全
集 2014, 上海古籍出版社]) 
 
117 Cf. [O]ne day with a friend who pointed to the blossoming trees on the mountain and asked, “Since 
there is nothing in the world outside of the mind, what is the relationship between those blossoming 
trees deep within the mountain and my mind?” Mr. Wang Yang-ming replied: “Before you had seen 
those blossoms, those blossoms and your mind belonged to the same void. When you saw the 
blossoms, you immediately recognized the color of the blossoms. This is knowledge; the blossoms do 
not exist outside of your mind”. (Huang, 1978, pp. 149-150) 
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in our daily life is not external to the mind. If so, this is of course a kind of idealism.  
  Now, let us take a closer look at this story. To face his friend’s challenge, Wang 
concedes that the flowers on the mountain are in a state of silent vacancy before we 
look upon them. The state of silent vacancy cannot be understood to be nonexistence, 
otherwise the consequence would be that there is no existence external to the mind 
given that the flowers in this story can be replaced by any other objective item. The 
conclusion that there is no existence external to the mind is surely not Wang’s intention. 
In Wang’s answer, the mind is also in the state of silent vacancy before the flowers are 
seen. If the state of the flowers’ silent vacancy can be understood as nonexistence, the 
mind itself should also be understood as being nonexistent. If so, there would be nothing 
to exist at all before we look at the flowers, and this is absurd. According to Wang’s 
doctrine of the investigation of things, the thing in this story refers not to the flowers 
on the mountain alone, but to the event in which the flowers are involved. Upon the 
occurrence of the event, the Li of the event of the flowers being seen is revealed in the 
mind. Or, to use Wang’s language, the colors of the flowers show up at once. When 
Wang claims that these flowers are not external to the mind this is, in fact, to claim that 
the Li of the event of the flowers being seen is not external to the mind. It does not mean 
that these flowers themselves only exist in the mind. Therefore, the story of the 
mountain flowers cannot prove that Wang is an idealist. 
  To return to the example of filial piety, what Wang emphasizes is that the Li of filial 
piety does not lie in parents. However, it is very clear that the fact that the Li of filial 
piety does not lie in parents does not imply in any way that parents themselves do not 
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exist. The ‘thing’ in this example is referring to the filial piety towards parents rather 
than parents themselves. What Wang argues is that the Li of filial piety does not exist 
as external to the mind. Therefore, the example of filial piety also cannot prove that 
Wang is an idealist. 
  When Wang claims that there is nothing external to the mind, he is claiming that there 
is no event external to the mind because a thing is an event towards which the will of 
the mind is directed. In the example of the flowers, what the will of the mind is directed 
towards is the event of seeing the flowers. In the example of filial piety, what the will 
of the mind is directed towards are the events involved in taking care of our parents in 
the appropriate way. Wang is not an idealist in the Berkeleyan sense, where the slogan 
is that ‘to be is to be perceived (esse est percipi)’. What Wang’s slogan really means is 
that the mind embodies all the Li of things, and it does not follow from this that external 
objects exist necessarily through the mind. It is still possible that external objects exist 
independently of the mind, and that the Li in the mind agrees with the Li in the objects 
outside. It is not right to say that Wang’s position is idealism.   
  Cartesian skepticism has no analogue in Confucianism. The concept of Tian is the 
core concept of Confucianism, and the Li of Tian became the core concept of Neo-
Confucianism. For Neo-Confucians, Li is One and it never changes. As was discussed 
in Chapter 3, according to the metaphysics of Neo-Confucianism, our universe and all 
of the things in it are made up of two parts: the unchangeable Li and the changeable 
Ch’i. The existence of the Li of Tian is objective, and the existence of all things that are 
derived from the Li of Tian are also objective. This metaphysical framework is accepted 
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by all Neo-Confucians, and also by Wang. Following this point, Neo-Confucianism has 
another nickname: The Song-Ming School of the Li118. Therefore, it is not possible for 
Wang to have a position similar to Berkeley’s subjective idealism, or Kant’s 
epistemological idealism119. Wang is a rationalist, but we could say that he advocates 
an idealistic approach in his epistemology.  
  To conclude, rationalism is the dominant aspect of Neo-Confucianism, not only in 
its branch of the School of Li, but also in its branch of the School of the Mind. With 
respect to Spinoza’s epistemology, in a parallel way, rationalism is also the dominant 
aspect.  
  Since it is a matter of orthodox opinion to say that Spinoza is a rationalist, I will not 
pursue this conclusion too much. I just want to emphasize one important point here. 
According to Spinoza, intuitive knowledge refers not only to knowledge of the essence 
of things but also to knowledge of God. This point could be understood in two ways. 
Firstly, ‘knowledge of God’ could mean knowledge that God possesses, i.e. ‘God’s 
knowledge’. In other words, God’s knowledge is intuitive. Men have three kinds of 
knowledge, but God only has intuitive knowledge. It is impossible for God to have 
knowledge of the first kind since God’s knowledge is always adequate. It is also 
                                                             
118 The School of Li in the Song dynasty and Ming dynasty. 
 
119 Briefly speaking, epistemological idealism has two positions. The first position is to say that whatever 
we know is of a mental nature, and the second position is to say that knowledge itself is of a mental 





impossible for God to have rational knowledge since ‘God does not know things in 
abstraction, nor does he formulate general definitions of that sort’ (Letter 19, p. 809). 
Therefore, God does not have any knowledge other than intuitive knowledge. Spinoza’s 
God is, then, intellectual. Joachim is right to conclude that ‘[the] Real is the Intelligible 
and the intelligible the Real…the Real qua Intelligible---the Real as it is in truth---is a 
single, all-comprehensive, and immanent Substance’ (Joachim, 1940, p. 39). Secondly, 
‘knowledge of God’ could mean the knowledge that men have of God or, put simply, 
men’s knowledge of God. In this way, men’s knowledge of God is also intuitive. I will 
pursue this point further in the next section. 
  In brief, when intuitive knowledge refers to the knowledge of God, it can be 
understood in two ways: on the one hand, God is intellectual and God’s knowledge is 
intuitive and, on the other hand, men’s knowledge of God is intuitive, and God’s 
intellect is knowable to us. We see here that Spinoza is one of the most optimistic 
epistemologists in the history of philosophy. He accepts all three of the basic 
epistemological methods and believes that God is knowable to men through intuition. 
Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge, and especially his notion of the intuitive 
knowledge of God, is the foundation with which we can support the view of Spinoza 
as a rationalist in terms of his epistemology. 
  To summarize, rationalism is the dominant aspect of the theory of knowledge for 
both Spinoza and Neo-Confucians. This conclusion is the orthodox position for both 
Spinoza and the School of Li of Neo-Confucianism. Chu, as a representative of the 
School of Li, is not an empiricist, but rather a rationalist who employs an empirical 
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approach for his theory of knowledge. Arguably, Wang, as a representative of the 
School of the Mind, is also not an idealist, but rather a rationalist who employs an 
idealistic approach for his theory of knowledge. Wang’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge 
is the foundation of his theory of knowledge. In a parallel way, Spinoza’s doctrine of 
intuitive knowledge is the foundation of his own theory of knowledge.  
5.3.2 The Parallel of Intuitive Knowledge as the Idealistic Approach  
In reaching our conclusion that Wang is ultimately a rationalist rather than an idealist, 
Wang’s theory of intuitive knowledge plays no role beyond demonstrating his idealistic 
approach towards epistemology. For Wang, intuitive knowledge is the original nature 
of the mind. Wang claims that ‘[in] heaven and earth, there is but one nature, one Li, 
one intuitive faculty [intuitive knowledge]’ (Wang, 1916, p. 440). Here, intuitive 
knowledge is identical not only with the original nature of the mind, but also with the 
nature of Tian and all things through the concept of Li. Wang believes as follows: 
 
[Intuitive knowledge] makes us acquainted with all things. It is spirit, it is 
Heaven, it is the Supreme Ruler. It is truly the spiritual intelligent substance of 
heaven and earth, the mysterious wonderful manifestation of man. (Wang, 1916, 
p. 269) 
 
Since it is the nature of men, intuitive knowledge must be endowed to men a priori by 
Tian and possessed innately. From this point, the term ‘innate knowledge’, which is 
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proposed by Chan and his followers, will be a better translation for the term Liang-chih.  
  As shown Section 5.1.2, Wang inherits Mencius’ belief that human nature is good. 
Wang believes that the good nature of men is intuitive knowledge. Wang emphasizes 
this point as follows: 
 
Tung Lo-shih [one disciple of Wang] returned from rambling about. When he saw 
his Master [Wang], he said, “today I saw a strange thing.” The Master asked, “what 
was it?” He answered, “I saw that all the people on the streets were sages.” The 
Master said, “This is a commonplace thing. Why should it be considered strange?” 
(Iki, 1961, p. 33) 
 
Wang is emphasizing that not only a sage but also an ordinary, or even ignorant, person 
has intuitive knowledge, and thus that is inborn and innate. 
  Moreover, intuitive knowledge is the nature not only of men but also of all things: 
everything has intuitive knowledge. Wang’s argument is bold: 
 
The innate knowledge [intuitive knowledge] of man is the same as that of plants 
and trees, tiles and stone. Without the innate knowledge inherent in man, there 
cannot be plants and trees, tiles and stones. This is not true of them only. Even 
Heaven and Earth cannot exist without the innate knowledge that is inherent in man. 
For at bottom Heaven, Earth, the myriad things, and man form one body. The point 
at which this unity manifests in its most refined and excellent form is the clear 
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intelligence of the human mind. Wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun and moon, stars, 
animals and plants, mountains and rivers, earth and stones are essentially of one 
body with man. It is for this reason that such things as the grains and animals can 
nourish man and that such things as medicine and minerals can heal diseases. (Chan, 
1963, p. 685)120 
 
This citation has rich implications. Wang defines his concept of intuitive knowledge as 
identical to the concept of Li of Neo-Confucianism given that (1) the intuitive 
knowledge of the mind is the intuitive knowledge of Tian and all things; (2) intuitive 
knowledge is the foundation of the existence of Tian and all things, since they cannot 
exist without it; and (3) All things form the great unity due to their intuitive knowledge. 
Here, Wang inherits the metaphysical framework of Neo-Confucianism, and his 
concept of intuitive knowledge follows the orthodox concept of the Li of Neo-
Confucianism121.  
                                                             
120 Cf. ‘The intuitive knowledge of man is the intuitive knowledge of plants and stones. If plants and 
inanimate objects lack the intuitive knowledge of man, they cannot be plants and inanimate objects…. If 
heaven and earth lack the intuitive knowledge of good which man has, they cannot exist. But heaven, 
earth, and all things are ab initio one with man. The point at which this great unity (the absolute) manifests 
intelligence in its highest and best form is called the little intelligence and cleverness of man’s mind. 
Wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun, moon, heavenly bodies, animals, plants, mountains, rivers, earth and stones, 
are of one structure with man. It is for this reason that the grains, animals and other things are able to 
nourish man’. (Wang, 1916, pp. 168-9) 
 
121 Moreover, applying the terminology of Western philosophy, Wang is stating his metaphysics in the 
way of so-called panpsychism. Here Wang’s argument is very naive, but his thought is very clear. All 
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  Furthermore, intuitive knowledge unifies the subjective and the objective. According 
to Wang’s definition of a thing as the event towards which the will of the mind is 
directed, Wang seems to rebuild an idealistically subjective world in addition to the 
existentially objective world. On the one hand, he has the bold slogan that there is 
nothing external to the mind. On the other hand, it should also be noted that the human 
mind is discussed alongside all other things (such as wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun and 
moon, stars, animals and plants, mountains and rivers, earth and stones) in the citation 
above, and that we cannot find any implication that external and objective things could 
be reduced to the mind itself. In other words, he acknowledges the existence of all 
external items, such as wind, rain, dew, thunder, sun and moon, stars, animals and plants, 
mountains and rivers, earth and stones122 . Therefore, Wang seems to create a gap 
between his subjective world inside and the objective world outside.  
  However, the notion of two independent worlds123 has no place in either Wang’s 
                                                             
things are essentially of one body with man. Wang does not, of course, mean that all things have the 
same biological or chemical (or even physical) structure, but rather that they have the same 
metaphysical structure: that is, the dual-aspect structure of the same reality with Li and Ch’i together. 
‘No mind, no body; no body, no mind’, as Wang believes (Cady, 1928, p. 270). The difference that can 
be found between men and all other things is not due to differing kinds, but in differences of degree 
within the same kind. Men’s mind manifests the highest and greatest intelligence but all things, even a 
stone, have intuitive knowledge. Wang seems to try to deal with a common challenge against 
panpsychism, i.e. whether or not a stone can be said to have a mind or not. Wang could answer that a 
stone does not have a mind to the same degree we find present as human consciousness but that it does 
have a mental aspect: its intuitive knowledge, or its Li. If this panpsychist interpretation is correct, then 
a more significant conclusion follows: Wang is not an idealist given that panpsychism is considered a 
replacement for idealism. 
 
122 This point further supports the above conclusion that Wang is not an idealist. 
 
123  Sometimes they are referred to as the ‘earthly world’ and the ‘heavenly world’, and sometimes 
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philosophy in particular, or in Confucianism in general. In fact, there is no gap in 
Wang’s philosophy. Wang’s subjective world is also the objective world: they are one 
and the same. At the level of metaphysics, intuitive knowledge refers to the essence of 
Tian and all things. At the level of epistemology, intuitive knowledge refers to the Li of 
Tian, and also the Li of things. At the moral level, Wang’s intuitive knowledge has the 
characteristic of action. Intuitive knowledge refers to not only internal intuition, but 
also practical action. Action in practice must be undertaken in the objective world. It is 
not possible to carry out practical action anywhere other than in the objective world: 
what can put in practice in the subjective world alone is meditation at most. This point 
will be developed further in Chapter 8. 
  In brief, Wang employs an idealistic approach in his epistemology, in which intuitive 
knowledge is at the core. With respect to Spinoza’s epistemology, I am claiming that, 
in a parallel way, intuitive knowledge is once again at the core of his approach. This 
claim can be defended by considering the following three points. 
  Firstly, we cannot understand Natura Naturans through any knowledge except 
intuitive knowledge. In Spinoza’s metaphysics, God and his attributes belong to Natura 
Naturans or, to use Spinoza’s own terminology, under the form of eternity. He claims 
that no experience can help us acquire knowledge of those things whose existence is 
not different from their essence (Letter 10). For Spinoza, God’s existence is not 
different from his essence. Moreover, Spinoza also claims that the existence of 
attributes cannot be apprehended through experience. Therefore, Natura Naturans 
                                                             




cannot be apprehended through experience. Knowledge of the first kind cannot help us 
to understand Ultimate Reality under the form of eternity. 
  If knowledge of the first kind cannot help us to understand Natura Naturans, what 
about knowledge of the second kind, i.e. reason? According to Spinoza, reason refers 
to knowledge of common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things. He 
holds all such knowledge to be abstract. Under such a definition of reason, in which 
common notions refer to infinite modes, the properties of things refer to those properties 
which are shared by the human body and by its corresponding external object. It is 
reasonable to say that the ‘things’ in the conception of ‘the properties of things’ refers 
to those things of finite modes. They, then, are referring to the level of modes. Therefore, 
reason, as knowledge of such modes, belongs to the knowledge of Natura Naturata. 
Since reason refers only to the knowledge of Natura Naturata, Natura Naturans also 
cannot be comprehended by reason. 
  Consequently, knowledge of the third kind, intuition, is the only available knowledge 
through which we can understand Natura Naturans, the Ultimate Reality under the form 
of eternity. Spinoza confirms that intuitive knowledge ‘depends on the mind as its 
formal cause insofar as the mind is eternal’ (E5p31, p. 376). As proof, Spinoza explains 
further that the mind ‘conceives nothing under a form of eternity… except insofar as 
the mind is eternal’ (E5p31 Proof, p. 376). Therefore, the eternity of the mind 
necessarily involves Natura Naturans, i.e. ‘under the form of eternity’. In short, Natura 
Naturans, or the Ultimate Reality under the form of eternity, can only be comprehended 
through intuition. This fact highlights the importance of the intuitive knowledge of 
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Spinoza’s epistemology.  
  Spinoza elaborates by claiming that intuitive knowledge proceeds from an adequate 
idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the 
essence of things. Here the attributes of God belong to Natura Naturans, and knowledge 
of such must be intuitive knowledge. According to Spinoza, ‘[the] human mind has an 
adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God’ (E2p47, p. 271). As 
known in Chapter 3, the eternal and infinite essence of God is the idea of God, which 
is identified as God’s intellect. To say that the human mind has an adequate knowledge 
of the eternal and infinite essence of God is to say that the human mind has the intuitive 
knowledge of the idea of God. Moreover, ‘God’s infinite essence and his eternity are 
known to all’ (ibid.)124. To say that God’s infinite essence and his eternity are known to 
all is also to say that the idea of God is known to all. To say that the idea of God is 
known to all is to say that men’s intuitive knowledge of God is innate and a priori125. 
                                                             
124 Spinoza also claims that ‘the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God’ (E2p11 Corollary, 
p. 250). To say that the human mind is part of the infinite intellect of God is, in a loose way, to say that 
men’s intuitive knowledge is part of God’s knowledge.  
 
125 Historically, there has been considerable debate on the question of whether or not God is knowable. 
One dominant opinion is that God is not knowable by us, or that at most God is only partly knowable 
by us. Spinoza touches directly on this issue in Chapter VII of his KV, and he lists three opinions: (1) 
‘it is impossible to give a true or right definition of God, because…. there can be no definition except 
per genus et differentiam, and as God is not a species of any genus’; (2) ‘God cannot be defined, 
because the definition must describe the thing itself and also positively…. but our knowledge of God 
cannot be of a positive’; and (3) ‘God can never be proved a prior, because he has no cause’ (KV, p. 
56). Spinoza disagrees with these opinions and ultimately rejects them all. Contrastingly, Spinoza is 




  Secondly, according to its definition, intuitive knowledge also refers to the essence 
of things. The ‘thing’ that is in the concept of ‘the essence of things’ in the definition 
of intuitive knowledge must belong to Natura Naturata, otherwise the definition 
would not make sense. Therefore, intuitive knowledge also refers to the essence of 
things of Natura Naturata. I will not continue to pursue this point here given that we 
have already discussed this in Section 5.2. 
  Thirdly, in its definition, Spinoza claims that intuitive knowledge is the knowledge 
which proceeds from the knowledge of Natura Naturans to the knowledge of the 
essence of things of Natura Naturata. According to its definition, intuitive knowledge 
is the knowledge that unifies Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata in the meaning of 
metaphysics126. Intuitive knowledge is directed from Natura Naturans to Natura 
Naturata or, in other words, from God to his modes. In his TIE, Spinoza also claims 
that ‘in fact knowledge of the effect is nothing other than to acquire a more perfect 
knowledge of the cause’ (TIE, p. 25). At the same time, Spinoza makes a special note 
to emphasize the importance of the knowledge of God himself, and says that ‘we 
cannot properly understand anything of Nature without at the same time extending our 
knowledge of the first cause, or God’ (ibid.). If we consider God as the cause, and a 
mode as its effect, then intuitive knowledge is the kind of knowledge that concerns a 
                                                             
126 In Chapter 3, I argued that Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata are unified through the concept 
of the idea of God in the meaning of metaphysics. A further question is whether intuitive knowledge is 




cause and its effect. In short, with respect to epistemology, God and his modes are 
unified through intuitive knowledge. 
  To summarize, Wang advocates an idealistic approach towards his epistemology. 
Wang’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge is at the core of his epistemology. In a parallel 
way, Spinoza advocates an idealistic approach towards his epistemology and intuitive 
knowledge is also at the core of his own epistemology. Intuitive knowledge is the only 
knowledge that can help us to understand Natura Naturans. Moreover, intuitive 
knowledge is also the only knowledge that can help us to understand the essence of 
things of Natura Naturata. Furthermore, with respect to epistemology, intuitive 





The Neo-Confucian Approach towards the Comprehension 
of Spinoza’s Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge 
In Section 6.1, I will explore in detail what I call a puzzle of the doctrine of intuitive 
knowledge. A Neo-Confucian approach to the puzzle can be developed by appealing to 
the parallel structure between the Wang’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge and Spinoza’s 
doctrine of intuitive knowledge. In Section 6.2, I will argue that the Neo-Confucian 
approach can help us solve the puzzle. 
6.1 A Puzzle of the Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge 
It is prima facie puzzling to see that Spinoza, as a rationalist, puts intuitive knowledge 
in the privileged position of his epistemology. The puzzle is strengthened further by 
Spinoza’s notoriously parsimonious treatment of his theory of knowledge. Spinoza 
scholars have raised many problems concerning the doctrine of intuitive knowledge. 
For example, a problem concerning how to understand the relationship between reason 
and intuition127 , a problem concerning how many instances of intuitive knowledge 
                                                             
127 Curley (1973b), Allison (1987), Wilson (1996), and Soyarslan (2013), argue that Spinoza’s 
distinction between reason and intuition stems from the cognitive object. Whereas reason refers to 
common notions and adequate ideas of properties of things, intuitive knowledge refers to the essence of 
a singular thing, which cannot be known through reason. By contrast, some other scholars hold an 
opposite opinion. Parkinson (1954) and Yovel (1990; also Yovel, 1993) argue that the distinction 
between reason and intuitive knowledge is only due to the cognitive method, and believe that reason 





exist 128 , and a problem concerning whether intuitive knowledge involves any 
reference129. These are problems that Spinoza scholars have disputed. I will not pursue 
these existing problems since they are not directly related to my focus here. Instead, I 
will raise a new problem. I believe that it is a crucial problem to tackle so that that we 
can correctly understand not only of the doctrine of intuitive knowledge itself but also 
of its relationship with both the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the doctrine of 
the Amor. Briefly speaking, my problem concerns the possibility of intuitive knowledge, 
which I will now explore in detail. 
  In order to introduce this problem in Spinoza’ doctrine of intuitive knowledge 
properly, let us briefly turn to Wang’s doctrine. Wang’s idealistic approach is founded 
upon his new explanation of the term ‘things’ in the concept of the investigation of 
things. In the hands of Chu, the term ‘things’ in the concept of the investigation of things 
refers to things and affairs. In the hands of Wang, this is replaced with a conception of 
things as the events in which the mind is involved. What I see in my reading of 
Spinoza’s epistemology presents a similar situation that has so far not been noticed in 
Spinoza scholars.  
  Knowledge always has its cognitive objects, and the term ‘thing’, in its traditional 
usage, seems also to be employed by Spinoza to refer to an external cognitive object. 
Spinoza repeatedly employs the term ‘thing’ in his definitions of the three kinds of 
knowledge. Imagination includes sense-based knowledge in which we sense ‘individual 
                                                             
128 See Curley (1973b, p. 54) 
 
129 See Curley (1973b, p. 28). By contrast, see Parkinson (1954, p. 184). 
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objects ….in a fragmentary and confused manner’ (E2p40 Scholium 2, p. 267, my 
italics). Imagination also includes sign-based knowledge: ‘from having heard or read 
certain words we call things to mind and we form certain ideas of them similar to those 
through which we imagine things’ (E2p40 Scholium 2, p. 267, my italics). Reason refers 
to ‘common notions and adequate ideas of the properties of things’ (E2p40 Scholium 2, 
p. 267, my italics). Intuition refers to ‘the essence of things’ (E2p40 Scholium 2, p. 267, 
my italics), or the ‘knowledge of particular things’ (E5p36 Scholium, p. 379, my italics). 
It might seem right to say that the term ‘thing’ is used by Spinoza to refer to the 
cognitive object external to the mind. However, this would be a serious 
misunderstanding of Spinoza’s conception of a ‘thing’. 
  In order to explain the misunderstanding, let us begin with Spinoza’s own example 
as follows: 
 
[The] idea, e.g., of Peter which constitutes the essence of Peter’s mind, and on the 
other hand the idea of Peter which is in another man, say Paul. The former directly 
explicates the essence of Peter’s body, and does not involve existence except as 
long as Peter exists. The latter indicates the constitution of Paul’s body rather than 
the nature of Peter; and so, while that constitution of Paul’s body continues to be, 
Paul’s mind will regard Peter as present to him although Peter may not be in 
existence. (E2p17 Scholium, p. 257) 
 
According to Spinoza, it is necessary for God to have an idea of Peter, as the essence 
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of Peter, through which Peter, as a mode of God, comes to exist and sustains its 
existence. The idea of Peter refers to the essence of Peter’s mind, which is also the 
essence of Peter’s body in Spinoza’s terminology because they are one and the same. 
At the same time, another person, such as Paul, could have an idea of Peter when Peter 
is cognised as his external cognitive object. What Spinoza is arguing here is that Paul’s 
idea of Peter is an affection of Paul’s body itself when Peter’s body is presented to Paul, 
rather than Peter’s body directly. Even if Paul knows Peter very well: if they are twins 
for instance, Spinoza argues that Paul’s idea of Peter still refers to the constitution of 
the body of Paul himself rather than Peter’s directly. This example reveals that, just as 
with Wang’s terminology, where the term ‘things’ in the concept of ‘the investigation 
of things’ refers to ‘events in which the mind is involved’, in Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge the term ‘things’ refers to similar events rather than to cognitive objects 
alone. In other words, if we follow Spinoza’s terminology then the traditional usage of 
the term ‘things’ should be discarded. 
  In Spinoza’s philosophy, the term ‘thing’ is closely linked with the term ‘image’.  
Spinoza makes a clear definition of the term ‘image’ as referring to ‘those affections of 
the human body’ of which the ideas represent external bodies as present to us, though 
they do not recall the figure of things (E2p17 Scholium, p. 257). An image is an 
affection of the human body through which external bodies are presented to us. Spinoza 
believes that external bodies cannot themselves be presented directly to us in an image, 
due to the fact that our bodies are themselves always involved in the image. This is why 
Paul’s idea of Peter indicates the constitution of Paul’s body rather than the nature of 
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Peter in the above example.  
  Moreover, even if an image has its cause in an external cognitive object, it is not 
necessarily dependent on the existence of the external cognitive object for its existence. 
If Paul is alive, Paul’s idea of Peter could continue to exist even if Peter does not. 
Therefore, ‘the ideas that we have of external bodies indicate the constitution of our 
own body more than the nature of external bodies’ (E2p16 Corollary 2, p. 256).  
  In short, a ‘thing’ does not refer directly to an external cognitive object but to a 
cognitive subject’s affection or, in Spinoza’s terminology, an image in which the 
cognitive object is presented and with which the cognitive subject is itself involved. 
This point is strikingly similar to Wang’s definition of the term ‘thing’ as the event 
towards which the will is directed. In a similar way, we can consider Spinoza’s image 
as an event in which the cognitive subject and the cognitive object are both involved 
but whose essence is a modification of the body of the cognitive subject.  
  Spinoza’s thought here has its roots in his metaphysics, i.e. in his thought that there 
is a special relationship between the mind and the body. An idea in the mind is also the 
idea of a mode of the body, and they are one and the same. It seems reasonable for us 
to say that to some degree we know the world through our own bodies in Spinoza’s 
epistemology because ‘the human mind perceives the nature of very many bodies along 
with the nature of its own body’ (E2p16 Corollary 2, p. 256). Again, the human mind 
does not perceive any external body as actually existing except through the ideas of 
affections of its own body (E2p26, p. 261). In Spinoza’s philosophy, the human body 
is far more complicated than we can imagine. According to Spinoza, any property of a 
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thing that a human being might encounter has a corresponding counterpart in the human 
body. Furthermore, the counterpart itself has its own mental counterpart, an idea, that 
constitutes the essence of the human mind. The potentiality of the human mind and 
body is, then, tremendous. This is why Spinoza believes that ‘the mind is more capable 
of perceiving more things adequately in proportion as its body has more things in 
common with other bodies’ (E2p39 Corollary, p. 266). Again, he claims that ‘whose 
body is capable of the greatest amount of activity has a mind whose greatest part is 
eternal’ (E5p39, p. 380). The activity of the body relates directly to the part of the mind 
that is eternal. Therefore, the body seems to become the gate of the mind (Wetlesen, 
1978). 
  Current works on Spinoza’s epistemology ignore this important foundation, and is 
misled by Spinoza’s usage of the term ‘thing’ in his definition of the three kinds of 
knowledge. Fortunately, this misunderstanding does not incur serious problems 
regarding knowledge of the first and second kinds due to their nature. Knowledge of 
the first kind, imagination, contains the notion of image in its definition. An individual 
object does not present itself to our mind directly, but rather is presented to us through 
our senses and through which we imagine the individual object. To turn to the example 
of gazing at the sun provided earlier, imagination refers to the conception of seeing the 
sun as two hundred feet away from us in our mind. To use Spinoza’s terminology, the 
conception is an image of the body. This idea of the mind has its corresponding mode 
of the body, which is an affection of our body involving the sun only to the extent that 
our body is affected by the sun (E2p35 Scholium, p.264). Moreover, knowledge of the 
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first kind is considered inadequate knowledge in Spinoza’s epistemology. It is not 
necessary for us to accept that the sun is two hundred feet away even if the conception 
is accepted as imagination. We can accept that, when referring to the sun in this way, 
imagination does not introduce us to knowledge of the sun in an accurate way.  
  Turning to knowledge of the second kind, reason, this misunderstanding once again 
does not incur serious problems. Reason refers to common notions and adequate ideas 
of the properties of things. Common notions refer to those things that are common to 
all things because ‘all bodies agree in certain respects’ (E2 lemma 2, p. 252), such as, 
motion and rest as an infinite mode of the attribute of Extension. Common notions are 
the same between the cognitive subject and the cognitive object since they are common 
to all things. Therefore, knowledge of common notions as one part of reason is not 
affected by the misunderstanding of the concept of a ‘thing’. 
  The concept of the properties of things in the definition of reason needs to be 
explained further, but the situation is similar. In contrast to common notions that are 
common to all things, there are some common between the human body and some 
external bodies, not all things. That which is common here is the properties of the 
external bodies (E2p39 Proof, p. 265). A property is common to the human body as well 
as to the thing considered as the external cognitive object. Therefore, knowledge of the 
properties of things as one part of reason is also not affected by the misunderstanding 
of the concept of a ‘thing’.  
  In brief, with respect to the concept of common notions, the content of knowledge is 
common between the cognitive subject and the external cognitive object since it is 
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common to all things. With respect to the concept of the properties of things, the content 
of knowledge is also common between the human body and the corresponding external 
bodies. Therefore, the misunderstanding of the concept of a ‘thing’ itself does not bring 
serious problems in the case of reason. 
  So far, what we have seen is that the misunderstanding of the concept of a ‘thing’ 
does not affect our comprehension of knowledge of both the first kind and the second 
kind in Spinoza’s epistemology. However, in the case of knowledge of the third kind, 
the situation is completely different. To return to the example of Paul and Peter, Spinoza 
tells us that Paul’s idea of Peter indicates only the constitution of Paul’s body rather 
than the nature of Peter. My interpretation is that the concept of ‘the nature of Peter’ in 
the quotation above is the same as the concept of ‘the essence of Peter’, given that 
Spinoza often uses the concept of essence and the concept of nature interchangeably. 
Therefore, it seems impossible for Paul to have knowledge of the essence of Peter.  
  What applies to Peter here could also apply to any other external object. As such, it 
seems impossible for Paul to have any knowledge of the essence of external objects. 
Turning to the above example of gazing at the sun, it seems impossible for us to have 
knowledge of the essence of the sun. However, according to Spinoza, intuitive 
knowledge refers to knowledge of the essence of things. This seems to imply that 
intuitive knowledge would not be accessible for us. Moreover, the essence of a thing is 
something that makes the thing what it is, and without which the thing cannot come 
into existence, or sustain its existence. It is also a general supposition that the essences 
of things are different from each other, since otherwise they would be the same thing. 
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In the example of Paul and Peter, Paul’s intuitive knowledge of Peter is supposed to be 
the essence of Peter. Since the essence of Peter is unique, as is the essence of Paul, how 
could Paul ‘have’ the essence of Peter given Paul’s idea of Peter indicates only the 
constitution of Paul’s body rather than the nature of Peter? In the example of gazing at 
the sun, the intuitive knowledge is supposed to be the essence of the sun itself. A man, 
as the cognitive subject, is unique, as is the essence of the sun. How could the man have 
the essence of the sun? This is what I will call the problem of possibility.  
  Some very radical answers to this problem can be found in an indirect way. Lewis 
argues that Spinoza denies that ‘you will find these [essences] out there in things’ 
(Lewis, 2001, p. 250, italics in original). Lewis has two supportive points for his 
argument. The first point is that matter is infinitely divisible in Spinoza’s metaphysics. 
This point is coherent with Spinoza’s denial of atomism, which I discussed in Chapter 
3. The second point is that matter is homogeneous in Spinoza’s metaphysics. This point 
is coherent with Spinoza’s thought that there is only one substance. A thing is only a 
mode of the substance and, as such, all things are homogeneous. Lewis concludes that 
‘[the] homogeneity of matter means that there are no different natures inherent within 
it’, and ‘[the] infinitude of matter means there is no smallest part in which natures can 
reside’ (Lewis, 2001, p. 250). According to Lewis, ‘matter’ is another name for the 
extended substance in Spinoza’s philosophy. Lewis believes that ‘matter has no nature 
at all’ in Spinoza’s philosophy (Lewis, 2001, p. 249)130. My problem concerns how the 
                                                             
130 Lewis does not seem to completely deny the possibility that a thing has an essence, but he believes 
that such an essence is only a perceived construct (Lewis, 2001, p. 249). Here, Lewis is taking a risk in 
considering Spinoza an idealist, a position that I have rejected. Lewis’s argument could be partly right 
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essences of things may be known and is, therefore, an epistemological issue. Lewis’s 
opinion is that there is no essence of things at all, which has ontological implications. 
For Spinoza, a thing has its nature due to the fact that in God there is necessarily an 
idea which expresses the essence of the thing (E5p23 Proof, p. 374). At the very 
beginning of the Ethics, Spinoza’s first definition involves the concept of essence when 
he tells us that ‘[by] that which is self-caused, I mean that whose essence involves 
existence, or that whose nature can be conceived only as existing’ (E1Definition 1, p. 
217)131. Afterwards, Spinoza uses the concept of essence again and again in his Ethics. 
Without the concept of the essence of things, Spinoza’s philosophy would collapse 
immediately. Therefore, Lewis’s opinion should be rejected since it is inconsistent with 
Spinoza’s whole framework of philosophy.  
  Joachim claims that [to] know the essence of a ‘single thing’ is to recognize that there 
is no thing in question at all (Joachim, 1940, p. 41, italics in original). Joachim’s answer 
is confused to some degree, and he seems to imply that a single thing, as a mode of God, 
is absorbed into God himself, and that its distinctive character disappears once its 
essence is known. Here Joachim’s position is similar to Hampshire’s position on 
Spinoza’s doctrine of the mind’s eternity, which I discussed and rejected in Chapter 4. 
We can also read Joachim’s claim in another way: the essence of a single thing cannot 
                                                             
if he were willing to accept my Neo-Confucian approach. Lewis could legitimately claim that the body 
of a thing which is made out of matter can be said to have no essence itself, since its essence refers to 
an idea of the thing, which is in the idea of God. This is similar to the Neo-Confucian thought that the 
Ch’i of a thing does not have its own essence: the essence of the thing lies in the Li of the thing.  
 
131 Here, it is worth noting that Spinoza uses the concept of essence and the concept of nature 
interchangeably, and this point supports my reading of the example of Peter and Paul above. 
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be understood except on the level of Natura Naturans, under the form of eternity. Any 
mode is God himself under the form of eternity, and its essence, then, is the essence of 
God. Following this logic, it seems that the essence of all things is the same, and they 
are the essence of God, i.e. the idea of God, itself. If so, Joachim’s answer is not far 
away from Lewis’s answer. 
  Spinoza emphasizes that the ‘more we understand particular things, the more we 
understand God’ (E5p24, p. 374). Here, I read “understanding of particular things” to 
be “understanding the essence of particular things” given that in the proof of E5p24 
Spinoza refers to E1p25, in which he emphasizes the point that ‘God is the efficient 
cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence’ (E1p25, p. 232, my 
italics). In the corollary of E1p25, Spinoza tells us that particular things are nothing but 
‘modes wherein the attributes of God find expression in a definite and determinate way’ 
(ibid.). Any mode is always unique in terms of expressing God in its own definite and 
determinate way, and the essence of a particular thing should be understood as being 
unique. Spinoza also implies the uniqueness of the essence of a particular thing in 
E5p24. Otherwise it would not seem to be necessary to understand particular things at 
the maximal possibility in order to understand God. Therefore, if my understanding of 
Joachim’s claim is right, Joachim’s claim should also be rejected. In short, the thought 
that the essence of things is the same should also be rejected. 
  To summarize, upon confirmation of the uniqueness of the essence of particular 
things, the problem of possibility reappears. Peter’s essence is unique, and Paul’s 
essence is unique. Spinoza claims that Paul’s idea of Peter only indicates the 
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constitution of Paul’s body rather than the nature of Peter. The problem, then, is how 
Paul could have intuitive knowledge of Peter’s essence. Lewis (2001) and Joachim 
(1940) help us to highlight the problem of possibility from different perspectives, but 





6.2 The Neo-Confucian Approach 
We have revealed that the reason for the problem of possibility is, at least in part, due 
to Spinoza’s specific use of the term ‘things’ in his theory of knowledge, and that this 
is similar to Wang’s specific explanation of the term ‘things’ in the concept of the 
investigation of things in Neo-Confucianism. We have also seen that Spinoza’s doctrine 
of intuitive knowledge and Wang’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge are in many ways 
parallel with each other. These observations suggest that it seems possible to develop a 
Neo-Confucian approach to resolve the problem of possibility. 
  Let us return to the example of Peter and Paul again. The idea of Peter as the essence 
of Peter exists because in God there is an idea of Peter. The idea of Peter is a mode of 
the idea of God, and the idea of God incorporates the idea of Peter. What we have seen 
is that when Paul has intuitive knowledge of Peter, Paul’s mind must incorporate the 
idea of Peter. In the same way, any external object exists because in God there is an 
idea of the external object, which is derived from the idea of God. Paul’s mind must 
incorporate the idea of the external object when Paul has intuitive knowledge of it. The 
more intuitive knowledge Paul has, the more Paul’s mind is similar to the idea of God. 
Following this pattern, the mind of Paul becomes more and more similar to the idea of 
God. A conjectural conclusion is that intuitive knowledge is identical with the idea of 
God. If this conjecture is compatible with Spinoza’s theory of knowledge, the problem 
of possibility will be resolved. This conclusion would probably surprise members of the 
circle of Spinoza scholars, but a similar conclusion is well-known in Wang’s philosophy.  
  One of the core thoughts in Wang’s doctrine is that intuitive knowledge is identical 
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with the Li of Tian. I argued in Chapter 3 that the concept of the Li of Tian in Neo-
Confucianism is parallel to the concept of the idea of God in Spinoza’s philosophy. The 
question now concerns whether or not we can also identify Spinoza’s intuitive 
knowledge with the idea of God in Spinoza’s epistemology. To answer this question, 
we must return to Wang’s thoughts once more, and understand the real meaning of the 
identification in Neo-Confucianism. 
  On the one hand, intuitive knowledge, as the essence of the mind, is identical with 
the Li of Tian in Wang’s philosophy. In the mirror analogy, which is one of Wang’s 
favorite analogies, the mind is like a mirror, through which all the specific Li in the 
universe can be revealed. All of the specific Li are identical with the Li of Tian. In 
another analogy, Wang considers the mind to be an abyss, in which any specific Li can 
be reflected. The abyss, then, is another name for the Li of Tian. Given the intuitive 
knowledge of a sage is identical with the Li of Tian, a sage is a man whose mind is 
enlightened and able to penetrate into the Li of Tian throughout. 
  In a parallel way, in my reading of Spinoza’s epistemology, intuitive knowledge can 
be understood as identical with the idea of God. The identification can be 
comprehended at two different levels: Natura Naturata and Natura Naturans. 
  With respect to Natura Naturans, I have shown, in Section 5.3.2, that knowledge of 
God is intuitive knowledge. According to Spinoza’s metaphysics, the idea of God is 
one (E2p4, p. 246) and is God himself (E2p7 Scholium, p. 247). Therefore, intuitive 
knowledge is identical with the idea of God. 
  Intuitive knowledge can also be understood to be identical with the idea of God in a 
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special way with respect to Natura Naturata. In the example of Peter and Paul, Paul’s 
intuitive knowledge of Peter refers to the essence of Peter, and the essence of Peter is 
nothing but an idea of Peter in God. The idea of Peter in God is nothing more than the 
idea of God itself when the idea of God is expressed in the mode of the idea of Peter. 
Therefore, Paul’s intuitive knowledge of Peter could be said to be identical to the idea 
of God when the idea of God is expressed in the mode of the idea of Peter. Paul’s 
intuitive knowledge of any other external object could also be said to be identical to the 
idea of God when the idea of God is expressed in the mode of the idea of the external 
object. From this perspective, Paul’s intuitive knowledge is identical with the idea of 
God. This conclusion concerning Paul’s intuitive knowledge could apply to any other 
intuitive knowledge. Once we have intuitive knowledge of a thing we, in fact, know 
God in the way that God is expressed as that thing. We would know God in a great 
many ways if we had intuitive knowledge of a great many things. Therefore, ‘the more 
we understand particular things, the more we understand God’ (E5p24, p. 374). The 
more we have intuitive knowledge, the more we know God. We know God in a maximal 
degree once we have intuitive knowledge in a maximal degree. It seems reasonable for 
us to say that intuitive knowledge is identical with the idea of God. To put it simply, the 
intuitive knowledge of the mind is identical with the idea of God when the idea of God 
is expressed in a mode to which intuitive knowledge is directed.  
  The remaining question is whether the mind’s intuitive knowledge can be identical 
with the idea of God under the unity of Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata. In 
Chapter 3, I argued that Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata are unified through the 
233 
 
idea of God in a metaphysical sense. In Section 5.2.3, I argued that intuitive knowledge 
is the knowledge that unifies Natura Naturans and Natura Naturata in an 
epistemological sense. Therefore, it is natural to conclude that intuitive knowledge is 
identical with the idea of God.  
  Spinoza supplies some further proofs of this conclusion. In the Ethics, he claims that 
‘the essence of our mind consists solely in knowledge [intuitive knowledge], whose 
principle and basis is God’ (E5p36 Scholium, p. 379). On the front cover of the TTP, 
he quotes a well-known verse of the Bible (1 John 4:13), ‘Through this means we 
recognise that we remain in God, and God remains in us---that He gave to us from His 
own Spirit’ (TTP, p. 387). The notion that we remain in God is one of the core thoughts 
of Spinoza’s metaphysics: a man is just a mode of God. The notion that God remains 
in us is to say, according to traditional theology, that through the Spirit of Jesus, God 
remains in the mind of the human being. Believing in the concept of a transcendent 
God, theologians believe that the Holy Spirit is distinct from the human mind even 
though it is believed that the Holy Spirit often lives in the believer’s mind. In other 
words, according to orthodox Christianity, the mind cannot be identified with the Holy 
Spirit. However, Spinoza’s God is an immanent God, and the spirit is nothing but 
another name for the mind in Spinoza’s philosophy. In the Ethics, Spinoza tells us that 
‘the spirit of Christ’ is the idea of God (E4p68 Scholium, p. 355). To say that God 
remains in us is to say that the idea of God remains in us. The idea of God that remains 
in us is nothing but the mind’s intuitive knowledge: the mind’s intuitive knowledge is, 
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then, identical with the idea of God132.  
  Again, in the last part of the Ethics, Spinoza boldly claims that the wise man is 
‘conscious, by virtue of a certain eternal necessity, of himself, of God, and of things’ 
(E5p42 Scholium, p. 382)133. ‘Conscious, by virtue of a certain eternal necessity’ refers 
to the mind’s intuitive knowledge: the wise man, then, has intuitive knowledge of 
himself, of things, and of God. Spinoza is implying that the mind can have intuitive 
knowledge of itself. The intuitive knowledge of Paul is the essence of Paul that is the 
idea of Paul in God, which is to say the idea of God expressed in the mode of Paul. Paul 
will know himself if he has intuitive knowledge of himself, and Paul’s mind will be 
identical with the idea of God when it is expressed in the mode of Paul. Intuitive 
knowledge will be the essence of the mind itself if the mind has intuitive knowledge of 
itself. As the essence of the mind intuitive knowledge is, then, the knowledge of 
oneself134. Since intuitive knowledge is identical with the idea of God, the knowledge 
of oneself will be the knowledge of God. Unfortunately, Spinoza does not discuss this 
possibility directly. However, I believe that Spinoza’s philosophy has this implication 
                                                             
132 In the TTP, there is a hint towards the possibility of the mind’s identity with the idea of God. Spinoza 
claims that Jesus communicated with God mind-to-mind whereas Moses communicated with God face-
to-face. The term mind-to-mind implies that Jesus knows God in the full degree, or that the mind of Jesus 
is identical with the idea of God. Does Spinoza permit Jesus as an exception because Spinoza believes 
that Jesus is the Son of God? Spinoza does not make the claim, and he seems to consider Jesus as the 
wisest man (the wisest sage), rather than God himself. 
 
133 Here the wise man is the same as the sage in Neo-Confucianism. See Section 8.3.3.   
 
134 Know thyself. 
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in the end part of the Ethics. In short, under the unity of Natura Naturans and Natura 
Naturata, intuitive knowledge can be comprehended as identical with the idea of God 
in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
  It is noteworthy that the identification cannot be understood as being of an 
ontological nature. As I have argued, Wang is not an idealist in the same sense as 
Berkeley, and the identification of intuitive knowledge with the Li of Tian is not an 
ontological identification. Intuitive knowledge does not itself decide the existence of 
external cognitive objects. The existence of external cognitive objects is dependent on 
the Li of Tian, not on intuitive knowledge of the mind. To return to the example of the 
mountain flowers, the existence of the flowers does not derive from the mind’s intuitive 
knowledge. In the example of filial piety, the existence of parents does not derive from 
the mind’s intuitive knowledge. The existence of all things in the universe is derived 
from the Li of Tian, and not from intuitive knowledge. Such existence is objective and 
independent of intuitive knowledge.  
  In a parallel way, even if such an identification is possible in Spinoza’s philosophy, 
it is also not an ontological identification. According to Spinoza, the mind’s intuitive 
knowledge is the essence of the mind, and at the same time the essence of the body also. 
The body is always a finite mode of God. The idea of Peter is the essence of Peter’s 
mind, and it is a mode of the idea of God. The idea of Paul is the essence of Paul’s mind, 
and it is another mode of the idea of God. The human mind, as a finite mode of God, 
cannot be identical with the idea of God in the sense of being infinite. Spinoza’s 
metaphysics has a mode-substance structure, and as such it is impossible for Spinoza 
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to identify intuitive knowledge with the idea of God in the ontological sense. 
  To summarize, once we get the conclusion of that the mind’s intuitive knowledge is 
identical with the idea of God, the problem of possibility, a puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine 
of intuitive knowledge, is resolved. However, the identification is epistemological 
rather than ontological. In short, intuitive knowledge is a traditional concept that 
Spinoza inherits, but he defines it in a unique way. Spinoza grounds it in his original 
metaphysics, through which his ethics becomes possible. I will explore the ethical 





The Parallel between the Concept of Jen and the Concept of 
the Amor 
After investigating the metaphysical aspect in Chapter 3 and 4, and the epistemological 
aspect in Chapter 5 and 6, it is now time to focus on our topic: the concept of the Amor. 
In Section 7.1, I will show that the concept of Jen is at the core of the ethics of 
Confucianism. In Section 7.2, I will show that the concept of the Amor is at the core of 
Spinoza’s ethical philosophy. In Section 7.3, I will conclude that the concept of Jen in 
Confucianism is parallel with the concept of the Amor in Spinoza. 
7.1 The Concept of Jen in Confucianism 
The concept of Jen is one of the backbone concepts of Confucianism. Its importance 
has been recognised throughout the development of Confucianism from the classical 
era through the Neo-Confucian era until modern times. In Section 7.1.1, I will explore 
the connotations of the Chinese term Jen. In Section 7.1.2, I will introduce Confucius’ 
concept of Jen given that Confucius himself put the concept of Jen at the core of his 
doctrines. In section 7.1.3, I will investigate the development of the concept of Jen from 
the classical era to the Neo-Confucian era. 
7.1.1 The Chinese Term ‘Jen’  
The Chinese character of Jen (仁) is the combination of two more basic characters, man 
(人) and two (二). Etymologically speaking, Jen embodies the thought of how two men 
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should treat each other. In other words, as a simple ideogram, the character of Jen itself 
reveals its first important connotation, embodying an ideal ethical norm. With respect 
to this connotation, Jen has been translated as benevolence, perfect virtue, goodness, 
magnanimity, altruism, man-to-manness … etc. Moreover, an epigraphic study reveals 
that the character of Jen has an alternative pre-imperial ideogram (忎), which is the 
combination of two more basic characters, body (身) above with mind/heart (心) below. 
This alternative ideogram shows its moral connotation, which can be understood in two 
different ways. The most common understanding is that a man of Jen is a man who 
always has other people in his mind/heart, and that he loves others. With respect to this 
understanding, Jen has been translated as love, universal love, charity…etc. The second 
interpretation is that a man of Jen is a person who pursues not only his material life but 
also his spiritual life, through which men are distinguished from other animals. As such, 
the concept of Jen is identical with true humanity. It is noteworthy that the character of 
Jen has the same pronunciation as the character of man (人) in Chinese. The same 
pronunciation seems to support this understanding of the word. With respect to this 
interpretation, Jen has been translated as true manhood, manhood at its best, humanity, 
human-heartedness, and humaneness. Furthermore, in Chinese medicine there is a 
usage, ‘non-Jen’, which refers to cases of paralysis. Consequently, the concept of Jen 
represents the healthy feeling of the whole nervous system in which every part of the 
body is properly involved. It is possible that this usage inspired Neo-Confucians to 
develop the thought of man forming one body with all things. Last but not least, in 
Chinese daily life there is another usage: the Jen of fruits, which refers to the kernel of 
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fruits or the seeds of plants. In this usage the concept of Jen embodies the power of life. 
All of these connotations were incorporated into the concept of Jen in Confucianism. 
7.1.2 Confucius’ Concept of Jen 
The character ‘Jen’ had appeared in the classical scriptures of the pre-Confucius era, 
but it was Confucius himself who elevated the concept of Jen as his central principle 
(Chan, 1955, p. 195). Jen is one of the main topics in the Analects and it appears 105 
times in this book, in 58 sections out of almost 500 (Yao, 1997, p. 71)135 . These 
conversations refer to its essence, meaning, function, implication, and relationship with 
other concepts. Firstly, Jen is the principal virtue: the foundation and unifier of all other 
virtues. According to Confucius, a man who masters himself and returns to propriety is 
a man of Jen (the Analects: XII, 2). Moreover, for Confucius, there is no sense to be 
made of having propriety without Jen (the Analects: III, 3). The wise will cultivate Jen 
for its advantage (the Analects: IV, 2). The man of Jen will be free from evil (the 
Analects: IV, 4), and considers Jen to be the highest virtue over all others (the Analects: 
IV, 6). Furthermore, the superior man will never abandon Jen (the Analects: IV, 5).  
  There is a central theme running throughout all of Confucius’ teachings (the Analects: 
XV, 2). This central thought ‘is none other than conscientiousness (Chung, 忠) and 
altruism (Shu, 恕)’ (the Analects: IV, 5). The concept of conscientiousness here means 
‘to do things sincerely’. According to Confucius, ‘A man of humanity [Jen], wishing to 
                                                             
135 Confucius did not write a treatise to explain the concept of Jen. What we know about Confucius’ 




establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be 
prominent himself also help others to be prominent’ (the Analects: VI, 28). The concept 
of altruism mainly emphasizes that, ‘Do not do unto others what you do not want others 
to do unto you’ (the Analects: XII, 2). In other words, a man of Jen should refuse to do 
something that he does not want others to do to him. Therefore, some scholars have 
proposed conscientiousness as the positive Golden Rule of Confucius, and altruism as 
the negative Golden Rule of Confucius (Jung, 1966, pp. 182-3; Dy, 1983, p. 433; Yao, 
1997, pp. 71-4)136. Most scholars agree that Confucius’ central theme is the concept of 
Jen, even if this is not stated directly in the Analects. Moreover, the concept of 
conscientiousness and the concept of altruism are considered to be two aspects of the 
concept of Jen: inseparable, like a coin’s two sides. They together constitute Confucius’ 
ethics, and the concept of Jen is at its center. 
It is noteworthy that the Chinese characters Chung (忠, conscientiousness) and Shu 
(恕, altruism) both have the character Hsin (mind/heart, 心) at the bottom: this seems 
to imply that there is always the feeling of love towards others. Confucius had this 
thought in mind. When one of his favorite disciples asked him what Jen is on earth, he 
claimed directly that ‘A man of Jen loves man’ (the Analects: XIV, 22). This analect is 
                                                             
136 Chan disagrees with this point, arguing that Shu could also be considered as the positive Golden 
Rule insofar as it also refers to the notion of establishing the character of others (Chan, 1963, p. 27). 
Chan is right to notice this point, and its English translated term ‘altruism’ embodies this positive 
meaning. However, in the Analects the concept of Shu mainly emphasizes the notion of not doing unto 
others what you do not want others to do unto you, and this notion is, of course, in accordance with the 
negative Golden Rule. As such, the mainstream opinion is also right. Unfortunately, its established 
English translated term ‘altruism’ does not denote this important point, and altruism is easily 
considered as the positive Golden Rule. Prof. Yujin Nagasawa reminded me of this point. 
241 
 
the basis on which Confucians identify the concept of Jen with the concept of love. In 
the Analects, there is a famous story that further clarifies this thought. One day, when 
Confucius found out that his stable had burned down, “Confucius asked, ‘was any man 
hurt?’ He did not ask about the horses” (the Analects: X, 12).  
  Confucius’ identification of Jen with love has a humanistic basis, and he firmly 
believed in humanism. On the one hand, when he was mocked by Taoist hermits, 
Confucius protested directly that ‘[o]ne cannot herd with birds and beasts. If I do not 
associate with mankind, with whom shall I associate?’ (the Analects: XVIII, 6) On the 
other hand, Confucius said that ‘by nature all men are alike; through practice they have 
become apart’ (the Analects: XVII, 2). Following this point, it is believed that Jen as 
love is shared by all men. As a result of Jen becoming considered a universal quality of 
man, the pursuit and practice of Jen became the ultimate goal of Confucius’ sayings. In 
other words, according to Confucius, an ideal man is the man who becomes a man of 
Jen (the Analects: XIX, 6). 
  Confucius acknowledged that Jen is not an easily attainable goal for man’s ethical 
cultivation. He was reluctant to claim the title of Jen for himself, and conceded the 
following: ‘How dare I claim to be a sage or a man of Jen? What I can be described is 
that I learn unwearyingly and teach others without impatience.’ (the Analects: VII, 34). 
This analect illustrates at least three points. Firstly, it reveals that Confucius regarded 
Jen as a very high ethical goal, almost equal to sagehood. Secondly, it reveals that 
Confucius always placed himself in a humble position in his self-cultivation. However, 
Confucians thereafter always considered Confucius as the model of a sage. Finally, it 
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reveals that Confucius’ attitude towards Jen seems to imply that Jen is not only an 
ultimate achievement but also an endless practical effort (Yao, 1997, p. 109). 
  It is noteworthy that Confucius did not give us a clear-cut definition of the concept 
of Jen even though he made it his central theme in the Analects. This left a huge space 
for Confucians thereafter to enrich the connotations of the concept of Jen. 
7.1.3 The Development of the Concept of Jen 
When Confucius spoke of the concept of Jen he mainly focused on its ethical 
connotations. He did not answer the question of the origin of Jen. Mencius engaged 
with this question and incorporated it into his doctrine of the Goodness of Human 
Nature. Mencius claimed that Jen is one of man’s inborn feelings because ‘the feeling 
of commiseration is the beginning of Jen, and all men have this basic feeling (the 
Book of Mencius, 2A: 6; 6A: 6). Here Mencius appealed to men’s intuitive feelings of 
commiseration, and his argument is very simple. Mencius claimed that, if one saw a 
child who was about to fall into a well, one should have the intuitive feeling of alarm 
and distress even if one did not have any relationship with the child. This feeling 
would be a universal and instinctual response that happens in all men (the Book of 
Mencius, 2A: 6).  
Moreover, Mencius asserted that Jen and three other virtues (righteousness, propriety, 
and wisdom) are the necessary conditions for a man to be qualified as a man. Mencius 
believes that ‘a man without the feeling of commiseration is not a man; a man without 
the feeling of shame and dislike is not a man; a man without the feeling of deference 
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and compliance is not a man; and a man without the feeling of right and wrong is not a 
man’ (ibid.). While the feeling of commiseration is the beginning of Jen, the feeling of 
shame and dislike is the beginning of righteousness, the feeling of deference and 
compliance is the beginning of propriety, and the feeling of right and wrong is the 
beginning of wisdom (ibid.)137. As in Confucius, Jen was placed in the chief position 
among these four basic virtues in Mencius’ thought. At the same time, these four basic 
virtues are not separable. One of Mencius’ main contributions was to develop the 
Confucian doctrine of righteousness. He defined the relationship between Jen and 
righteousness as one of inseparability. Mencius claimed that ‘Humanity [Jen] is the 
peaceful abode of man and righteousness is his straight path’ (the Book of Mencius, 4A: 
10).  
Furthermore, Jen was directly identified with man’s mind/heart by Mencius, and he 
said ‘Humanity [Jen] is man’s mind [mind/heart] and righteousness is man’s path’ (the 
Book of Mencius, 6A: 11). Mencius’ thought that Jen is man’s mind/heart had a huge 
influence on the development of the concept of Jen in Confucianism. Neo-Confucians, 
especially Chu, further developed this notion.  
Chu inherited the thought of Jen as man’s principal quality from classical 
Confucianism. Chu claims that ‘[w]henever and wherever humanity (Jen) flows and 
operates, righteousness will fully be righteousness and propriety and wisdom will fully 
be propriety and wisdom’ (Chan, 1963, pp. 632-3). At the same time, Chu fully 
incorporated the concept of Jen into his doctrine of Li. Jen takes a core role in Chu’s 
                                                             
137 This is Mencius’ doctrine of Four Beginnings. 
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thought of One and Many. Chu claimed that ‘Principle [Li] is one but its functions 
differentiate into the many. There are distinctions in love’ (Chan, 1955, p. 316, my 
italics). ‘Jen is the principle [Li] of love …. Jen makes love…. possible’, and love is 
the function of Jen (Chan, 1963, p. 633). Chu argued that Jen is spontaneous, natural, 
uncalculating, and has nothing in view whereas altruism (Confucius’ concept of Shu) is 
cultivated, effortful, calculating, and has an object in view (ibid.). Furthermore, Jen is 
the essence of the eternal process of production and reproduction. Obviously, Chu’ 
concept of Jen was significantly different from the concept of Jen in classical 
Confucianism.  
  Wang inherits Chu’s thought of the concept of Jen. For Wang, if the mind is one then 
Jen is also one. This is the metaphysical foundation of Wang’s notion of the universality 
of Jen. Wang developed this thought through his doctrine of forming one body with all 
things: 
 
The great man regards Heaven and Earth and the myriad things as one body. He 
regards the world as one family and the country as one person … That the great 
man can regard Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things as one body is not because 
he deliberately wants to do so, but because it is natural to the humane nature of his 
mind that he do so … Therefore when he sees a child about to fall into a well, he 
cannot help a feeling of alarm and commiseration. This shows that his humanity 
[Jen] forms one body with the child … when he observes the pitiful cries and 
frightened appearance of birds and animals about to be slaughtered, he cannot help 
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feeling an “inability to bear” their suffering. This shows that his humanity forms 
one body with birds and animals … when he sees plants broken and destroyed, he 
cannot help a feeling of pity. This shows that his humanity forms one body with 
plants … when he sees tiles and stones shattered and crushed, he cannot help a 
feeling of regret. This shows that his humanity forms one body with tiles and stones. 
This means that even the mind of the small man necessarily has the humanity that 
forms one body with all. (Chan, 1963, pp. 659-660)  
 
Here Wang emphasizes the claim that the great man should form one body with Tian 
and the myriad things. Further, Wang argues that Jen is the nature of the mind, and that 
it prompts one to form a union with Tian. This seems to borrow the notion of Jen as 
found in Chinese medicine, in which the notion of Jen represents the healthy feeling of 
the whole nervous system. All parts of the body form an organic and living whole 
through the nervous system. Similarly, Wang proposes that all things form one body 
through Jen. 
  To summarize, Confucius placed the concept of Jen at the center of his doctrine. Jen 
is the principal virtue, and it unifies the two aspects of Confucius’ ethics: 
conscientiousness as the positive Golden Rule, and altruism as the negative Golden 
Rule. A man of Jen loves others. Jen as love has its basis in Confucius’ humanism. 
Therefore, the pursuit of Jen and its practice became the ultimate goal in the Analects. 
For Mencius, Jen originates in the human mind, and is the inborn essence of the mind. 
Jen was identical with man’s mind in the hands of Mencius. Further, Mencius claimed 
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that Jen is man’s mind. For Chu, Jen is the character of the mind and the Li of love. At 
the same time, Chu believes that love is the function of Jen. Wang proposed that the 
great man forms one body with all things through Jen. Then, we see that, accompanying 
the development of Confucianism, the connotations of the concept of Jen were 
continually developed by subsequent generations of Confucians. Chan concludes that 
the concept of Jen is ‘close to the hearts of all Confucianists’ (Chan, 1963, p. 591). 
Sometimes Confucianism is also called the Doctrine of Jen, and Jen itself became ‘the 
symbol of Confucianism’ (Yao, 1997, p. 69) 138. 
 
  
                                                             
138 The concept of Jen is also an important concept in other schools, such as Taoism and Buddhism. 
The discussion of the concept of Jen in these schools was due to either the argument against 
Confucianism or the utilization of the influence of Confucianism to advertise their own thoughts. The 
former was mainly used by Taoists. For example, it was argued that ‘when the greatest Tao declined’, 
the doctrine of Jen and righteousness arose in Tao-Te Ching (Chan, 1963, p. 148). The latter was 
mainly used by Buddhists to rename all kinds of Buddhist objects, such as the King of Jen (the 
Buddha), the Sutras of Jen (the Book of the Buddha), the temple of Jen, the pagodas of Jen…etc. (Yao, 
1997, p. 69). 
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7.2 The Concept of the Amor in Spinoza 
7.2.1 The Concept of Love in Spinoza’s Related Works 
Spinoza’s doctrine of love is one of the main threads running through his philosophical 
career. This point will be revealed clearly through a brief investigation of the 
development of the concept of love in Spinoza’s works.  
  Nowadays most scholars agree that Spinoza’s TIE (Treatise on the Emendation of the 
Intellect) is his first philosophical piece (Morgan, 2002, p. 1). The TIE is an unfinished 
work, which was only published after his death139. Morgan proposes that the status of 
the TIE in Spinoza’s philosophy is similar to that of Discourse on Method in Descartes’ 
philosophy, and it is possible that Descartes’ Discourse on Method inspired Spinoza’s 
writing of his TIE (ibid.). Therefore, it is reasonable for us to consider the TIE to be a 
preface to his Ethics. Spinoza tells us the following in the first sentence of the TIE:  
 
After experience had taught me that the hollowness and futility of everything that 
is ordinarily encountered in daily life, and I realised that all the things which were 
the source and object of my anxiety held nothing of good or evil in themselves save 
insofar as the mind was influenced by them, I resolved at length to enquire whether 
                                                             
139 However, it was always Spinoza’s intention to finish the TIE, as we are told by the editors of his 
Opera Posthuma, who were Spinoza’s best friends and were well familiar with his life and philosophy. 
This fact tells us that Spinoza does not renounce the basic thoughts in the TIE. Some scholars argue 
that Spinoza did not finish the work due to some internal conflicts between the thoughts in the TIE and 




there existed a true good, one which was capable of communicating itself and could 
alone affect the mind to the exclusion of all else, whether, in fact, there was 
something whose discovery and acquisition would afford me a continuous and 
supreme joy to all eternity. (TIE, p. 3, my italics) 
 
Given that the TIE is Spinoza’s first philosophical piece, and that this is the first 
sentence of the TIE, the citation above is Spinoza’s very first sentence in his 
philosophical career. Spinoza set up the final goal of his philosophy in the TIE. Clearly, 
the first sentence reveals that Spinoza’s goal is developed in a moral context. According 
to my reading, this first sentence is a foretelling of Spinoza’s whole philosophy. Spinoza 
is seeking not only the truth but also the good, a true good for man’s life. Pollock claims 
that Spinoza’s philosophy is a philosophy for the good whereas Descartes’ philosophy 
is a philosophy for the truth (Pollock, 1880, pp. 138-9). All his metaphysics and 
epistemology are in service of his ethics, in which he focuses on a true good for man’s 
life140.  
  Spinoza is an honest man: he confesses his anxiety from the beginning. He tells us 
that he did not find supreme joy, the highest happiness, in his pursuit of objects that 
‘can be reduced to these three headings: riches, honour, and sensual pleasure’ (TIE, p. 
4). His reason for failing to find the highest happiness is that every object in the pursuit 
is uncertain in its own nature (ibid.). Now we arrive at the place in which the concept 
                                                             




of love is first used in Spinoza’s philosophy, and he claims that ‘all happiness or 
unhappiness depends solely on the quality of the object to which we are bound by love’ 
(TIE, p. 5, my italics). In other words, love is at the key position, in which our happiness 
or unhappiness is decided. Spinoza claims that there would be no strife, no sorrow, no 
envy, no fear, and no hatred without love (ibid.). Spinoza continually claims that all our 
unhappiness, such as strife, fear, hatred, sorrow, and envy, ‘occur in the case of the love 
of perishable things’ whereas all our happiness occurs in the case of the love towards 
eternal things (ibid.). We know the only certain object for Spinoza is God himself. From 
this we can see that Spinoza has tightly bound the highest happiness, his salvation, and 
the eternal thing, God, with the concept of love at the very beginning of his 
philosophical career.  
  The TIE is a good attempt, but it falls short of providing a core brick for a complete 
building of philosophy. The core brick is metaphysics. Spinoza’s KV (Short Treatise on 
God, Man, and His Well-Being) in 1662 fills in this gap. Its overall structure is very 
similar to that of the Ethics since it ‘begins with metaphysics and theology, turns to 
epistemology and psychology, and ends with ethics and religion’ (Morgan, 2002, p. 31). 
As such, the KV can be seen as Spinoza’s initial draft of the Ethics. 
  With respect to the concept of love, the first noteworthy point is a title in its contents. 
Spinoza lists the topic of love and the topic of God’s love of man in its sub-titles (KV, 
pp. 35-6). Moreover, Spinoza claims that the relationship between the concept of love 
and the concept of understanding is brotherly. The love united with God is supremely 
perfect, and this love is dependent on the perfection of the understanding, in which God, 
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as the highest object of perfection, is conceived. In short, he brought his epistemology 
and metaphysics together to support his concept of love in the KV. He pointed out that 
the supremely perfect love is to be united with God. All the core insights in his last three 
doctrines in the Ethics had taken initial shape in the KV.  
  Due to its radical claims, the KV was strongly challenged when it was circulated 
among Spinoza’s close friends. It seemed clear that stronger arguments are needed. The 
research of Cartesian philosophy inspired his thought at this important moment. 
Spinoza’s PPC (Principles of Cartesian Philosophy) and CM (Metaphysical Thoughts) 
in 1663 is the first of the mere two works published before his death. We are told in the 
preface by its editor, Dr. Lodewijk Meyer, one of Spinoza’s best friends, that the main 
thoughts in the PPC belong to Descartes rather than to Spinoza himself except for its 
appendix, the CM, in which Spinoza wrote down his own metaphysics. We will not 
investigate the thoughts concerning the concept of love in the PPC since what is 
explored there are Descartes’ thoughts rather than Spinoza’s141.  
  In the CM, two points concerning the concept of love are developed. The first point 
explores the metaphysics of the unity in which the supreme love is considered as unity 
with God. The second point is Spinoza’s claim that the self-love of God is God’s will 
itself. Spinoza tells us that ‘God’s will, by which he wills to love himself, follows 
necessarily from his infinite intellect, by which he understands himself’ (CM, p. 200). 
                                                             
141 What should be noted in the PPC is its geometrical written style. Descartes had used this geometrical 
style for his Principles of Philosophy in 1644. Spinoza was completely convinced by the geometrical 
written style, and he subsequently used it for his Ethics. 
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To combine the two points together, it is natural for Spinoza in his Ethics to draw the 
conclusion that man’s intellectual love towards God, which is the unification with God, 
and God’s self-love, which is God himself in essence, are one and the same. In short, 
Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor had its initial metaphysical foundation in his CM.  
  From 1665, Spinoza’s other great work, the TTP (Theological-Political Treatise), 
was conceived, and finally published in 1670. The TTP is, in fact, the second of the two 
works that was published before Spinoza’s death. The main goal of the TTP is not an 
unfolding of Spinoza’s own philosophy but rather a critique of the hermeneutics of 
Scripture, which was terrifically radical in Spinoza’s era. Many scholars believe that 
TTP’s publication was Spinoza’s attempt at paving a road for the publication of his 
Ethics. It is generally agreed among scholars that Spinoza’s thought in the TTP was as 
mature as his thought in Ethics. With regard to our topic, the concept of love in the TTP 
will therefore help us in comprehending its final meaning in Ethics. What we can learn 
from the TTP does not concern Spinoza’s philosophical thought about the concept of 
love, but his attitude towards the concept of love as found in Scripture itself. Therefore, 
Spinoza’s explanation of the concept of love in Scripture is a complementary resource 
for us to understand Spinoza’s concept of love in his Ethics. As Spinoza’s thought in 
the TTP is just as mature as his thought in Ethics, the TTP can be considered the twin 
of the Ethics. For Spinoza, the Ethics is his work of philosophy and the TTP is his work 
of theology.  
Spinoza’s discussion of the concept of love is very rich in the TTP. Briefly speaking, 
the concept of the knowledge and love of God, a twinned concept of the intellectual 
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love of God (the Amor), was developed in the TTP. We also find that the fact that the 
term ‘knowledge’ and the term ‘love’ have the same Hebrew etyma has an important 
impact on the final shaping of the doctrine of the intellectual love of God in the Ethics. 
A further investigation of this issue will be carried out in Section 7.2.3. 
  The TTP contains some political theory, but this is not Spinoza’s main concern in the 
book. Spinoza also acknowledges that it is not enough to express his thoughts on 
political theory in the TTP, and he began to write another book about his political theory, 
his TP in 1675 or 1676 (Morgan, 2002, p. 676). Unfortunately, the TP was left 
unfinished when he died in 1677. Since the Hebrew Grammar, which will be discussed 
in the next section, and the TP do not have any direct connection with his concept of 
love, I will not further explore them here. 
  In short, Spinoza’s works in which his concept of love is directly involved include 
the TIE, which is analogical to the preface of the Ethics, the KV, which is analogical to 
an initial draft of the Ethics, the CM, an antecedent in the same written style as the 
Ethics, the TTP, a theological twin of the Ethics, and finally his life’s masterwork, the 
Ethics. Shirley concludes that the Ethics is analogical to the great skyscraper of 
Spinoza’s philosophy for which the other four works are its four entrances (Shirley, 
2002, p. XV). This analogy is also suitable when applied to Spinoza’s concept of love: 
the other four works act as entrances to our understanding of Spinoza’s concept of love 
in the Ethics. As such, it is my conclusion that the doctrine of love is one of the main 
threads of Spinoza’s philosophy.  
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7.2.2 The Concept of Love in the Ethics 
In the Ethics, love is firstly considered as a kind of emotion. Spinoza establishes a direct 
link between the term ‘love’ and the term ‘emotion’ as follows: 
 
Modes of thinking such as love, desire, or whatever emotions are designated by 
name, do not occur unless there is in the same individual the idea of the thing loved, 
desired, etc. But the idea can be without any other mode of thinking. (E2 Axioms 
3, p. 244) 
 
Here the term ‘love’ is used for the fourth time in the Ethics142. Spinoza’s use of the 
term ‘love’ here is no different from its use in daily contexts, such as ‘Tom loves 
Catherine rather than Sara’. Spinoza considers love as a kind of emotion. An 
investigation of Spinoza’s concept of emotion will also be helpful for our 
comprehension of the concept of love. Emotion is given a clear definition in the 
beginning part of Part 3 as follows: 
 
By emotion [affectus] I understand the affections of the body by which the body’s 
power of activity is increased or diminished, assisted or checked, together with the 
ideas of these affections. Thus, if we can be the adequate cause of one of these 
affections, then by emotion I understand activity, otherwise passivity. (3 Definition 
                                                             




3, p. 278, italics in original). 
 
Here, Spinoza is discussing the essence of emotion. To some degree, the term ‘emotion’ 
is not a good translation, and it can easily lead to a purely mental reading143. Most 
scholars prefer to use the term ‘affect’ rather than the term ‘emotion’, such as Den Uyl 
(2008). According to Spinoza, it also refers to the modifications of the body. These 
affections or modifications are linked to the body’s power and increase or diminish this 
power144. This consideration has its roots in Spinoza’s metaphysics of God-Attribute-
Mode145. According to Spinoza’s metaphysics, emotions are modes, and all modes have 
the attribute of Extension, which Spinoza calls the affections or modifications of the 
                                                             
143 Traditionally, emotion has been considered a mental activity and has seemed always to belong to 
the scope of the mind. Emotion is a part of our mental life, the object of psychology rather than 
physiology. Helm says that ‘emotions just are responses to objects that combine evaluation, motivation, 
and a kind of phenomenology’ (Helm, 2017).  
 
144 Therefore, it seems wrong to say that the whole of Part 3, which is titled ‘Concerning the Origin 
and Nature of the Emotions’ in the Ethics, is devoted only to psychology. According to Spinoza, 
emotion is also considered a kind of neuro-physiological process. This view is in accordance with the 
thought of contemporary cognitive neuro-science (de Sousa, Winter 2017). 
 
145 As shown in Chapter 3, according to Spinoza, an idea is the mode of thinking and the mind is the 
collection of ideas. In Spinoza’s metaphysics of God-Attribute-Mode, God is the sole substance, and 
has infinite attributes. Attributes are considered as the intellectual perception of the essence of 
substance. What man can access among God’s infinite attributes are only two attributes: the attribute of 
Thought and the attribute of Extension. A mode is a way or manner in which God expresses himself. 
Therefore, the sensible reality that we experience daily can be considered as a collection of the infinite 
modes of God rather than anything else. A mode of thinking is an idea and, correspondingly, there 
exists a mode of the body. This is not to say that this mode of the body and its corresponding mode of 
thinking are two different modes: they are, in fact, one and the same. Therefore, the notorious riddle of 




body. At the same time, they also have the attribute of Thought, which Spinoza calls 
the ideas of the affections or modifications of the body.  
  Moreover, here emotion is linked directly to the body’s power of activity. Sometimes 
emotion increases the body’s power of activity, and sometimes it decreases it. Therefore, 
there are two primary kinds of emotions in Spinoza’s system. The emotion that 
increases the body’s power of activity is named ‘pleasure’, by which Spinoza means 
the transition from a less perfect state to a more perfect state. The emotion that decreases 
the body’s power of activity is named ‘pain’, by which Spinoza means the transition 
from a more perfect state to a less perfect state. Behind the pair of primary emotions, 
pleasure and pain, is a more basic kind of emotion known as desire which, according to 
Spinoza, ‘is the very essence of man insofar as his essence is conceived as determined 
to any action from any given affection of itself’ (E3 Definition 1, p. 311). Therefore, 
desire is another name for human power.  
  In Spinoza’s definition of the concept of emotion he emphasizes that when a kind of 
emotions occurs, its corresponding idea must also occur. In other words, active 
emotions correspond to the mind conceiving adequate ideas (E3p58 Proof, p. 309). By 
contrast, passive emotions correspond to the mind conceiving inadequate ideas. For 
Spinoza, inadequate ideas belong to knowledge of the first kind, imagination, whereas 
adequate ideas belong to knowledge of the second kind, reason, and the third kind, 
intuition. It is here that Spinoza’s concept of love establishes the close connection with 
his epistemology. Given the emotion of pleasure can be divided into passive emotion 
and active emotion, it implies that there is the passive kind of love, i.e. passionate love, 
256 
 
and, also, the active kind of love, that is our love towards God and the Amor. 
  Traditionally speaking, the concept of love is one of notorious ambiguity in 
philosophy. It is used to refer to so-called personal love (in the sense that I love my 
family) rather than the kind of love I have for my pets, or my job, or beautiful natural 
scenery (such as The Lake District)146. Such personal love focuses on human beings 
rather than on other things.  
  To turn to our topic, we see that Spinoza’s concept of love has a very broad meaning, 
and any object could become the beloved (even a stone). For Spinoza, love, as a kind 
of emotion, is a form of pleasure whereas hatred is a form of pain. Since they both are 
expression of power, they can overcome each other. Love can overcome hatred, and 
hatred can overcome love. At the same time, it is important to know that most of the 
time our desires, both pleasure and pain, are derived from our passive responses towards 
the external environment. 
  In short, in the Ethics, Spinoza considered love as a kind of emotion. For Spinoza, 
emotions are affects rather than a kind of mental activity only as we usually consider 
them to be. The nature of emotions is the power of activity. With respect to the bodily 
side, pleasure is the emotion that increases the body’s power of activity, and pain is the 
emotion that decrease the body’s power of activity. With respect to the mental side, 
emotions always have corresponding ideas in the mind. According to Spinoza, 
passionate love is passive with inadequate ideas in the mind, whereas both our love 
                                                             




towards God and the Amor are active with adequate ideas in the mind. For Spinoza, the 
concept of love has a very broad meaning rather than referring narrowly to personal 
love. 
7.2.3 The Concept of the Amor 
Spinoza’s concept of the Amor intertwines with his concept of love in his works. 
Returning to the very first sentence of Spinoza’s philosophical career, he tells us that 
his goal is to find a true good, and that the true good is capable of communicating itself. 
Spinoza did not clarify the intended meaning of this phrase. Now we know that it was 
stated that the love of God is also God’s self-love in E5p35. Given that, for Spinoza, 
the true good is God himself, it is reasonable to say that God’s self-love in E5p35 is a 
new explanation of the notion that God is capable of communicating himself. In the 
same sentence, Spinoza also claims that the true good is a joy, a continuous and supreme 
joy, which leads us to eternity. All of these notions are embodied in his last doctrine of 
the Amor. Surveying Spinoza’s whole philosophical career, it is also clear that the 
doctrine of the Amor as the last doctrine in the Ethics is not redundant, but is in fact 
Spinoza’s final goal which he had pursed from the beginning of his philosophical career. 
In other words, Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor was in embryonic form at the very 
beginning of his philosophical career, and the ‘continuous and supreme joy’ is the first 
name of the Amor. 
  The thought of God’s self-love was developed further in the CM. Spinoza claims that 
‘God’s will, by which he wills to love himself, follows necessarily from his infinite 
258 
 
intellect, by which he understands himself’ (CM, p. 200). Here, Spinoza is claiming that 
God’s will is identical with God’s self-love. As shown in Chapter 3, Spinoza developed 
his notion of God’s will in the Ethics, in which he argued that God’s will and God’s 
intellect are one. Moreover, according to Spinoza’s metaphysics, God’s intellect is God 
himself. Consequently, Spinoza arrived at the conclusion that the essence of God is love 
in the form of God’s self-love. In short, Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor had its initial 
metaphysical foundation in his CM.  
The TTP is Spinoza’s critique of the hermeneutics of Scripture, and his attitude 
towards the concept of love in Scripture is a complementary resource for us to 
understand his concept of the Amor in the Ethics. In the TTP, three points of relevance 
to the doctrine of the Amor in the Ethics deserve to be discussed further here. 
Firstly, Spinoza agreed that the essence of Scripture is ‘to love God above all, and 
one’s neighbor as oneself’, and that ‘Scripture can properly be called the Word of God’ 
in respect of this essence (TTP, p. 508). Spinoza considered this essence to be an 
uncorrupted fundamental principle of Scripture, and he further claimed that our 
salvation is dependent solely on God’s grace and must follow this fundamental 
principle (TTP, p. 509). Spinoza repeats this notion in the Ethics, claiming that the Amor 
as salvation ‘is called grace in the Holy Scripture, and rightly so’ (E5p36 Scholium, p. 
378). Following this point, Spinoza’s concept of the Amor seems to be a twin of the 
concept of the glory of God in the Scripture147. The concept of glory and the concept of 
                                                             
147 Therefore, it is my opinion that Spinoza could be called a disciple of Jesus Christ, but he is not a 




the love of God are inseparable in Theology. The concept of the love of God (Amor Dei) 
is the backbone of Christian Philosophy, in which the essence of God is identical with 
love. The thought that God is love has its roots in the New Testament, especially in the 
Gospel of John 3:16148, 1 John 4:8149 and Romans 5:8150. Generally speaking151, ‘glory’ 
as a theological term means the free and unmerited favour of God that is manifested in 
the salvation of sinners and the bestowing of blessings. The free and unmerited favour 
of God can be explained as the love of God in Christian philosophy. It has also been 
said that glory is the love of God in action. The relationship between the concept of 
glory and the concept of the love of God in theology suggests that Spinoza is 
considering his concept of the Amor as a kind of love in action. 
Secondly, Spinoza uses the phrase ‘the knowledge and love of God’ to refer to the 
supreme good in the TTP152 . The supreme good is ‘man’s highest happiness and 
                                                             
148 ‘For God so loved the world that he gave his one and only Son, that whoever believes in him shall 
not perish but have eternal life.’ (John 3:16 NIV) 
 
149 ‘Anyone who does not love does not know God, because God is love.’ (1 John 4:8 NIV)  
 
150 ‘But God demonstrates his own love for us in this: While we were still sinners, Christ died for us.’ 
(Romans 5:8 NIV) 
 
151 The issue of glory and love in theology is beyond the scope of this thesis. What I can do here is just 
to repeat the common conclusion on this issue. According to my own understanding, the New 
Testament reveals the love of God and the Holy Bible as a whole reveals the glory of God. 
 
152 In the TTP, this phrase occurs in the following sentences: ‘this eternal covenant involving the 
knowledge and love of God is universal’ on p. 424, ‘by divine law I mean that which is concerned only 
with the supreme good, that is, the true knowledge and love of God’ on p. 427, ‘[this]…is the sum of 
our supreme good and blessedness, to wit, the knowledge and love of God’ on p. 428, ‘he who does 
good from true knowledge and love of good acts freely and with a steadfast mind’ on p. 432, ‘from 
miracles men may accept false gods quite as readily as the true God, unless they are well fortified by 
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blessedness, and the final end and aim of all human action’ (TTP, p. 428). It is, then, 
another name for man’s salvation. Therefore, the phrase ‘the knowledge and love of 
God’ is a twinned term of the intellectual love of God (the Amor) in the TTP. Wolfson 
also confirms that the knowledge and love of God is the kindred expression of the 
intellectual love of God in the TTP (Wolfson, 1934b, p. 306). The intellectual love of 
God is expressed philosophically in the Ethics, while the knowledge and love of God 
is expressed theologically in the TTP. As such, Spinoza’s explanation of the concept of 
the knowledge and love of God in the TTP should be considered a mirror explanation 
of the concept of the intellectual love of God in the Ethics. Spinoza took two steps to 
explain this concept in the TTP. He explains it in the first step as follows: 
 
[Our] supreme good and perfection depends solely on the knowledge of God … So 
the whole of our knowledge, that is, our supreme good, not merely depends on the 
knowledge of God but consists entirely therein …. So he who loves above all the 
intellectual cognition of God, the most perfect Being, and takes especial delight 
therein, is necessarily most perfect, and partakes most in the highest blessedness.’ 
(TTP, pp. 427-8) 
 
                                                             
true knowledge and love of God’ on p. 449, ‘the true knowledge and love of God cannot be subject to 
anyone’s jurisdiction. At the same time, in the TP, it occurs in the sentence: the true knowledge and 
love of God…is also the case with charity towards one’s neighbor’ on p. 693. Also in Letter 78, it 
occurs in the sentence: ‘he who cannot control his desires…cannot enjoy tranquility of mind and the 




Spinoza does not provide an explicit philosophical argument in the citation above. 
However, the thought in this explanation is coherent with the thought in his Ethics. That 
our knowledge consists entirely in the knowledge of God was unfolded in Part Two of 
the Ethics. Here, Spinoza uses the term ‘intellect’ and the term ‘the intellectual 
cognition of God’, and this seems to foretell the use of the term ‘intellect’ in the phrase 
of the intellectual love of God in the Ethics. Moreover, blessedness belongs to those 
who love above all the intellectual cognition of God. Spinoza told his friend that the 
love of God ‘flows from the knowledge of God’ (Letter 19, p. 810). 
  As the second step, Spinoza particularly emphasized the notion that ‘‘knowledge’ 
itself may perhaps be ‘love’, since the Hebrew word ‘Jadah’ can have both meanings’ 
(TTP, p. 433). Spinoza himself emphasized the importance of this kind of knowledge 
of philology. Spinoza’s method for biblical hermeneutics follows the basic principle 
‘that knowledge of Scripture must be sought only from Scripture’ (ibid.). Therefore, 
Spinoza argued that ‘a thorough knowledge of the Hebrew language’ is needed for us 
to ‘acquire a completely and assured knowledge of the Holy Bible’ (ibid.). For this 
reason, Spinoza began to write his Hebrew Grammar following the publication of the 
TTP in 1670, and for the same reason he confessed that he could not undertake the task 
of a detailed critique of the New Testament since he lacked knowledge of Greek. 
Spinoza concluded that Solomon’s thought in Scripture is that ‘our intellect and 
knowledge depend solely on the idea or our understanding of God, and spring from it 
and are perfected by it’ (TTP, p. 434). This is, of course, Spinoza’s own view. Now we 
know that Spinoza claimed that the Amor arises necessarily from intuitive knowledge 
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in the Ethics, and it is possible that the fact that the term ‘knowledge’ and the term ‘love’ 
have the same Hebrew etyma inspired this thought of Spinoza’s. It is also possible that 
this same fact forced Spinoza to change the phrase ‘the knowledge and love of God’ in 
the TTP into the phrase ‘the intellectual love of God (the Amor)’ in the Ethics.   
In short, as the TTP itself is considered to be the twin of the Ethics, it is also 
reasonable for us to say that the concept of the knowledge and love of God in the TTP 
and the concept of the Amor in the Ethics are twins. We also found that the fact that the 
term ‘knowledge’ and the term ‘love’ have the same Hebrew etyma had an important 
impact on the final shaping of the doctrine of the Amor in the Ethics. 
  The term ‘the intellectual love of God’ itself, ‘Amor Dei Intellectualis’, is an unusual 
piece of terminology in the history of philosophy. It is noteworthy that Augustine153 
used a similar term, ‘Amor Naturalis’, i.e. ‘the natural love’, in the medieval era 
(Wolfson, 1934b, pp. 197-200). Thomas Aquinas distinguished the natural love, which 
exists even in inanimate objects, from the intellectual, rational, spiritual love (Wolfson, 
1934b, pp. 304-5). It is possible that Spinoza took inspiration from Augustine’s 
terminology ‘Amor Naturalis’ to develop his terminology ‘Amor Dei Intellectualis’ 
since he believed that Nature and God are identical with each other. Further, Spinoza 
himself used the terminology ‘the natural love’ in his KV. According to Spinoza, ‘the 
natural love… prompts everything to preserve its body’ (KV, p. 104). This definition 
                                                             
153 Augustine (354–430 CE) used the term to refer to the power causing the ‘natural movements 




reveals that the term ‘the natural love’ is the initial name of the term ‘conatus’. This 
thought, then, gives us an important clue for comprehending the concept of the Amor 
through the concept of conatus, which we will explore in due course. 
 To summarize, we have confirmed that the concept of love is one of the main threads 
of Spinoza’s philosophy, and that the concept of the Amor is at the core of his concept 
of love. These basic thoughts were developed from his very first philosophical piece, 
the TIE, through the KV, the CM, and the TTP, until their maturation in the Ethics. Both 
Christian theology, especially Augustine’s thought, and Spinoza’s Jewish background 




7.3 The Parallel between the Concept of Jen and the Concept of the Amor 
As shown in Section 1.3, Graf (1949) claims that Chu’s concept of Jen is identical to 
Spinoza’s concept of the Amor. I am not yet able to say that they are identical with each 
other. However, it is clear from what we have explored in Section 7.1 and Section 7.2. 
that the concept of Jen in Confucianism is very similar to the concept of the Amor in 
Spinoza’s work. 
  This similarity is highlighted through several summary points below. Firstly, they 
both are at the core of their respective ethics. Confucius himself places the concept of 
Jen at the center of the ethics of Confucianism. For Spinoza, the concept of the Amor 
is also at the center of his ethics. In the Ethics, the Amor is the final goal, but Spinoza 
had set the goal at the very beginning of his philosophical career. Secondly, they both 
refer to union with the Ultimate Reality. For Wang, man’s highest ethical goal is to form 
one body with Tian and everything, and man can fulfil this goal only through the 
practice of Jen. For Spinoza, the highest happiness consists in union with God. This can 
only be fulfilled through the Amor. Finally, they are both intertwined with the concept 
of love. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to say that the concept of Jen in Confucianism 
and the concept of the Amor are parallel to each other.  
  Since the parallelism here is very clear, I will not pursue this point further. The 
parallelism will be further highlighted during our exploration of the puzzle of the 





The Neo-Confucian Approach towards the Puzzle of the 
Doctrine of the Amor 
Following the puzzle that we explored in Chapter 2, and our discussion of the 
parallelism between Spinoza’s philosophy and Neo-Confucianism in their three main 
aspects, in this chapter we are finally ready to resolve the problems (the problem of 
nature, the problem of cause, and the problem of transition) in the puzzle of the doctrine 
of the Amor. In Section 8.1, I will argue that, from the perspective of God, the Amor is 
nothing but the creative power of God. In section 8.2, I will argue that, from the 
perspective of an individual, the Amor is the essence of this very individual. By 
combining the conclusions of Section 8.1 and Section 8.2, the problem of nature will 
be resolved. In Section 8.3, I will argue that, from the combined perspective, the Amor 
is not only man’s final fulfilment of freedom through intuitive knowledge, but also 
man’s self-cultivation in practice. Through this explanation, both the problem of cause 
and the problem of transition are fully resolved. 
8.1 The Amor as the Creative Power of God 
In this section, we will focus on the realm of Natura naturans in order to analyze the 
problem of nature. In Chapter 2, we saw that the problem of nature concerns the nature 
of the Amor: given Spinoza’s anti-anthropomorphic rationalism, in which God is not a 
personal God and Nature is his other name, how can the concept of love be applied to 
God himself? In fact, Neo-Confucians face a similar problem. On the one hand, as we 
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saw in Chapter 3, Tian, as the Neo-Confucian Ultimate Reality, is impersonal. On the 
other hand, Confucians believe that Jen, as the essence of Tian, is love. As such, it is 
implied that the essence of Tian is love. Now, a similar problem arises: how can the 
notion that the essence of Tian is love make sense in Neo-Confucianism? 
  According to Neo-Confucianism, the universe is a ceaseless process of production 
and reproduction. Jen is the essence of the eternal process of production and 
reproduction. As shown in Chapter 3, Tian is the Great Ultimate in the essential realm. 
The creative power of the Great Ultimate is infinite and eternal, and everything comes 
into existence and sustains its existence through the Great Ultimate. For Chu, Jen refers 
to the infinitely creative power of the Great Ultimate. Chu says that Tian has ‘no other 
business except to have the mind to produce things’ (Chan, 1963, p. 642-3). Here, the 
mind of Tian is another name for the Great Ultimate, and its business is nothing but to 
create the myriad things. The production and reproduction of the myriad things is due 
to the Great Ultimate. Chu claims that Jen is ‘like the ten thousand things being stored 
and preserved’ in the Great Ultimate (Chan, 1963, p. 633). In turn, Jen refers to the 
infinitely creative power of the Great Ultimate. In short, Jen is the creative power of 
Tian in Neo-Confucianism.  
  In a parallel way, we find that, for Spinoza, the Amor also refers to the creative power 
of God. The thought is first found in his CM as follows: 
 
God’s will, by which he wills to love himself, follows necessarily from his infinite 
intellect, by which he understands himself, but how these three are distinguished 
267 
 
from each another---his essence, his intellect …, and his will--- this we fail to 
comprehend … we clearly and distinctly perceive that God’s intellect and his 
power and will, whereby he has created, understood, and preserves or loves created 
things, are in no way distinct from one another save only in respect of our thought. 
(CM, p. 200, my italics) 
 
Here Spinoza is saying that God’s will is the will of loving himself (the love of God). 
Furthermore, God’s will is to create, understand, and preserve created things, and this 
is also God’s creative power. In other words, the love of God towards created things is 
the same as the creative power of God, through which God creates, understands and 
preserves created things. This is a specific way of saying that the love of God is his 
creative power. Spinoza also asserts that God’s will is also his essence, and this is the 
same as saying that the love of God is the essence of God. Spinoza’s CM was published 
in 1663. This fact reveals that Spinoza had the notion of the love of God as his creative 
power before he developed his doctrine of the Amor in his Ethics. 
  Furthermore, Spinoza also claims that God and God’s power are one and the same, 
and tells us as follows: 
 
But the force whereby God perseveres in his own being is nothing but his 
essence, so that those speak best who call God ‘life’. (CM, p. 197, my italics) 
 
Here, Spinoza believes that the concept of life can be applied to God, in other words, 
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God’s life. This point is coherent with the notion that God is a living being, which we 
saw in Section 3.1.2. The concept of God’s life expresses the power through which God 
perseveres in his own being, and it is identical with God’s essence. As such, God’s 
essence, God’s power, God’s life, and God’s love are all one and the same for Spinoza. 
  To turn to the Ethics, as shown in Chapter 3, Spinoza repeatedly claims that God’s 
essence, God’s intellect, and God’s will are one and the same. At the same time, two 
points were developed further. The first point, in E5p35, sees Spinoza confirming that 
the love of God is the divine Amor: God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love.  
  The second point sees Spinoza establishing a firm metaphysical foundation for the 
Amor, centered on the notion of the self-caused. In Section 3.1.2, I pointed out that the 
notion of the self-caused is at the core of Spinoza’s concept of God. The concept of the 
self-caused is the first definition of the Ethics, and Spinoza places it at the very 
beginning of the Ethics (E1 Definitions 1, p. 217). For Spinoza, the self-caused God 
means the immanent God and, therefore, the creative power of God is the immanent 
power existing in an individual thing. In his definition of the concept of the Amor in 
E5p35, Spinoza refers back to the concept of the self-caused as follows:  
 
God’s nature enjoys infinite perfection, accompanied (Pr. 3, II) by the idea of itself, 
that is (Pr.11, and Def. 1, I [E1 Definitions 1]), by the idea of its own cause; and 
that is what, in Cor. Pr.32. V, we declared to be intellectual love. (E5P35 Proof, p. 




Here we see that Spinoza closely connects the concept of the Amor with his first concept, 
the concept of the self-caused. In other words, Spinoza founds the concept of the Amor 
upon his concept of the self-caused. Moreover, given that Spinoza’s self-caused God is 
immanent, this is why Spinoza claims that ‘God, insofar as he loves himself, loves 
mankind (the Amor towards men)’ (E5P35 Corollary, p. 378). Following the same logic, 
God loves all other things insofar as God is self-caused. 
  To summarize, Spinoza already had the notion of the love of God as the creative 
power of God when writing the CM, and he also considered the love of God as the 
essence of God. In the Ethics, Spinoza further confirms that the love of God is the Amor, 
and he places the concept of the Amor upon the concept of the self-caused. The concept 
of the self-caused is the metaphysical foundation of the concept of the Amor as the 
creative power of God. According to the concept of the self-caused, the creative power 
of God is not a transcendental power but an immanent power. This immanent power is 
embodied in every individual thing. In order to analyse this immanent power, we need 




8.2 The Amor as the Essence of an Individual Thing 
Before we turn to the question of how the Amor should be understood in terms of 
Spinoza’s realm of Natura naturata, let us first see how Jen is understood in terms of 
the functional realm of Neo-Confucianism. In the functional realm, we change our 
perspective from the Great Ultimate to the ‘myriad things’. Jen, as the creative power 
of the Great Ultimate, is not limited to the essential realm, and it is also not a creative 
power outside the functional realm. In other words, it is not a transcendental power 
outside the functional realm. It is necessarily expressed and unfolded immanently in 
the myriad things of the functional realm. As shown in Chapter 3, Chu insists that the 
Great Ultimate somehow exists in every individual thing in its entirety. Chu further 
explains his view as follows:  
 
“The mind of Heaven and Earth is to produce things.” In the production of man 
and things, they receive the mind of Heaven and Earth as their mind. Therefore, 
with reference to the character of the mind, although it embraces and penetrates all 
and leaves nothing to be desired, nevertheless, one word will cover of it, namely, 
Jen …. In discussing the excellence of man’s mind, it is said, “Jen is man’s 
mind” …. In man, it is the mind to love people gently and to benefit things. (Chan, 
1963, pp. 593-5, my italics, cited in Dy, 1983, pp. 437-8) 
 
While ‘the mind of Heaven and Earth’ is another name for the Great Ultimate, ‘the 
mind of’ man and things is another name for the nature of man and things in the 
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terminology of Neo-Confucianism. The nature of man and things is nothing but their 
Li. Chu is saying that Jen is the character of Li, and Jen embraces and penetrates all 
things. Further, Chu claims that ‘such things as seeds of grain or the peach and apricot 
kernels…. they are not dead things…For this reason they are called [Jen]…., [Jen] 
implies the spirit of life’ (Chan, 1963, p. 633，my italics). When Chu argues that Jen 
penetrates all things, he is implying that not only animals have life: everything has life. 
Here we see that, for Chu, Jen, as the character of Li, is the power of life in all things. 
Therefore, Yang argues that the existence of the Great Ultimate in its entirety somehow 
in every individual thing should be understood as the immanent power of the individual 
thing, like the power of a seed (Yang, 2015, pp. 225-6). 
  It is noteworthy that, in the last sentence of the citation above, Chu argues that in 
man, Jen is the mind to love others and to benefit other things. This further reveals 
Chu’s doctrine of Jen. For Chu, ‘Jen is the principle [Li] of love, … if there is Jen, there 
is love’, and Jen ‘makes love …possible’ (Chan, 1963, p. 633). In other words, with 
respect to men, Jen can also be considered as love, and the concept of Jen and the 
concept of love are united in men.  
  In short, with respect to the functional realm, Jen is the character of Li, and this is 
the power of life. As the power of life, Jen exists universally as the immanence in all 
things. Specifically, with respect to men, Jen is love. To conclude, Chu believes that 
Jen is the character of the Li of the myriad things, and specifically Jen is the Li of love 
in men. 
  In a parallel way, the Amor can also be considered the character of the essence of a 
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thing and its immanent power in Spinoza. With respect to the realm of Natura naturata, 
as shown in Chapter 4, the essence of the thing refers firstly to its actual essence. Here 
Spinoza’s concept of conatus must be taken into account.  
  The term ‘conatus’ originates from the Latin term ‘cōnātus’ in Spinoza’s 
manuscripts, and its verb is ‘cōnor’. The verb is usually translated as ‘to endeavor’ in 
English, and some translators subsequently translate the term ‘cōnātus’ into the 
English term ‘endeavour’. Spinoza was not the first to use the term, and it has 
historical roots in ancient Greek154. It is possible that Spinoza borrowed the term 
directly from Hobbes155. At the same time, Spinoza would also have read this term in 
Descartes’ works. Garber concludes that Descartes developed the concept of conatus 
in two important ways (Garber, 1992, pp. 150-4). Firstly, Descartes denounced its 
                                                             
154 According to Wolfson (1934), its original Greek term ‘ὁρμή’ has been used to describe the desire of 
the soul and the action following this kind of desire in ancient Greek. For example, both Stoics (333–
264 BCE) and Peripatetics (c. 335 BCE) used it to describe the impulse of life that ‘is directed to self-
preservation’ (Pollock, 1880, p.132). Diogenes Laertius (c. 235 BCE) denied its application to any kind 
of plant, and limited its use to animals only. Cicero (106–43 BCE) applied it to refer to the impetus of 
animals. Once the term was limited to refer to animals only, an alluded connection was building 
between the conatus and other cognitive emotions. Both Aristotle and Laertius seem to allude that men 
do not desire to something because of believing the good finding in it, but believes the good because of 
desiring it. The wishing derives from mankind’s natural inclination, and the natural inclination of 
mankind is the conatus of mankind (Wolfson, 1934a, p. 204). But Wolfson (1934a) finds that the term 
has been used to refer to not only animals but also inanimate objects in ancient Greek era (Wolfson, 
1934a, p. 202). 
 
155 Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) believed that it is our instinct to struggle to preserve ourselves in 
difficult environments. Therefore, all of our mind’s cognitive functions are merely variations of a more 
basic emotion in the mind, i.e. the conatus (Bidney, 1940, p. 91). As such, the concept of conatus 
became the core of Hobbes’ psychological theory. It is noteworthy that sometimes the conatus is 




ancient Greek anthropomorphic meaning whereby the term referred to the notion of a 
soul’s struggling for certain ends. Secondly, Descartes proposed a more mechanistic 
meaning to replace the mysterious meaning that was developed in the medieval era. 
Descartes believed that everything ‘insofar as in it lies, always perseveres in the same 
state, and when once moved, always continues to move’ (Blackwell, 1966, p. 220)156. 
According to Descartes, upon creating the material world and bestowing immutable 
natural laws to it, God would never again interfere in its operation. Therefore, it 
became possible for mankind to carry out scientific investigations of the material 
world. Moreover, the material world governed by the immutable natural laws is not 
necessarily teleological. Descartes’ views might well have had a huge influence on 
Spinoza’s concept of conatus. Now, we know that Spinoza extended its usage from 
Descartes’ material world to the whole of nature.  
  In fact, Spinoza had the idea of conatus in the early stage of his philosophical 
career. As shown in Section 7.2.3, in the KV Spinoza uses the concept of natural love, 
which embodies the thought of conatus. According to Spinoza, natural love prompts 
everything to preserve its body, and it ‘cannot have any other origin than…the 
“objective” essence of such body’ (KV, pp. 104-5, italics in original). Given that it 
prompts everything to preserve its body, the term ‘natural love’ is the initial name of 
the term ‘conatus’. According to my reading, in the KV the term ‘the objective 
                                                             





essence’ is the initial name of the term ‘the formal essence’ in the Ethics157. This 
thought, then, gives us an important clue for comprehending the concept of the Amor 
through the concept of conatus given that, as we saw in Section 7.2.3, the term of 
‘natural love’ also has close links with the concept of the Amor. 
  In his CM, Spinoza further developed his concept of conatus as follows: 
 
It should be noted that if life is also to be attributed to corporeal things, nothing 
will be devoid of life … because the word ‘life’ is commonly used in a wider 
sense, there is no doubt that it should also be attributed to corporeal things… by 
life we for our part understand the force through which things persevere in their 
own being. And because that force is different from the things themselves, we 
quite properly say that things themselves have life. (CM II 6, p. 197, my italics) 
 
Here Spinoza claims that by life he means the force through which things persevere in 
their own being. Spinoza’s use of the concept of life in the CM should be considered 
the embryonic form of the concept of conatus in his Ethics. 
  Spinoza’s concept of conatus became mature in his Ethics. Spinoza claims that each 
thing ‘endeavors to persist in its own being’, and this is its conatus (E3p6, p. 283). 
Further, Spinoza directly identifies the conatus with the actual essence, and claims that 
                                                             
157 As we know that the conatus refers to the actual essence, it seems that Spinoza implies that the 
formal essence is the origin of the actual essence in the KV. This point supports my argument, in 
Chapter 4, that the formal essence and the actual essence are one and the same at the metaphysical level 




the conatus ‘is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself’ (E3p7, p. 283). Spinoza 
concludes that the conatus could be called the power of the thing (E3p7 Proof, p. 283).  
  The conatus, as the expression of God’s immanent creation, does not only relate to 
men but to every mode of God or, in other words, every individual thing. This is why 
Spinoza claims that ‘the mind’s intellectual love towards God (the human Amor)’, or 
‘the love of God towards men (the divine Amor towards men)’, ‘is part of’ the love of 
God (the divine Amor) (E5P36 Proof, p. 378). To compare Spinoza’s use of the term 
‘natural love’ in his KV and his use of the term conatus in his Ethics, we see that Spinoza 
withdrew his use of the term ‘love’, and replaced it with the term ‘conatus’ to refer to 
the universally immanent power in the universe in the Ethics. At the same time, Spinoza 
only applied the term ‘love’ to men and God in the Ethics. This is very similar to Chu’s 
use of the term ‘the spirit of life’ to the universal power, when he restricts the term ‘love’ 
just to refer to men alone in Neo-Confucianism. This point is revealed clearly through 
his definition of the relationship between the conatus and desire as follows: 
 
When this conatus is related to mind alone, it is called Will [voluntas]; when it is 
related to mind and body together, it is called Appetite [appetitus], which is 
therefore nothing else but man’s essence… Further, there is no difference between 
appetite and Desire [cupiditas] except that desire is usually related to men insofar 
as they are conscious of their appetite. (E3p9 Scholium, p. 284) 
 
With respect to men, Spinoza clearly establishes a relationship of identity between 
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men’s essence, conatus, and desire. As shown in Section 7.2.2, love is related to 
pleasure, and pleasure is one kind of desire. Therefore, the conatus could be considered 
as the nature of love in men. In turn, with respect to men, the Amor can also be 
considered as the nature of love. The table below summarizes these related concepts 
clearly: 
 
Table 11 A comparison of the concept of Jen and the concept of the Amor. 
 
In short, with respect to Natura naturata, the Amor is the conatus of everything, and 
the conatus is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. The conatus refers to 
the power of everything coming to exist and sustaining its existence. Therefore, the 
conatus is the expression of God’s immanent creative power in Natura naturata. With 
respect to men, the conatus is the nature of love. 
 Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
 Jen The Amor 
The perspective of the 
essential realm / Natura 
naturans 
The power of the Great 
Ultimate 
The power of God 
The perspective of the 
functional realm / Natura 
naturata 
The spirit of life Conatus 
Men’s perspective Love Love 
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  To summarize, to combine what we have concluded in Section 8.1 and this section, 
the problem of nature could be answered as follows: from God’s perspective the Amor 
is understood as the immanently creative power of God; from an individual’s 
perspective the Amor is understood as the immanent essence of this very individual, i.e. 




8.3 The Amor as Man’s Self-cultivation in Practice  
In Section 8.1 and Section 8.2, we answer the problem of nature through both God’s 
perspective and an individual’s perspective. However, until now we have not touched 
upon the problem of cause and the problem of transition, which were raised in the 
puzzle of the doctrine of the Amor in Chapter 2. However, as shown in Section 3.4, I 
have argued that both Neo-Confucians and Spinoza use not only the perspective of the 
essential realm (Natura naturans) and the perspective of the functional realm (Natura 
naturata) respectively, but also a perspective combining these two perspectives: the 
combined perspective. We saw that the combined perspective is the key to resolving 
both the puzzle of the doctrine of the eternity of the mind, in Chapter 4, and the puzzle 
of the doctrine of intuitive knowledge in Chapter 6.  
  The nature of the combined perspective is expressionistic, by which I mean that the 
functional realm is the expression of the essential realm. Following the same logic, in 
this section, I propose that the combined perspective is once again the key to resolving 
the puzzle of the doctrine of the Amor. To borrow Deleuze’s term, I will label my 
solution as an ‘expressionistic reading’158. I will unfold this expressionistic reading in 
Section 8.3.2. Moreover, I propose that the expression is not static, but dynamic. This 
is my dynamistic reading. I will unfold this dynamistic reading in Section 8.3.3. 
However, before we unfold our final discussion, both the problem of cause and the 
problem of transition should be further clarified. Now, let us return to the problems 
                                                             
158 This is a term that Gilles Deleuze (1990) uses to summarize Spinoza’s philosophy in his book: 
Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza. I have merely borrowed the term, and I do not refer to 




8.3.1 A Further Clarification of the Puzzle 
The problem of cause consists in the fact that, on the one hand, Spinoza changes the 
cause part in his definition of the three kinds of love and, on the other hand, he still 
insists that they are coherent with his standard definition of the concept of love. The 
problem of cause is highlighted clearly in Table 1, and it is helpful for us to recall it as 
follows: 
 
Table 1 A comparison of the formulae of Spinoza’s three kinds of love. 
 
In Table 1, we clearly see that the part of cause in the standard pattern, ‘transition + 
cause’, in E3 Definition 6, is changed in each step. Given the fact that Spinoza’s God 
is immanent, the essence of the problem of cause seems to be that the external cause in 
the definition of passionate love becomes the internal cause in the latter two kinds of 
love. To put it simply, this seems to be the problem of the external/internal relationship. 
In order to further clarify this issue, we need to discuss both our love towards God and 
Love Transition Cause 
Standard definition of love Transition The idea of an external cause 
Passionate love Passive transition The idea of an external cause 
Our love towards God Active transition The idea of God 
The Amor Active transition The idea of God as cause 
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the Amor separately.  
  Our love towards God is accompanied by the idea of God. As shown in Chapter 2, 
the epistemological approach highlights the importance of taking Spinoza’s theory of 
knowledge into account. The basic idea of the epistemological approach is that the 
incoherence in the concepts of Spinoza’s three kinds of love is justified due to the fact 
that their corresponding three kinds of knowledge are different from each other. This is 
on the right track for a solution to the puzzle. To follow the epistemological approach, 
the knowledge of the idea of God, as the cause of our love towards God, should be 
considered an example of rational knowledge. As shown in Chapter 5, reason is abstract 
knowledge that refers to common notions, which are common to all things, or the 
adequate ideas of the properties of things, which are common between the subject and 
the object. In the case of our love towards God, the subject is men, and the object is 
God. Whether the idea of God refers to a common notion or an adequate idea of the 
properties of things, it is always common between at least the subject, man, and the 
object, God159. Man’s rational knowledge of the idea of God is abstract: for example, 
our knowing that God’s essence and his existence are one and the same, and that 
everything is only a mode of God, and that God is infinite and perfect, and so on. Given 
that it is always common between the subject and the object, man’s rational knowledge 
of the idea of God could be considered either an internal cause or an external cause160. 
                                                             
159 Here I believe that man’s knowledge of God, the idea of God, through reason, should be considered a common 
notion in Spinoza’s philosophy. 
 
160 We encountered a similar situation when we discussed the general misunderstanding of the concept of things in 
Spinoza’s epistemology in Section 6.1. Given the commonality between the subject and the object of the 




In other words, it does not matter whether the rational knowledge of the idea of God is 
considered as an external or internal cause given the fact that man’s knowledge of the 
idea of God is rational161. It is legitimate for Spinoza to consider it as an external cause: 
this is coherent with his standard definition in E3 Definition 6. In short, with respect to 
our love towards God, the problem of cause is not in fact a real threat. 
  With respect to the Amor, the situation is different given that the knowledge of the 
idea of God is intuitive. Given that the Amor is an umbrella term, covering the divine 
Amor, the human Amor, and the divine Amor towards men, we need to analyze all of 
these meanings. In Chapter 2, we saw their formulae listed clearly in Table 2, and it is 
also helpful for us to recall it as follows: 
 
Table 2 A comparison of the formulae of the Amor. 
 
In Table 2, with respect to the Amor, we clearly see there are two kinds of cause: the 
                                                             
161 To hold the abstract knowledge of the idea of God, we, as the subjects, seem to consider ourselves 
as separate subjects who are independent of the object, God. In this sense it seems better for us to 
consider it as an external cause. However, I will not pursue this point further here as it does not affect 
my argument. 
Love Transition Cause 
Standard definition of love Transition The idea of an external cause 
The divine Amor Perfection The idea of God as his own cause 
The human Amor  Activity The idea of God as cause 
The divine Amor towards men Activity The idea of God as cause 
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idea of God as his own cause and the idea of God as cause. According to E5p35, the 
divine Amor is nothing but God’s self-love, and it is therefore accurate to say that the 
idea of God is his own cause. With respect to both the divine Amor towards men and 
the human Amor, superficially, at least, the subject and the object are not the same. This 
is why Spinoza cannot consider the idea of God ‘as his own cause’, rather ‘as cause’ in 
his definitions. However, given the nature of intuitive knowledge, there is no distinction 
between the subject and the object either in the divine Amor towards men or in the 
human Amor. For example, consider the situation of the divine Amor towards Peter, and 
Peter’s intellectual love towards God (or Peter’s human Amor). Peter is a mode of God. 
As shown in Section 6.2, Peter’s intuitive knowledge of the idea of God is the idea of 
Peter in God itself. The idea of Peter in God is nothing more than the idea of God itself 
when the idea of God is expressed in the mode of Peter. At this point, Peter is God, God 
is Peter, and they are one and the same. Following this logic, the divine Amor towards 
Peter and Peter’s human Amor are also one and the same. This is why Spinoza claims 
that ‘the love of God towards men and the mind’s intellectual love towards God are one 
and the same’ (E5p36 Corollary, p. 378). The difference between the subject and the 
object disappear in nature, and the different descriptions between them are just due to 
different viewpoints.  
  In short, among the three sub-types of the Amor, Spinoza introduces two kinds of 
cause, the idea of God as his own cause and the idea of God as cause. Given the idea of 
God as intuitive knowledge, they are the same in nature. Therefore, we can say that the 
cause in the Amor is nothing but the idea of God as his own cause in nature, and this 
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seems to be incoherent with there being an external cause. The problem of cause 
remains as a real threat to the Amor.  
  So far, we have investigated both our love towards God and the Amor, and we have 
found that the problem of cause does not pose a real threat with respect to our love 
towards God, but is problematic for the Amor. We can conclude that there are two kinds 
of cause among Spinoza’s three kinds of love: an external cause for passionate love and 
our love towards God, and God’s own cause for the Amor. Now the problem of cause 
demands a defense of the coherency between God as his own cause in the definition of 
the Amor and God as an external cause in Spinoza’s standard definition of love.  
  Now let us turn to the problem of transition. As known in Section 2.1, according to 
Spinoza’s standard definitions, love is the transition of the mind to a state of greater 
perfection, but whereas passionate love involves a passive transition, our love towards 
God involves an active transition. However, as clearly shown in Table 2, the Amor does 
not involve a transition: the notion refers to God’s nature enjoying infinite perfection. 
In other words, it is not a transitional process, but an abidance at the highest stage of 
perfection because God himself is absolute perfection, and he cannot undergo any 
change. Put simply, the problem of transition seems to be the problem of the 
process/consequence relationship.  
  In short, with respect to the problem of cause, both passionate love and our love 
towards God are on one side, and the Amor is on the other. This point is similar to the 
situation for the problem of transition. Now we see that both the problem of cause and 
the problem of transition are related to the Amor and do not pose a real threat towards 
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either passionate love or our love towards God. We can now summarize the problems 
through the table below: 
 
Table 12 The relationship between the problem of cause / the problem of transition 
and Spinoza’s three kinds of love. 
 
8.3.2 The Functional/essential Relationship of Love in Spinoza  
As shown in Chapter 7, there are three kinds of love in the Ethics. Moreover, these three 
kinds of love seem to be at the same level, i.e. we considered them as having the same 
status. However, for Spinoza’s three kinds of love, this is a misunderstanding. In other 
words, Spinoza’s three kinds of love are not at the same ontological level, and they do 
not have the same status. As shown in Section 8.3.1, it is clear that Spinoza somehow 
divides his three kinds of love into two groups: passionate love and our love towards 
God on one side, and the Amor on the other side. Now we have simplified our problems 
into the relationship between two different groups of love, rather than among three 
different kinds of love. This simplification provides us with a good foundation for 
resolving our problems.  
 The problem of cause The problem of transition 
Passionate love O O 
our love towards God O O 
The Amor X X 
285 
 
  I suggest that we can resolve this problem through the resources that we find in 
Spinoza’s works, but that we also need to amend our way of thinking. To review our 
process of addressing the puzzle of the doctrine of the eternity of the mind in Chapter 
4, and the puzzle of the doctrine of intuitive knowledge in Chapter 6, we can see that 
we followed a basic pattern whereby we transferred the relationship between the two 
realms of Ultimate Reality into a functional/essential relationship. In Neo-
Confucianism, an individual thing is a functional expression of the Great Ultimate, and 
for Spinoza, an individual thing is a mode of God, and also a functional expression of 
God. This is the foundation that Gilles Deleuze (1990) adopted to summarize Spinoza’s 
philosophy as expressionism. With respect to resolving both the problem of cause and 
the problem of transition, I propose that we need to perform the same transformation.  
  As shown in Section 7.1, for Neo-Confucianism, Jen is the character of the mind and 
the Li of love. In other words, Jen is the nature of love. At the same time, love is 
considered as the functional expression of Jen.  
  In a parallel way, according to my reading of Spinoza, the external/internal 
relationship, which entails the problem of cause, can be understood as being the 
functional/essential relationship. If this is an external/internal relationship then I 
believe that the problem of cause will not be resolvable because an internal cause is 
always opposite to an external cause, but an external cause is in Spinoza’s standard 
definition of love. This leads us into a deadlock given the standard formula that 
Spinoza insists on using to define the three kinds of love. However, once we see it as 
the functional/essential relationship rather the static external/internal relationship, the 
problem of cause seems to disappear. Following the same logic, the 
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process/consequence relationship in the problem of transition can also be understood 
as being the functional/essential relationship. This is the so-called expressionistic 
reading. Now let us unfold our discussion. 
(i) The Element of Eros and the Element of Agape in Spinoza 
Firstly, I propose that we need to go back to the source of Spinoza’s concept of love. 
Spinoza’s concept of love has its roots in the tradition of Western philosophy. Helm 
concludes that the term ‘love’, which we use today in philosophy, has three etymologies 
from the ancient Greeks, and they are Eros, Philia, and Agape (Helm, 2017).  
  For most of us, Eros is the most familiar. A typical kind of Eros is romantic love. The 
basic characteristics of Eros are also revealed through romantic love: the lover has the 
passionate desire for union with the beloved, and there are some merits embodied in 
the beloved, such as the beloved’s physical beauty, or spiritual goodness … etc., 
through which the lover is attracted. These merits are the reasons why the lover has the 
passionate desire for union with the beloved. This description of Eros has its 
philosophical roots in Plato’s Symposium, in which Eros was understood not only as a 
response to bodily beauty in particular, but also ‘a response which ought to be 
developed into a response to the beauty of a person’s soul, and ultimately into a 
response to the form, Beauty’ (Helm, 2017). With respect to Philia, it has its 
philosophical roots in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, in which the love of Philia 
seems to be equal with friendship. According to Badhwar (2003), Philia can happen 
‘between parent and child, wife and husband, siblings as well as ‘just friends’’ (Badhwar, 
2003, p. 43). Helm states that Philia is directed at ‘not just one’s friends but also 
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possibly towards family members, business partners, and one’s country at large’ (Helm, 
2017). As Philia also depends on some good qualities embodied in the beloved, on this 
point it is similar to Eros. This leads to a difficulty with distinguishing Philia from Eros 
when Eros does not refer exclusively to romantic love162. Nygren argues that Philia 
seems to be a transformation of Eros because Philia ‘is built in the last resort…on self-
love’, which is a kind of Eros (Nygren, 1969, p.186). In other words, Philia has its 
nature in the sense of the self-love of Eros. Therefore, Nygren believes that Philia could 
be considered as a kind of Eros, and at this point I will follow Nygren in this thesis. 
Even though there are some differences between Eros and Philia, they all belong to the 
Hellenistic tradition163. As with Plato’s Ideal Realm, Aristotle’s Pure Form itself is ‘the 
absolutely Unmoved’, and everything in the universe longs for likeness to it in the 
irreversible upward tendency (Nygren, 1969, p.185).  
By contrast, Agape refers to a completely different kind of love. For the beloved, it 
is unconditional. It is not based on the value of the beloved, but rather on some character 
of the lover himself/herself. Historically, Agape was primarily used to name the kind of 
                                                             
162 One approach to distinguish them is to argue that Philia implies equality in some degree between 
the lover and the beloved whereas Eros does not involve this requirement and emphasizes the lover’s 
desire for the merits of the beloved. 
 
163 Nygren indicates that the roots of Eros are in ancient mystery-piety, maturing in Plato’s philosophy, 
and remodeled in Aristotle’s hands, before finally being shaped further in Neoplatonism in the Middle 
Ages (Nygren, 1969, p. 57). It is noteworthy that Aristotle claimed that the whole process of nature is 
the movement ‘from matter to form, from imperfection to perfection of being, from potentially to 
actuality’, and towards Pure Form finally by ‘being loved’. (Nygren, 1969, p. 184). In other words, for 




love that God has towards men in Christianity. Consequently, as one kind of response 
to God’s love towards men, our love towards God, and our love towards our neighbors, 
also belong to this kind of love164. It is not necessary for God to seek any merit in men 
since He is perfect and possesses all merits, and this is the logical foundation of Agape. 
God loves men not because of our merits but rather because love is the essence of God. 
Due to its unconditional nature, God loves everyone equally, and we should therefore 
love our neighbors equally. The direction of Agape is from the perfect to the imperfect, 
therefore the merit is created in the beloved through Agape. By contrast, Eros in 
Platonism seeks some merits or values which already exist in the beloved. There is a 
basic tension between Plato’s Ideal Realm (perfect Realm) and realistic Realm 
(imperfect Realm), and men have the potential impulsion to pursue the Ideal Realm 
since Plato’s Ideal kingdom itself cannot fall upon us. Therefore, the direction of Eros 
is from the imperfect to the perfect. For example, the beauty of your lover attracts you, 
and that is because the beauty of your lover is a shade of the Ideal of Beautifulness. 
This attraction is rooted in the Ideal of Beautifulness.  
In short, it is reasonable for us to conclude that Eros moves upward from the realistic 
Realm to the Ideal Realm whereas Agape moves downward from the heavenly Realm 
to the earthly Realm. Eros is an upward endeavor for the unification with the unmoved 
Ultimate Reality. The character of union is one of the most distinctive feature of Eros. 
Agape is a downward creation for embodiment in the earthly world. The character of 
                                                             
164 Our love towards God is not due to the omniscience, omnipotence, or other characteristics of God, 
but it follows from love as the essence of God, and through it we follow God and embrace God. For the 
same reason, we love our neighbors. 
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creation is one of the biggest characteristics of Agape.  
(ii) The Functional/essential Relationship of Love in Spinoza 
According to my reading, in the development of his concept of love, Spinoza inherits 
both the thought of Eros and the thought of Agape. As shown in Section 7.2, he claims, 
at the beginning of the TIE, that men’s happiness depends solely on the merits of the 
object to which we are bound by love and, in the KV, he argues that men should 
endeavor to unite with God through love. Clearly, the conception of love in both the 
TIE and the KV belongs to the thought of Eros, and his core concern is to emphasize 
union with God.  
  However, Spinoza’s concept of love undergoes an explicit transformation in the 
Ethics. Given that intuitive knowledge accompanies the Amor, let us recall the 
definition of intuitive knowledge. According to E2p40 Scholium 2, intuitive knowledge 
proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an 
adequate knowledge of the essence of things. This definition is almost a counterpart of 
the notion of Agape, and emphasizes that it is a downward process from God to an 
individual thing. As such, the concept of the Amor is coherent with the thought of Agape. 
The element of Agape in the definition of the Amor is clearly embodied in the concept 
of the Amor towards men. The Amor towards men is an activity whereby God’s creative 
power is immanently embodied in men. 
  Moreover, Spinoza himself twice directly touched on the issue of the essence of love 




The definition given by writers who define love as “the lover’s wish to be united 
with the object of his love” expresses not the essence of love, but a property of it; 
and since these writers have not sufficiently grasped the essence of love, neither 
have they succeeded in forming any clear conception of its property. (E3 Definition 
6 Explication, p. 312) 165. 
 
The citation here is Spinoza’s specific explanation for his standard definition of the 
concept of love in E3 Definition 6. Spinoza is clearly criticizing the notion of Eros. 
Spinoza argues that it does not express the essence of love. But he does not denounce 
the notion of Eros completely and recognizes it as a property of love. Spinoza also 
argues that a clear conception of this property has not been forthcoming. What is 
Spinoza’s own conception of this property? I believe that Spinoza is alluding to the 
transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection. The notion of considering love as 
the transition from lesser to greater perfection is clearly coherent with the concept of 
Eros.   
  The second time Spinoza directly addresses the issue is in E5p20 Scholium. As 
shown in Section 2.2.3, Spinoza touches upon the issue of the essence of love again, 
and it is helpful for us to cite it again here:  
 
[W]e may conclude that this love towards God is the most constant of all emotions, 
                                                             
165 It has been pointed out that the writer who Spinoza is alluding to in this passage is Descartes. 
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and insofar as it is related to the body it cannot be destroyed except together with 
the body. As to its nature insofar as it is related solely to the mind, this we shall 
examine later on. (E5p20 Scholium, p. 372, my italics) 
 
Nadler is right to claim that the Amor can be considered as the nature of our love 
towards God (Nadler, 2017, p. 18). I want to go a step further. According to my reading, 
the Amor is the nature of both passionate love and our love towards God. Passionate 
love is the function of the Amor when the subject of this love holds knowledge only of 
the first kind (imagination). Our love towards God is also the function of the Amor 
when the subject of this love holds knowledge of the second kind (reason). This reading 
has an epistemological foundation given the fact that intuitive knowledge can be 
considered as the nature of both knowledge as reason and knowledge as imagination. 
Furthermore, knowledge as reason and knowledge as imagination are the function of 
intuitive knowledge, a conclusion that we reached in Chapter 6. Further, this reading 
has a metaphysical foundation given the fact that the formal essence of a thing is the 
idea of the thing in God, which is a mode of the idea of God. In the previous section, 
we concluded that, with respect to God’s perspective, the Amor is nothing but the 
creative power of God. The creative power of God is nothing but the formal essence of 
a thing when the thing is considered as a mode of God at the ontological level. With 
respect to a mode’s perspective, the Amor is its actual essence, its conatus, i.e. its power. 
When the conatus of a thing is restricted to men, Spinoza refers to the conatus as love 
when men have the corresponding knowledge. As shown in Chapter 4, the formal 
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essence and the actual essence are one and the same at the ontological level. As such, it 
is legitimate for us to say that the Amor is the nature of both passionate love and our 
love towards God, and both passionate love and our love towards God are the function 
of the Amor.  
  In short, Spinoza incorporates both the element of Eros and the element of Agape 
into his concept of love. Spinoza considers the element of Eros, which is embodied in 
his concept of both passionate love and our love towards God, as a property of love. 
This is coherent with Spinoza’s claim, in E5p19, that the lover who loves God cannot 
wish that God should love him in return given that the beloved in Eros is an unmoved 
object. At the same time, he considers the element of Agape, which is embodied in his 
concept of the Amor, as the nature of love. Given that Spinoza’s God is an immanent 
God, the Amor could also be considered an immanent Agape due to the lover and the 
beloved being one and the same in nature. Spinoza is trying to combine the element of 
Eros and the element of Agape together into his concept of love. In other words, 
Spinoza’s concept of love is coherent with immanent Agape in nature, i.e. the Amor, 
and is also coherent with Eros in function, i.e. both passionate love and our love towards 
God. As such, the Amor is the nature of both passionate love and our love towards God, 
and both passionate love and our love towards God are the functional expression of the 
Amor in practice. This conclusion explains both the problem of transition and the 
problem of cause to some degree. 
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8.3.3 The Amor as Man’s Self-cultivation in Practice 
In Section 8.3.2, I proposed that we need to change our pattern of thought in order to 
resolve the problems of the puzzle of the Amor, and I suggested that we need to transfer 
both the external/internal relationship of the problem of cause and the 
process/consequence relationship of the problem of transition to the functional/essential 
relationship. This transformation resolves both the problem of transition and the 
problem of cause to some degree. However, it does not relieve all of the tension that 
exits in the puzzle of the Amor, and it does not explain how the Amor, as the nature of 
love, is functionally expressed in the realm of Natura naturata. In this section, I argue 
that we need to change our pattern of thought even further. I argue that the functional 
expression is not static, but dynamic166. Moreover, this dynamic expression is embodied 
in two ways: as an upward practical process and, at the same time, as a downward 
practical process. 
(i) The Upward Practical Process 
I now want to explore the question of how a free man can arrive at the highest stage of 
life, i.e. the stage of the Amor. At this point, it will be helpful for us to understand 
Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor by seeing how Neo-Confucians deal with a similar 
problem. In Neo-Confucianism, there is a dispute over whether Jen in practice should 
be considered as graded love or universal love. This dispute is one of the enduring topics 
in the history of Chinese philosophy, and emerged in the classic era. 
                                                             
166 Den Uyl has a similar opinion (Den Uyl, 2008, p. 124). 
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  Universal love was proposed by Mo Tzu (墨子, 479 - 438 B.C.), the founder of 
Moism167. Moists believe in asceticism and utilitarianism, and propose the doctrine of 
universal love and the doctrine of non-war. Moist arguments for the doctrine of 
universal love are mainly established on the belief that the fulfillment of universal love 
will bring the most benefits to the whole of society.168  
  By contrast, Mencius believes that it is impossible for a man to love everyone equally 
because Jen, as love, should start with familial love. Mencius said that ‘[c]hildren 
carried in the arms all know to love their parents. As they grow, they all know to respect 
their elder brothers’ (the Book of Mencius, 7A: 15). Moreover, Mencius proposed that 
men should ‘[t]reat with respect the elders in [their] family, and then extend that respect 
to include the elders in other families. Treat with tenderness the young in [their] own 
family, and then extend that tenderness to include the young in other families’ (the Book 
of Mencius, 1A: 7).  
Even though the Moist doctrine of universal love was fiercely criticized by Mencius, 
it stimulated the development of the thought of universal love in Confucianism. Han Yu 
                                                             
167 What we know today about Mo Tzu is very limited. It is possible that Mo Tzu ‘was born before 
Confucius died and died before Mencius was born’ (Chan, 1963, p. 212). Moists also believe in the will 
of Tian (天志) rather than the mandate of Tian (天命), which Confucius proposed strongly. Moism 
rather than Taoism was the main rival of Confucianism until the beginning of the Han dynasty (Chan, 
1963, p. 211). However, even though Moism was successful as a social movement, as a kind of 
philosophy it is too shallow (Chan, 1963, p. 212). 
 
168 Unfortunately, there was almost no scholarly reviving of Moism in Chinese history until the 
emergence of Christianity in China. Some scholars find the similarity between Moism and Christianity 
not only in the thought of universal love but also in the thought of the will of Tian (correspondingly, the 




(韩愈 , 768-824), who inspired the revival of Confucianism in the Tang Dynasty, 
directly declared Jen as universal love (Chan, 1963, p. 454).  
  In the era of Neo-Confucianism, the dispute between graded love and universal love 
was settled through the theory of the functional/essential relationship. According to Chu, 
Jen should be considered universal love from the perspective of the essential realm, and 
it should also be considered to be graded love from the perspective of the functional 
realm in practice.  
  The notion of graded love has its roots in Confucius himself: according to Confucius, 
‘filial piety and brotherly respect are the root of Jen’ (the Analects: I, 2), and 
furthermore, ‘[t]o be able to judge of others by what is near in ourselves, this may be 
the method of achieving Jen’ (the Analects: VI, 28). If familial love is the root of Jen, 
then this implies that to love others outside of the family constitutes the branches of 
Jen. The analogy of the root and branches became a classical analogy to support the 
doctrine of graded love in the history of Confucianism. Wang rephrases Confucius’ 
analogy of the root and branches as follows: 
 
Take a tree, for example. When in the beginning it puts forth a shoot … After the 
shoot appears, the trunk grows. After the trunk grows, branches and leaves come 
and then the process of unceasing production and reproduction has begun. ... With 
the root the plant will grow. Without it the plant would die … The love between 
father and son and between elder and younger brothers is the starting point of the 
human mental spirit of life … From here it is extended to humaneness [Jen] to all 
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people and love to all things. (Chan, 1963, p. 676) 
 
Here Wang’s argument is a revival of Confucius’ analogy of the root and branches in 
the style of Neo-Confucianism. As with the growth of a tree, Jen as love operates in a 
gradational process in practice. As such, Jen should be considered as graded love rather 
than universal love. The problem with the Moist doctrine of universal love is that it has 
no starting point. Like a tree that does not sprout, Moist universal love is impossible in 
practice. The growth of Jen is due to the fact that it has a starting point, and is unceasing 
once there is growth (ibid.).  
  At the same time, Wang does not renounce the thought of universal love. On another 
occasion he warns that ‘root and branches should not be distinguished as two different 
things’, rather they are different parts of the same tree. Similarly, Jen is universal in 
nature (Chan, 1963, p. 663). This point is coherent with Chu’s thought. 
  In short, according to Neo-Confucianism, graded love is the starting point of Jen, 
and this initial stage cannot be skipped in practice, otherwise Jen is impossible. In a 
parallel way, I propose that, even though that the Amor is the highest level of love, 
passionate love is its necessary starting point. It is impossible to arrive at the stage of 
the Amor in practice without the practice of passionate love and our love towards 
God. The Amor is, in fact, a matter of practice. Consequently, passionate love, our 
love towards God, and the Amor form a gradational process in practice. This 
illustrates that the Amor is an upward practical process. The Amor as an upward 
practical process can be better understood through several points below. 
297 
 
  Firstly, it is not possible for us to entirely fulfil the Amor in our daily life. Given that 
the human Amor and the divine Amor are one and the same, this seems to imply that 
men can have the divine Amor completely. However, this is just an ideal conclusion. 
According to Spinoza’s metaphysics, it is impossible for men to completely acquire 
intuitive knowledge in practice. A man, as a mode of God, always lives in a vast causal 
network, in which a man is just a tiny piece of the matrix. A man has very limited power, 
and ‘is infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes’ (E4 Appendix 32, p. 362). 
Our power is not extensive enough for us to avoid all of the impact that external things 
exercise towards us. In other words, the level of intuitive knowledge that a man can 
manage to acquire is a matter of various degrees: a free man can fulfil whatever he can 
manage to practice at the maximal degree, whereas an ignorant man can exercise his 
knowledge only at the lowest degree. As such, no one can have the divine Amor 
completely owing to the fact that ‘we do not have absolute power to adapt to our 
purposes things external to us’ (E4 Appendix 32, p. 362). The freedom that we can gain 
through the Amor is relative, not absolute. The Amor, for men, is thus a matter of various 
degrees in practice. 
  Secondly, even though it is located at the lowest level of Spinoza’s classification of 
love, passionate love is not in itself bad, but good. According to E4p41, passionate 
love always produces the emotion of pleasure, through which our power is increased. 
Spinoza further confirms that ‘the more we are affected with pleasure, the more we 
pass to [a] state of greater perfection; that is, the more we necessarily participate in 
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the divine nature’ (E4p45 Scholium, p. 345). Fdti also points out that passionate love, 
‘in fact, greatly increases the periphery of world-exposure’ (Fdti, 1979, p. 441). 
  Finally, it is incorrect to understand Spinoza’s ethics in the stoic way. It was noted 
that Spinoza warns us that ‘the free man who lives among ignorant people tries as far 
as he can to avoid receiving favors from them’ (E4p70, p. 356). Spinoza also confirms 
that free men are always rare and the common people are always ignorant. As such, a 
hermit-style life withdrawn from society seems to be the better choice for a free man. 
It seems that Spinoza also lived like a hermit in his own life. Consequently, Goldstein 
believes that the fate of free men, ‘for Spinoza, is not to become insiders, but rather 
outsiders’ (Goldstein, 2006, p. 186).  
  However, this stoic explanation is a misunderstanding. Even if Spinoza warns us 
that the free man should avoid receiving favors from the ignorant as far as he can, in 
the same proposition he also emphasizes the fact that the ignorant ‘are still men, who 
in time of need can bring human help, than which nothing is more valuable’ (E4p70 
Scholium, p. 356). Furthermore, ‘[m]an is a God to man’ (E4p35 Scholium, p. 338)169. 
Spinoza confirms that ‘the principle of seeking our own advantage teaches us to be in 
close relationship with men’ (E4p37 Scholium 1, p. 340). With respect to Spinoza’s 
own situation, his hermit-style life is mainly due to his excommunication: this is 
passive consequence, not active choice. Even so, he had close relationships with the 
academic circle of his era, and was one of the memberships of the Collegiants. He had 
                                                             





good relationships with his landlord family and the local craftsmen from whom he 
received services in daily life. Fdti argues that ‘[o]ne who refuses immersion in 
affectional love and seeks to contemplate it dispassionately from the perspective of 
eternity can achieve autonomy only at the cost of impoverishment’ (Fdti, 1979, p. 
441). Den Uyl argues that ‘in the end Spinoza seeks not to … withdraw us from the 
world, nut exactly the opposite’ (Den Uyl, 2008, p. 81).  
  In short, Spinoza was not a genuine hermit. In the Ethics Spinoza recommends an 
ideal way of life as follows: 
 
Therefore, it is the part of a wise man to make use of things and to take pleasure 
in them as far as he can (but not to the point of satiety, for that is not taking 
pleasure). It is, I repeat, the part of a wise man to refresh and invigorate himself 
in moderation with good food and drink, as also with perfumes, with the beauty 
of blossoming plants, with dress, music, sporting activities, theaters, and the like, 
in which every man can indulge without harm to another. …. Therefore, of all 
ways of life, this is the best and is to be commended on all accounts. (E4p45 
Scholium, p. 345). 
 
Whatever Spinoza is recommending here is clearly opposed to the stoic interpretation 
of his ethics. A free man, for Spinoza, should actively embrace society rather than 
turning his back on it. 
  Now, our explanation of the Amor as an upward practical process can help us answer 
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a specific question: why does Spinoza refuse to formulate the cause in his standard 
definition in a general way, ‘a cause’, rather than in its specific way, ‘an external cause’? 
He chooses the general way in his definition of pleasure: he chooses a general word, 
‘transition’, to replace the specific word, ‘passive transition’, in order to accommodate 
both passionate love and our love towards God. It is clear that the problem of cause 
would not emerge if Spinoza were to formulate the cause in his standard definition of 
the concept of love as ‘a cause’. The Amor as an upward practical process provides us 
with a good reason to explain why Spinoza believed that his standard definition of the 
concept of love also applied to the Amor. I conclude that Spinoza’s purpose was to 
emphasize the external cause because passionate love is the unavoidable beginning of 
the development of the Amor in practice170. This conclusion resolves the problem of 
cause. 
(ii) The Downward Practical Process  
I now want to explore what the life of a free man looks like upon arrival at the stage 
of the Amor. Many scholars propose that the Amor should be considered only as a 
kind of intellectual enlightenment. They find strong contextual evidence as follows: 
 
                                                             
170 As shown in Section 2.2.2, Maxwell (1990) believes that when Spinoza developed his doctrine of 
love in Part 3 of the Ethics, the definition is particularly severed from passionate love. However, 
Spinoza forgot to revise the definition to finally accommodate the Amor. I cannot agree with Maxwell 




Therefore it is of the first importance in life to perfect the intellect, or reason, as 
far as we can, and the highest happiness or blessedness for mankind consists in 
this alone. … the final goal [of a man] … is that by which he is brought to an 
adequate conception of himself and of all things that can fall within the scope of 
his understanding. (E4 Appendix 4, p. 358) 
 
Here the highest happiness seems to be nothing but the enlightenment of the mind. 
According to Spinoza, there is no good or evil in nature, and our suffering derives 
from our surplus passion, which has its roots in our ignorance. Consequently, 
Spinoza’s remedy seems to be an intellectual therapy, and he suggest that we transfer 
our passive emotion into active emotion through rational knowledge and intuitive 
knowledge. As such, our freedom seems to depend completely on knowledge. As 
such, the ideal life seems to be a purely contemplative life. Many scholars have taken 
this explanation seriously. For example, Yovel considers Spinoza’s ‘salvation as 
mental transformation’, which is ‘the rational philosopher’s way of salvation, … and 
has no important meaning beyond it’ (Yovel, 1990, pp. 169-170). Rutherford (1999) 
also considers salvation as a state of mind. 
  I believe that this intellectualistic explanation does not grasp the whole meaning of 
Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor. The Amor should be understood as not only a mental 
joy at its highest level, but also as an activity in practice. In other words, the Amor 
refers to both the highest possible contentment in the mind and positive activity in 
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practice. With respect to this point, it will be helpful for us to become familiar with 
Wang’s doctrines of the unity of knowledge and action.  
  According to Wang’s doctrines of the unity of knowledge and action, knowledge is 
action and action is knowledge171. Wang argues that ‘knowledge is the direction for 
action and action the effort of knowledge, and that knowledge is the beginning of action 
and action the completion of knowledge’ (Chan, 1963, pp. 669-670). Sometimes Wang 
argues for his conclusion through experienced facts, for example: ‘[only] after one has 
experienced pain can one know pain’ (Chan, 1963, p. 669). Sometimes he argues for it 
through an appeal to man’s instinctual reactions, such as men’s instinctively loving 
beautiful colors and hating bad odors, which was discussed in the Great Learning. 
‘Seeing beautiful colors appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colors 
appertains to action’, and it is not the case that one first sees it and then makes up his 
mind to love it, rather than once he sees it he has already loved it (ibid.). Wang was the 
first person to directly identify knowledge with action in the history of Chinese 
philosophy172.  
                                                             
171 Wang’s knowledge here partly implies knowledge of the know-how variety, such as the knowledge 
of how to swim which comes from swimming, and the knowledge of archery which comes from the 
practice of archery (Cady 1928, p. 274). However, for Wang, knowledge is not limited to the know-how 
variety: there are other forms of knowledge, such as moral knowledge. For example, Wang argues that 
one could not be considered as having knowledge of filial piety unless one has practiced filial piety 
towards one’s parents (Chan, 1963, p. 669).  
 
172 The problem of practice is continually emphasized in the theory of knowledge in Confucianism. 
Chu says that the relationship between knowledge and action is like ‘a person who cannot walk without 
legs although he has eyes, and who cannot see without eyes although he has legs’. Chu believes that 
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  For Wang, to say that knowledge is action is, in fact, to say that intuitive knowledge 
has the instinctive power to act. Wang believes that knowledge is not dead but active: 
intuitive knowledge has the power to act in practice. According to Wang, the 
investigation of things is the way to rectify the mind, and our intuitive knowledge 
becomes clear and alive through such a rectification of the mind (which, ultimately, 
gets rid of selfish desires). The clear and alive intuitive knowledge forces us to practice 
it instinctively. Wang claims that if intuitive knowledge ‘orders us to go or to stop, to 
live or to die, we must go or stop, live or die. If the world says that we are insane in 
doing so, we can accept its censure and be at ease, because there is, as stated above, no 
other road for us to take’ (Iki, 1961, p. 29). To extend intuitive knowledge to things and 
affairs is the process of action, and conversely the process of action is also the process 
of practicing our intuitive knowledge of the mind. As such, Wienpahl concludes that 
‘knowing about certain things by reading is to be … a Confucian. Knowing by practice 
is to be a sage’ (Wienpahl, 1974, p. 215). 
  In a parallel way, we can see a similar thought in Spinoza. According to Spinoza’s 
definition, intuitive knowledge proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence 
of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things (E2p40 
Scholium 2, p. 267). In this definition, intuitive knowledge clearly refers to a downward 
process from God to a mode. Moreover, intuitive knowledge has a necessary connection 
with the Amor, since Spinoza claims that ‘from the third kind of knowledge there 
                                                             
‘knowledge comes firstly’ with respect to order and ‘action is more important’ with respect to 
importance (Chan, 1963, p. 609). 
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necessarily arises’ the Amor (E5p32 Corollary, p. 377). As shown in Section 8.2, sub 
specie aeternitatis, the Amor is the immanently creative power of God. Sub specie 
temporis, God’s immanent power is embodied in every individual thing. The Amor is 
the conatus, and the conatus is nothing but the actual essence of a thing. Consequently, 
from the combined perspective, the Amor should be understood as a downward fulfilled 
process of the nature of life, through which the power of God is embodied into a mode 
as its conatus.  
  Let us return to the example of Peter and Paul again. Paul’s intuitive knowledge of 
Peter refers to the formal nature of Peter. As shown in Chapter 4, this formal nature is 
also his actual nature. As shown in Section 8.2, Peter’s actual nature is his conatus. The 
essence of Peter is God’s power as expressed through Peter as a mode of God. God’s 
power as expressed through Peter as a mode of God could be considered to be the divine 
Amor towards Peter. Consequently, when Paul has intuitive knowledge of Peter, he has 
the divine Amor towards Peter which could be named Paul’s divine Amor towards Peter, 
and, in this situation, Paul, Peter, and God are fully unified. As such, God is Paul and 
Paul is God. Given the fact that Peter’s essence is the expression of the immanently 
creative power of God, Paul necessarily endeavors to fully bring about the fulfillment 
of Peter’s essence. How can we understand the process of Peter’s essence being 
completely fulfilled? This process means that Peter’s potential essence is completely 
fulfilled and Peter’s actual essence and Peter’s formal essence are completely united in 
practice. Peter finally becomes a free man. How does this process unfold? If Peter is a 
child of Paul, Paul should provide him the best familial and social environment, support 
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him in acquiring the best education, and make efforts to ensure that his potential talent 
is completely fulfilled. If Peter is a friend of Paul, Paul should provide whatever he can 
to help Peter. Either way, whoever Peter is, Paul should provide Peter with whatever he 
can and help Peter to fulfill his potential essence.  
  Paul’s divine Amor towards Peter is different from his passionate love towards Peter, 
and his passionate love towards Peter could transfer into an extreme hatred towards 
Peter. Paul’s divine Amor towards Peter is also different from his rational love towards 
Peter. Rational love depends on the common properties between Paul and Peter. With 
rational love Paul considers Peter as an independent object, and Paul believes that Peter 
and himself both have their own pursuits. Therefore, Paul is not in a position to love 
Peter unconditionally and unreservedly. When Paul has the divine Amor towards Peter, 
he loves him unconditionally and unreservedly and is even willing to sacrifice his own 
life if necessary. In a parallel way, Confucius also emphasized that, a man of Jen ‘will 
never seek to live at the expense of injuring the humanity [Jen], He would rather 
sacrifice his life in order to realize humanity’ (the Analects: XV, 8) 
  In other words, to acquire intuitive knowledge is to positively act in practice, through 
which the essence of a thing is completely fulfilled. Put simply, intuitive knowledge is 
action in practice. I am not alone in drawing this conclusion: Den Uyl argues that, for 
Spinoza, ‘[t]o know what is right is not to then do the right but to be doing the right, for 
the knowing and the doing would be simultaneous and coextensive’ (Den Uyl, 2008, p. 
51, italics in original). It is noteworthy that Den Uyl’s conclusion does not come from 
his exploration of Spinoza’s doctrine of intuitive knowledge or the doctrine of the Amor, 
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but rather from Spinoza’s general metaphysical and epistemological framework. Den 
Uyl’s insight enhances my conclusion that intuitive knowledge entails positive action 
in practice. Comparatively speaking, Wang publicly proposes the doctrine of the unity 
of knowledge and action, but Spinoza does not. However, in Spinoza’s doctrine of 
intuitive knowledge, what I see has the same implication. This implication was 
expressed in Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor. Since the Amor necessarily arises from 
intuitive knowledge, we can consider the Amor and intuitive knowledge as two aspects 
of the same thing: intuitive knowledge illustrates the aspect of knowledge and the Amor 
illustrates the aspect of action in practice. In short, the Amor entails the downward 
practical process. 
  Finally, we cannot say that a free man only practices the upward process in the 
beginning stage and the downward process in the final stage. Rather, we should 
understand the Amor as a process in a dialectical way173: the upward practical process 
and the downward practical process are one and the same, and it is a dynamic process. 
Furthermore, the upward practical explanation could be considered as the perspective 
of sub specie temporis towards the process. The element of Eros in his concept of love 
is embodied in this process. The downward practical explanation could also be 
considered as the perspective of sub specie aeternitatis towards the process. The 
element of Agape in his concept of love is embodied in this process. The dialectical 
explanation could also be considered as the combined perspective towards the process 
                                                             
173 Jonas (1965), Fdti (1979) and Den Uyl (2008) all argue that Spinoza’s philosophy should somehow 
be understood dialectically (Jonas, 1965, p. 56; Fdti, 1979, p. 441; Den Uyl, 2008, p. 125). However, 
none of them focuses on the doctrine of the Amor. 
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in practice. As such, the element of Eros and the element of Agape are united. This is 
another reason to claim that Spinoza incorporates both the element of Eros and the 
element of Agape into his concept of love. During this dialectical process, the transition 
of the mind to a state of greater perfection is its basic characteristic. I conclude that 
Spinoza’s purpose is to emphasize the process of transition, because the Amor always 
unfolds in a dialectical process in practice. This conclusion resolves the problem of 
transition.  
  To summarize, a free man in daily life always practices a dynamic process in a 
dialectical way. This is not different from a sage in Neo-Confucianism who practices 
his self-cultivation in daily life. Tu concludes that Wang’s doctrine of the unity of 
knowledge and action ‘denotes the identity of a dynamic process rather than the unity 
of two static concepts…[s]pecifically it refers to the creative way of how to become a 
sage.’ (Tu, 1973, p. 195). As such, a free man, as Spinoza endeavors to become, is 






Research concerning Spinoza’s doctrine of the Amor has been lacking until now, and 
this thesis is the first systematical investigation. Here I will summarize our discussion 
and draw my overall conclusion.  
9.1 The Argument for the Parallelism 
As a Neo-Confucian approach to the puzzle of the doctrine of the Amor, firstly I have 
proposed that there is a parallel relationship between Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza’s 
philosophy. This parallelism provides us with a firm basis for my Neo-Confucian 
approach. 
  The parallelism embodies all of the three main aspects: the metaphysical aspect, the 
epistemological aspect, and the ethical aspect. 
  With respect to the metaphysical aspect, the parallelism was revealed in four 
important ways in Chapter 3. As shown in Section 3.2, the first way refers to the 
metaphysical frameworks of Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza, and the main concepts 
within those frameworks. The Ultimate Reality of Neo-Confucianism is Tian and the 
Ultimate Reality of Spinoza is God. They both have two realms and two aspects (the 
bodily aspect and the mental aspect). Table 6 lists the parallelism of the two realms of 






Ultimate Reality / Tian (天) Ultimate Reality / God (substance) 
The essential realm (The Great Ultimate) Natura naturans (The intellect of God) 
The functional realm (The myriad things) Natura naturata (Individual things) 
Table 6 A Comparison of the Two Realms. 
 
They are both considered to have two realms: the essential realm and the functional 
realm in Neo-Confucianism, and Natura naturans and Natura naturata for Spinoza.  
  As shown in Section 3.3, the second way refers to the bodily aspect. Table 7 lists the 
parallelism of the bodily aspect as follows: 
 
Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
Ch’i (气) Extension (Attribute) 
Yin and Yang (阴阳) / Five Elements (五行) Motion and Rest (Infinite mode) 
physical form (形体) The body (Finite mode) 
Table 7 A Comparison of the Bodily Aspect. 
 
The concept of Ch’i in Neo-Confucianism and the concept of the attribute of Extension 
in Spinoza are parallel since Tian and God are both identical with Nature in their own 
way, and both Neo-Confucians and Spinoza deny the theory of atomism.  
  As shown in Section 3.4, the third way refers to the mental aspect. Table 8 lists the 




Table 8 A Comparison of the Mental Aspect. 
 
Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza each have the rationalistic dimension as the dominant 
dimension. Moreover, Neo-Confucians and Spinoza have the same thoughts concerning 
the isomorphism of the bodily aspect and the mental aspect in the functional realm. 
Both Neo-Confucians and Spinoza believe that the mental element permeates 
everything throughout the universe.  
  In addition to the parallels of contents above, there is also the parallel of perspectives. 
As shown in Section 3.5, both Neo-Confucians and Spinoza deploy different 




BenTi (本体) (The essential realm)  sub specie aeternitatis (Natura naturans) 
Yong (用) (The functional realm) sub specie temporis (Natura naturata) 
Table 9 A Comparison of the perspectives of the two realms. 
 
Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
Li (理) Thought (Attribute) 
The Li of Tian (天理) The idea of God (Infinite mode) 
The Li of a thing (事理) The idea of a thing (Finite mode) 
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Neo-Confucians have the perspectives of both BenTi and Yong, and Spinoza has the 
perspectives of both sub specie aeternitatis and sub specie temporis. Both Neo-
Confucians and Spinoza deploy these two different perspectives to observe the same 
Ultimate Reality respectively. Further, they both deploy a combined perspective to 
observe Ultimate Reality. The combined perspective is the key to understanding the 
puzzles that we have encountered in all of the three important aspects of this thesis. For 
Neo-Confucianism, the combined perspective closely links with the concept of the Li 
of Tian, and for Spinoza it closely links with the concept of the idea of God. 
  To turn to the epistemological aspect, as shown in Chapter 5, Wang’s concept of 
intuitive knowledge and Spinoza’s concept of intuitive knowledge are parallel. Wang 
advocates an idealistic approach towards his epistemology. Wang’s doctrine of intuitive 
knowledge is at the core of his epistemology. In a parallel way, Spinoza also advocates 
an idealistic approach towards his epistemology and intuitive knowledge is also at the 
core of his own epistemology. To turn to the ethical aspect, as shown in Chapter 7, the 
Confucian concept of Jen and Spinoza’s concept of the Amor are parallel.  
  To summarize, the parallelism is impressive. Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza are not 
merely superficially similar to each other. We observed that their metaphysical aspects 
(their frameworks of metaphysics and the main concepts within those frameworks), 
epistemological aspects, and ethical aspects, are all in parallel. However, we should 
avoid claiming that they are identical to each other as they are not: they were developed 
in totally different cultures at different times.  
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9.2 The Puzzle of the Doctrine of the Eternity of the Mind and Its Solution 
As shown in Chapter 2, in order to understand the doctrine of the Amor we have to fully 
understand the doctrine of the eternity of the mind and the doctrine of intuitive 
knowledge. With respect to the doctrine of the eternity of the mind, as shown in Section 
4.1, there are two main problems: the problem of isomorphism and the problem of 
duration.  
  Firstly, Spinoza claims that the order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things in E2p7, and this has been interpreted as the creed of 
isomorphism between the mind and the body by Spinoza scholars. In contrast, Spinoza 
claims, in E5p23, that the mind is in some sense eternal whereas the body can be 
destroyed. How can the doctrine of the eternity of the mind be reconciled with the 
notion of isomorphism between the mind and the body? This is the problem of 
isomorphism.  
  Moreover, Spinoza seems to make some conflicting statements during his discussion 
of the concept of eternity. Spinoza confirms, in E1 Definition 8 and in E5p23 Scholium, 
that eternity cannot be explicated through duration or time, even if duration is conceived 
as without beginning and end. However, before commencing the discussion of his last 
three doctrines, Spinoza reminds us, in E5p20 Scholium, that he will be concerned with 
the duration of the mind without respect to the body. Moreover, in E5p23 Scholium, 
Spinoza asserts that we feel and experience that we are eternal. How can we have the 
experience of eternity when eternity cannot be explicated through duration? This is the 
problem of duration.  
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  While the problem of isomorphism refers to the possibility of the eternity of the mind, 
the problem of duration refers to the nature of that eternity. These two problems are 
entangled with each other, and constitute the puzzle of Spinoza’s doctrine of the eternity 
of the mind. 
  I have proposed that, in a similar fashion to the case of Li as eternal and Ch’i as 
mortal in Neo-Confucian rationalism, the relationship between the mind and the body 
in Spinoza’s philosophy is variable with respect to the perspective on Ultimate Reality 
that one adopts. The mind is not separate from the body sub specie temporis. What is 
eternal in mind is the formal essence of a thing sub specie aeternitatis. From the 
combined perspective, the formal essence of the mind is eternal and the body is mortal, 
and this point answers the problem of isomorphism. Moreover, Spinoza employs sub 
specie temporis in some places, and sub specie aeternitatis in other places. This is the 
reason that some conflicting statements occur in the text. This point answers the 
problem of duration. It is reasonable to say both that the mind is eternal and that we can 
feel and experience the eternity of the mind in terms of the combined perspective.  
  Ultimate Reality is one and the same, and the formal essence and the actual essence 
of the mind are one and the same in the ontological sense. This conclusion provides us 
with an important ontological basis from which to resolve the puzzle of the doctrine of 





9.3 The Puzzle of the Doctrine of Intuitive Knowledge and Its Solution 
To turn to the epistemological aspect, as shown in Chapter 6, Spinoza’s doctrine of 
intuitive knowledge has the problem of possibility. When Spinoza says that a cognitive 
subject has the knowledge of a ‘thing’, the ‘thing’ does not refer directly to an external 
cognitive object but to an image in which the cognitive object is presented and with 
which the cognitive subject is itself involved. This is similar to Wang’s definition of a 
‘thing’ as the event towards which the will is directed. In a parallel way, Spinoza’s 
defines the ‘image’ as an event in which the cognitive subject and the cognitive object 
are both involved but whose essence is a modification of the body of the cognitive 
subject. If intuitive knowledge refers to the essence of a thing, it refers to the essence 
of the cognitive subject firstly, rather than to the essence of the cognitive object. In the 
example of Peter and Paul, Paul’s idea of Peter only indicates the constitution of Paul’s 
body rather than the nature of Peter. 
  In contrast, according to Spinoza, intuitive knowledge refers to knowledge of the 
essence of the cognitive object. The essence of a thing is that which makes the thing 
what it is, and without which the thing cannot come into existence. The essences of 
things are different from each other, since otherwise they would be the same thing. This 
seems to imply that intuitive knowledge, as the essence of the cognitive object, would 
not be accessible for the cognitive subject. In the example of Peter and Paul, Peter’s 
essence is unique, and Paul’s essence is unique. How could Paul have intuitive 
knowledge of Peter’s essence? This is the problem of possibility. 
  The only way to resolve the problem of possibility is to affirm that intuitive 
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knowledge of the cognitive subject is identical with the idea of God. In a similar fashion 
to Wang’s doctrine that intuitive knowledge is identical with the Li of Tian in Neo-
Confucianism, I have proposed that intuitive knowledge is also identical with the idea 
of God for Spinoza. Sub specie aeternitatis, it is easy to see that intuitive knowledge is 
identical with the idea of God since God only has intuitive knowledge.  
  Sub specie temporis, once we have intuitive knowledge of a cognitive object, we, in 
fact, know God in the way that God is expressed as the cognitive object. We would 
know God in a great many ways if we possess intuitive knowledge of a great many 
things. Therefore, the more we understand particular things, the more we understand 
God. The more we have intuitive knowledge, the more we know God. We know God 
in a maximal degree when we have intuitive knowledge in a maximal degree. In the 
example of Peter and Paul, the idea of Peter as the essence of Peter exists because in 
God there is an idea of Peter. The idea of Peter is a mode of the idea of God, and the 
idea of God incorporates the idea of Peter. When Paul has intuitive knowledge of Peter, 
Paul’s mind must incorporate the idea of Peter. In the same way, any external object 
exists because in God there is an idea of the external object, which is derived from the 
idea of God. Paul’s mind must incorporate the idea of the cognitive object when Paul 
has intuitive knowledge of this cognitive object. The more intuitive knowledge Paul 
has, the more Paul’s mind is similar to the idea of God. Following this pattern, the mind 
of Paul becomes more and more similar to the idea of God.  
  From the combined perspective, as shown in Section 3.5, Natura Naturans and 
Natura Naturata are unified through the idea of God in a metaphysical sense. As shown 
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in Section 5.3.2, intuitive knowledge is the knowledge that unifies Natura Naturans 
and Natura Naturata in an epistemological sense. Therefore, it is natural to conclude 
that intuitive knowledge is identical with the idea of God in an epistemological sense. 
Spinoza believes that we remain in God, and God remains in us. Spinoza’s God is an 
immanent God, and to say that God remains in us is to say that the idea of God remains 
in us. The idea of God that remains in us is nothing but the mind’s intuitive knowledge. 
If intuitive knowledge is identical with the idea of God, the problem of possibility can 
be dismissed. 
  Furthermore, intuitive knowledge will be the actual essence of the mind itself if the 
mind has intuitive knowledge of oneself. As such, intuitive knowledge of the actual 
essence of the mind is also the formal essence of the mind, and intuitive knowledge is 




9.4 The Puzzle of the Doctrine of the Amor and Its Solution 
To turn to the ethical aspect, as shown in Chapter 2, there are three problems 
constituting the puzzle of the doctrine of the Amor: the problem of nature, the problem 
of cause and the problem of transition. Firstly, given Spinoza’s anti-anthropomorphic 
rationalism, in which Spinoza’s God is not a personal God and Nature is his other name, 
there is the problem concerning how the concept of love is applied to God himself. This 
is the problem of nature. 
  In Section 8.3, I pointed out that, with respect to the perspective of the essential realm, 
the concept of Jen and the concept of the Amor have their corresponding concepts: the 
power of the Great Ultimate in Neo-Confucianism and the power of God in Spinoza; 
with respect to the perspective of the functional realm, the concept of Jen and the 
concept of the Amor have their corresponding concepts: the spirit of life in Neo-
Confucianism and conatus in Spinoza; with respect to men, they all have the 











Table 11 A comparison between the concept of Jen and the concept of the Amor. 
 
Sub specie aeternitatis, the Amor is the creative power of God. Spinoza founds the 
concept of the Amor upon the concept of the self-caused. The concept of the self-caused 
is the ontological foundation of the concept of the Amor as the creative power of God. 
According to the concept of the self-caused, God’s creation is not transcendental but 
immanent. The creative power of God is not a transcendental power but an immanent 
power. This immanent power is itself embodied in every individual thing.  
  Sub specie temporis, the Amor is the conatus of everything, and the conatus is 
nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. Therefore, the conatus is the 
expression of God’s immanent creative power in Natura naturata. With respect to men, 
the conatus is the nature of love. As such, the problem of nature can be dismissed. 
  The conatus is the actual essence of a thing, and the fact that the Amor refers to the 
 Neo-Confucianism Spinoza 
 Jen The Amor 
The perspective of the 
essential realm / Natura 
naturans 
The power of the Great 
Ultimate 
The power of God 
The perspective of the 
functional realm / Natura 
naturata 
The spirit of life Conatus 
Men’s perspective Love Love 
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conatus reveals that the Amor refers to the unified process of the actual essence and the 
formal essence in ethical practice. This point further helps us to resolve both the 
problem of cause and the problem of transition.  
  With respect to the problem of cause, on the one hand, Spinoza insists on citing his 
standard definition of the concept of love in the discussion of his three kinds of love; 
on the other hand, Spinoza changes the causal part in his definitions of the three kinds 
of love in subtle ways. With respect to the problem of transition, on the one hand, love 
refers to the transition of the mind to a state of greater perfection. On the other hand, 
the Amor does not refer to a transitional process, but to abiding at the highest stage of 
perfection. After the clarification in Section 8.3.1, both the problem of cause and the 
problem of transition threaten the concept of the Amor, but they do not pose any threat 
to the concept of passionate love or our love towards God. This situation is clearly listed 
in Table 12: 
 
Table 12 The relationship between the problem of cause / the problem of transition 
and Spinoza’s three kinds of love. 
 
According to the table above, it is clear that the nature of both the problem of cause and 
 The problem of cause The problem of transition 
Passionate love O O 
our love towards God O O 
The Amor X X 
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the problem of transition concerns the relationship between the Amor and the other two 
kinds of love. If this is an external/internal relationship then I believe that the problem 
of cause will not be solvable due to the fact that an internal cause is always opposed by 
an external cause, which belongs to Spinoza’s standard definition of love. This leads us 
into a deadlock given that Spinoza insists on using his standard formula when defining 
the three kinds of love. I have proposed that we should change our pattern of thought 
in order to resolve the two problems above. 
  As shown in Section 7.1, for Neo-Confucianism, Jen is the character of the mind and 
the Li of love. In other words, Jen is the nature of love. At the same time, love is 
considered the functional expression of Jen. In a parallel way, according to my reading, 
for Spinoza, the external/internal relationship, which the problem of cause seems to be 
entailed by, can be understood as being the functional/essential relationship. Once we 
see it as the functional/essential relationship rather than the external/internal 
relationship, the problem of cause disappears to some degree. Following the same logic, 
the process/consequence relationship in the problem of transition can also be 
understood as being the functional/essential relationship.  
  According to my reading in Section 8.3.2, Spinoza incorporates both the element of 
Eros and the element of Agape into his concept of love. He considers the element of 
Eros, which is embodied in both his concepts of passionate love and our love towards 
God, as a property of love. At the same time, he considers the element of Agape, which 
is embodied in his concept of the Amor, as the nature of love. Spinoza is trying to 
combine the element of Eros and the element of Agape together into his concept of love. 
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As such, Spinoza’s concept of love is coherent with immanent Agape in nature, i.e. the 
Amor, and is also coherent with Eros in function, i.e. passionate love and our love 
towards God. In short, the Amor is the nature of both passionate love and our love 
towards God, and both passionate love and our love towards God are the functional 
expressions of the Amor. This conclusion explains both the problem of transition and 
the problem of cause to some degree. 
  Moreover, the functional/essential relationship is unfolding in a dynamic process, 
and this is my dynamistic reading in Section 8.3.3. Further, this dynamic process 
unfolds in two ways: in an upward practical process and a downward practical process. 
According to the upward dynamistic explanation, I conclude that Spinoza’s purpose is 
to emphasize the external cause in the standard definition of the concept of love, 
because passionate love with an external cause is the unavoidable beginning of the 
development of the Amor. This explanation fully resolves the problem of cause. 
Following this explanation, it is wrong to understand Spinoza’s ethics in the stoic way. 
Spinoza is not attempting to withdraw from society in his ethical theory. This upward 
dynamistic explanation could be considered as the perspective of sub specie temporis 
towards the process in practice. The element of Eros in Spinoza’s doctrine of love could 
be considered to be embodied in this process. 
  According to the downward dynamistic explanation, Spinoza’s intuitive knowledge 
entails action in practice. As such, the Amor is not merely the tranquility of mind. It is 
wrong to see Spinoza’s salvation as mere mental enlightenment. Then, an ideal life is 
not a purely contemplative life. This downward dynamistic explanation could also be 
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considered as the perspective of sub specie aeternitatis towards the process in 
practice. The element of Agape in Spinoza’s doctrine of love could be considered to 
be embodied in this process. 
  Further, we should understand this process in the proper dialectical way: the upward 
practical process and the downward practical process are one and the same, and it is 
simply the way in which the wise practically pursue the Amor in daily life. This 
dialectical explanation could also be considered as the combined perspective towards 
the process in practice. Both the elements of Eros and Agape could be considered to be 
united in this dialectical process. I conclude that Spinoza’s purpose is to emphasize the 
process of transition, because the Amor always unfolds in a dialectical process of daily 
life, and the wise can always gain a greater perfection in practice through self-
cultivation. An ideal life which always abides in the highest happiness is not possible 
in practice. This explanation fully resolves the problem of transition. As such, a free 
man, as Spinoza endeavors to become, is equivalent to a Neo-Confucian sage.  
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9.5 Potential Future Research Areas  
I hope to have established a new, cross-cultural approach to Spinoza scholarship which 
bridges his philosophy with Neo-Confucianism. Three potential areas could be further 
developed in the future.  
The first area concerns some specific issues in relation to Neo-Confucianism and 
Spinoza. For example, the relationship between the Neo-Confucian doctrine of Yin and 
Yang and Spinoza’s doctrine of Motion and Rest can be explored further. According to 
Neo-Confucianism, Yang is motion and Yin is rest. The parallel between the concept of 
Yin and Yang and the concept of Motion and Rest is, then, obvious. However, the details 
of the relationship between them are more complicated. For example, the distinctive 
ratio of motion and rest could be used as an individual identity, a notion that Spinoza 
mainly inherits from Descartes. However, a similar notion is absent in Neo-
Confucianism. For Confucianism, the doctrine of Yin and Yang hangs mainly on 
metaphysics, and its connection with physical science is lacking. Could such 
comparative research revive the doctrine of Yin and Yang in the light of modern physical 
science?  
  The second area concerns tackling certain topics in Neo-Confucianism by borrowing 
insights from Spinoza’s philosophy. For example, research into Neo-Confucian 
political philosophy could benefit from incorporating Spinoza’s insights concerning 
democratic societies, which is Spinoza’s specialised area. In Neo-Confucianism, there 
are some resources that could be used as the foundation of the development of a 
democratic society. Such as, Chu’s thought that Li is One but its manifestations are 
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Many implies that everyone is equal in nature. Furthermore, Wang’s doctrine of 
intuitive knowledge entails the possibility of individual liberation, since every 
individual can make their own decisions following their own intuitive knowledge. 
However, these thoughts of equality and liberation in Confucianism did not develop 
into a matured political philosophy of democratic societies. Spinoza developed his 
political philosophy in his TP, and its main spirit is in accordance with modern 
democratic societies. Given the parallelism between Neo-Confucianism and Spinoza, 
there is a space for Neo-Confucianism scholars to carry out such comparative research. 
  The third area concerns tackling certain topics in Spinoza’s philosophy with the aid 
of relevant Neo-Confucian insights. For example, research into Spinoza’s moral theory 
could benefit from incorporating insights from the Neo-Confucian moral theory of self-
cultivation, an area which Neo-Confucians have greatly developed. As shown in 
Chapter 8, Spinoza’s ethical theory entails the necessity of self-cultivation. However, 
Spinoza did not sufficiently unfold his discussion of self-cultivation. Consequently, 
there exists fertile ground for Spinoza scholars to carry out such comparative research. 
  Cross-culture comparative research is always difficult, but its fruits are rich. In the 
beginning of my research, I only had in my mind the similarity between the concept of 
Jen and the concept of the Amor. Now in this final stage, I have seen an impressive 
parallelism of all three main aspects, and I myself am surprised by this result. It seems 
fitting to use Spinoza’s last sentence in his Ethics as the end of my thesis: ‘All things 
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